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Abstract 
 
Images of war and discourses around armed conflict and militarisation are subject to continuous 
reconstruction and representations based on past and present events (Palmary 2003).  
Discourses therefore, do not describe the world neutrally but rather classify it, revealing some 
aspects of social reality while concealing others (Parker 1992). This is true when exploring 
women’s lived experience in conflict and times of militarised nationalism. Women are constantly 
represented as victims or perpetrators, little recognising that women play multiple roles, 
depending on their situations, positionality and intersecting identities.  
 
This thesis explores the effect of conflict and militarisation on women’s lives taking a participatory 
action research approach to gathering and analysing the narratives of Sri Lankan women 
belonging to the Tamil, Sinhala, Muslim and Burgher communities living in Sri Lanka and in exile 
in the UK.  It aims to uncover how women accommodate, participate or resist relations with 
militarised national liberation movements and what happens to women who accept and/or resist 
militarism and violence and decide to go into exile as a result of their activism/resistance. 
     
Key themes that emerged from the women’s narratives include gender based violence, 
constructions of womanhood and sexuality, women as actors of violence, women’s political 
agency within militarism, women’s resistance to violence and militarism, forced migration, and 
post conflict reconstruction. 
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The findings reveal that women’s experiences are not homogenous and that conflict and violence 
impact in different ways depending on their different and inter-relatied identities and positionalities.  
While some women become victims of humiliation, gender based violence and human right 
abuses, there are other women who resist militarism and violence and become activists for 
change at micro level and at times at a macro level, for example, active political/public 
participation leading to change.  The thesis is concluded with an overview of the challenges that 
Sri Lanka will face in a post conflict situation with suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
WOMEN AND CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the effect of conflict and militarisation on women’s lives taking a participatory 
action research approach drawing upon the narratives of Sri Lankan women belonging to the 
Tamil, Sinhala, Muslim and Burgher communities living in Sri Lanka and in exile in the UK.  It aims 
to uncover how women accommodate, participate or resist relations with militarised national 
liberation movements and what happens to women who accept and/or resist militarism and 
violence and decide to go into exile as a result of their activism/resistance. 
     
Key themes that emerged from the women’s narratives include gender based violence, 
constructions of womanhood and sexuality, women as actors of violence, women’s political 
agency within militarism, women’s resistance to violence and militarism, forced migration, and 
post conflict reconstruction that has been discussed throughout the thesis. 
 
The findings reveal that women’s experiences are not homogenous and that conflict and violence 
impact in different ways depending on women’s different and inter-relatied identities and  
positionalities.  While some women become victims of humiliation, gender based violence and 
human right abuses there are other women who resist militarism and violence and become 
activists for change at micro level and at times at a macro level, for example, active political/public 
participation leading to change.   
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Socio-political Context 
Militarised conflict and political repression have a dramatic and disproportionate impact on women 
and girls (hereafter referred to as women), seriously threatening their security and human rights. 
Evidence of the abuse and exploitation of women are frequent across conflict zones, including 
Darfur, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sri Lanka. Militarised conflict in Sri Lanka is the main 
focus of this thesis.  Despite agreements and resolutions such as the United Nations Resolution 
1325, Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) and many more, violence against women 
continue (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch).  Testimonies across conflict zones reveal 
the violence, threats and intimidation women face at the hands of armed groups, own 
communities, families (Coomaraswamy 1998, 1999, 2005) and peace keeping forces who are 
assigned with civilian protection.  
 
Women are not only targets of sexual violence and human right abuses; they also face 
discrimination when seeking justice due to various cultural and religious practices and gender 
relations that exists in the societies in which they live.  The stigma attached to sexual violence in 
many societies prevents women from reporting the violence they undergo. 
 
Even when women gather courage and report crimes of sexual violence, their subordinate 
position in society prevents them from receiving equal treatment.  Under the Hudood Ordinance in 
Pakistan, the country’s religious-based laws, a woman reporting rape is compelled to produce four 
witnesses to the crime or face charges of adultery (Feministing.com accessed 17/10/07).  In Sri 
Lanka rape within marriage is recognised only if the spouses are living under judicial separation 
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making it difficult for women to get redress if they are faced with marital rape (Truth behind Sri 
Lanka’s Gender development accessed 15/07/2006). 
  
Additionally, threats and intimidation by the perpetrators who are often members of security 
forces, militia, gangs, or persons of power and authority (family/political/economical/religious or 
cultural) equally contribute to women’s fear and reluctance to report sexual crimes to the 
authorities.  Further the breakdown of the legal and judiciary services during conflict  
accompanied by the lack of medical care due to the closure of hospitals, breakdown in transport 
systems that prevent women getting to the limited health centres and financial difficulties to pay 
for medication and transport makes it more difficult for women to get justice for the violence they 
face. 
 
The failure of governments and the legal system to prosecute offenders particularly when they are 
members of security forces or receive political patronage encourage the continuation of violence.  
There are many instances in Sri Lanka where security personnel accused of sexual violence have 
gone unpunished.  Regular reports by humanitarian agencies (Human Rights Watch 2002) on 
other parts of the world confirm that this is a reality of conflict across the globe (Accord 2005).  
 
As evident in the north of Sri Lanka and in Chapter Eight (page 234), women also become subject 
to abuse and exploitation in relief/refugee camps (Amnesty International 2007) and in exile.   
Economic hardships, breakdown of social structures and threats to personal security during 
conflict directly contribute to the exploitation of women exposing them to multiple vulnerabilities 
(Coomaraswamy 2005; Taper 2006).  Added to this is the recruitment of women into non-state 
armies as in Sri Lanka (discussed in Chapter Five page 120), Nepal (Taper 2006) and Chechnya 
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(Sjoberg & Gentry 2007) that raises several questions of the status of women returning from 
combat. 
 
Traditionally armed conflict is treated as a masculine activity, carried out by men, whether as state 
armed forces, para military groups, non state military groups or peace-keeping forces (Enloe 
1993, 1989; Pankhurst 2003). This narrow perspective can produce a simplistic division of gender 
roles in conflict: men as the protectors (in defence of the nation, women and children), and women 
as victims, particularly of sexual abuse and forced abduction (Kelly 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997).  
Even where men are victims, the tendency is to represent them as heroes (Burguieres 1990) who 
die for their country/people.  Similar to this is the idea that relates women to peace (passivity).  
The belief that women are peace loving and caring has meant that women’s efforts in building 
peace are viewed as an extension of their gender roles, rather than part of a political process. For 
example in Sri Lanka when women organised to resist state violence in the late 80’s, the political 
powers appealed to them as mothers rather than political agents (See more details in Chapter 
Seven on the Mothers Front page 208).  Often women’s contribution to peace is ignored and they 
are excluded from peace negotiations and post conflict reconstruction when and after peace deals 
are signed (Cockburn 1998).   Associating women with peace and passivity also ignores women’s 
ability to commit violence and violent women are labelled as “mad or bad” rather than 
acknowledging their ability to engage in violence (Sjoberg & Gentry 2007). 
 
Analyses of violent conflict in recent years have extended to take into account women’s human 
rights in relation to gender based violence (GBV) (Bunch & Carrillo 1992). These studies have 
also looked at the vulnerability of internally displaced or refugee women as victims of war (Wallace 
1993; Benjamin and Fancy 1998) and women’s testimonies of their experiences of conflict 
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(Turshe and Twagiramariya 1998). Similarly there are studies, which explore men’s experiences 
as victims of abuse during conflict, as refugees or displaced persons (Ruddick 1998; British 
Medical Foundation 2000), opening up a debate of men and women’s agency during conflict, 
national liberation struggles and political repression. 
 
Therefore, at a time where women are increasingly affected by ethno-national conflicts (Kashmir, 
Estimore, Chechnya) and are being incorporated into military movements in multiple and 
contradictory ways, it is important to understand women’s diverse experiences during militarised 
conflict if prevention and harm minimisation strategies are to be developed to avoid further 
atrocities such as the mass rape in Congo, Rwanda, Liberia and Bosnia. The implementation of 
such strategies will only be successful if policy makers take into account how military, political and 
social movements influence gender identities and how these newly formed intersecting identities 
impact on women’s lives during and after conflict.  Using the case of Sri Lanka based on the 
available literature and the evidence gathered from the field work, this thesis aims to uncover the 
impact of violent conflict and nationalism on women.  
 
Sri Lankan Case 
There is a large volume of studies on the ethnic and political dimensions of the Sri Lankan conflict, 
its historical background and current developments (Bullion 2006; Chandraprepma 1991; 
Goodhand 2005; Gunaratna 1997). The humanitarian and human rights crisis has also received 
much attention due to international agencies such as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, and UNHCR to name but a few working in the country.  This has been complemented by 
academic and feminist scholarship that have taken advantage of the myriad of opportunities 
presented for analysing various gender dimensions such as women’s human rights 
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(Coomaraswamy 1998), women’s changing role (De Alwis 1998; 2002), Tamil women’s militancy 
(Alison 2003, 2004; Balasingham 1983 Sornrajah 2004) and women’s peace movement (Samuel 
2006). 
 
In the context of the available literature and recognising that any conflict must be understood 
within its historical context (Palmary 2003) the work of Chandraprema (1991); Gunaratna (1997, 
1998); Piyadasa (1984); Rupasinghe (eds 2006);and Zakaiya & Shanmugaratnam (accessed 
2005) have been reviewed to map key historical events that  led to the development of 
Tamil/Sinhala militancy.   
 
The exploration of women’s experience within nationalism and militarism in Sri Lanka raises the 
following key themes: gender based violence (GBV), constructions of womanhood and sexuality, 
women as actors of violence, women’s political agency within militarism, women’s resistance to 
violence and militarism and forced migration.  The work of De Mel (2001) De Alwis (1998, 2002) 
and Jayewardene (1986, 1987) address the issues of women and nationalism in colonial and post 
colonial Sri Lanka. The work of Alison (2003, 2004); Balasingham (1983, 1993); Coomaraswamy 
(1996), Gonsalves (2007) Sornarajah (2004) and Thambiah (2005) explores Tamil Women’s 
militancy and seeks to understand how Tamil women have been incorporated into nationalist 
militarism in post independent Sri Lanka.  
 
While the work of Balasingham (1983, 1990, 1993, 2001) contribute to an understanding of the 
women combatants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) it is essential to point out that 
her work is not a critical analysis of the LTTE women but work carried out in her capacity as the 
wife of LTTE spokesperson Anton Balasingham.  However, she has shed light on the lives of the 
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LTTE women combatant by living alongside of these women in the camps and therefore, her work 
can be a valuable source in understanding the lives of LTTE women combatants.  
 
Despite the large number of academic and feminist interventions, my review of the available 
literature reveals that there is a gap in knowledge about the diverse experience of women during 
conflict taking into account their intersecting identities.  It became clear in the process of 
examining the literature that if the effect of militarised ethnic conflict on women is to be understood 
in-depth, then research would have to look at women not as a homogenous group but to study 
their multiple layered identities in situations of conflict.   For example, a large proportion of Sri 
Lankan women who have entered into inter-ethnic marriages are identified with their husband’s 
ethnicity rather than the ethnic group they were born to and therefore, these women’s experience 
of the conflict can differ from time to time depending on their perceived ethnicity. 
  
Similarly it is also essential that any study exploring the impact of conflict on women take into 
account the lived experience of women who are forced to flee the country. This is due to the 
understanding (Castles 2003; O’Neill 2002, 2004) that forced migration is complex and 
experiences in the places of origin can impact on women’s lived experience and identity formation 
even in exile. This research has identified (Chapter Eight page 234) that women’s lived 
experience in exile can equally have an impact on the lives of women in the place of origin. 
 
The reasons for this lack of research on women across ethnic groups and in exile in relation to Sri 
Lanka can be attributed to many reasons including: a)  the patriarchal notion that gender and 
ethnicity is fixed, that leaves little  space to accept that women can have multiple ethnic identities, 
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such as women who marry into different ethnic groups.  b) Universal representation that narrowly 
defines women as victims of conflict (such representations continue within the development or 
humanitarian fields) or perpetrators of violence and ignore the multiple intersecting identities that 
are created at times of conflict.  C) Even when one is keen to research the experiences of Tamil 
women; there is little access to information, especially in the North, which is the heart of the 
conflict.   
 
Fig 1.1. Map of  Sri Lanka. The areas indicated in red are the North East which is the heart of the 
conflict :  
Source 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6b/Sri_Lanka_North_Eastern_Province_locator_
map.svg accesses  12/09/2011 
 
The government has prohibited journalists and staff of international agencies into the conflict 
zone. On occasions where access has been granted to some journalists/researchers, the 
information they have been able to gather has been largely censored due to the iron glove of the 
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state and the LTTE.  For example, interviews are arranged by the LTTE who make the decisions 
about which combatants can be interviewed (Alison 2003).  In other instances, the LTTE have 
prohibited people talking to researchers on issues such as caste (Goodhand 2000).     
 
Researching women’s experience in exile has not received adequate attention due to the limited 
resources and the barriers faced when researching women asylum seekers/refugees that are 
discussed in Chapter Two (page 52).  
 
Due to the above and many other reasons, there is a lack of research that fully captures the 
complex issues facing women who are caught up in the conflict. This under representation of 
gendered causes, costs and consequences of violence have not only seriously endangered 
women’s lives but have also resulted in insufficient recognition of women’s involvement both 
intended and unintended conflict situations (Lentin 1997; Jacobs et al 2000).  
 
In this context the research aims to fill in the gap in the literature and looks at the lived 
experiences of women who are caught up in the militarised ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka including 
women who have fled the country. Various strategies have been adopted to overcome the barriers 
that involved in conducting an in-depth feminist analysis of women’s experience in conflict and 
women’s experience in exile. These are discussed in length in Chapter Two (page 54). 
 
While this research focuses on Sri Lanka and seeks to capture the lived experience of women 
caught up in the conflict, it recognises that the world is a global place, particularly when historical 
patterns of colonialism (political and economical) and its affects are visible within global politics 
and in the creation of nation states.  Within this context and drawing upon Enloe’s (1989) analysis 
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that the personal is global, the thesis will offer an investigation of women and conflict ranging from 
the local, personal to the national and international. At local and national level the thesis has 
focused on women’s experience in Sri Lanka. The thesis has drawn upon the researcher’s 
personal positioning as a woman belonging to an ethnic group that has been marginalised due to 
its colonial heritage1 and cultural prejudices.  In the international context the research will explore 
the experiences of Sri Lankan women in exile in the UK (Chapter Eight page 234). 
 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Exploring the nexus between theory and practice of women’s positioning within ethno-national 
conflict the research aims to study women and conflict in relation to Sri Lanka informed by a 
feminist participatory action research approach using in-depth interviews and observations in the 
field during 2004-2008.  A central aim is to understand how women have accommodated, 
participated or resisted relations with militarised national liberation movements and what happens 
to women who accept and/or resist militarism and violence.  In doing so the thesis will also explore 
the extent to which GBV and humiliation has been recognised in determining refugee status and 
maps the experience of women in exile to understand how intersecting identities such as class, 
caste and political affiliation in the place of origins have shaped their lives in exile.    Upon 
completion the thesis aims to fill a gap in the current literature and contribute to the knowledge on 
women and conflict with specific focus on Sri Lanka, which might also feed into policy and 
practice. 
                                                 
1 The author is a Burgher - Burghers are the descendents of the Portuguese & Dutch who colonised the maritime 
boundaries of the country. Dutch burgers consider themselves to be superior to the Portuguese burghers and enjoy a 
higher status. However, their loyalty, to the country has been met with ambiguity. On the other hand the reputation 
associated with Burghers as fun loving people has meant that they are looked upon as women with loose characters who 
do not have a place in the Sinhala or the Tamil “honourable state”.  However, contradictory to the reputation of the 
Burghers the ambiguity is that Sinhala and Tamil people are keen to adopt the life style, language and dress codes of the 
Burghers which is considered to be more westernised, something that is essential for climbing the social ladder.    
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THEORETICAL BASIS 
Theoretically, the research both builds upon and develops a feminist theory of women’s 
involvement in conflict.  Intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989 Collins P. Hill 1998, 2000); Yuval Davies 
2006), humiliation (Hartling 1996; Lindner 2000 O’Neill 2005;) conflict (Galtung 1969) and 
representation have been used as analytical tools for understanding and responding to the ways 
in which gender intersects with other social categories and how these intersecting identities 
contribute to women’s experiences during conflict.  
 
The concept of Intersectionality has been widely used to discuss black women’s employment in 
the US (Crenshaw 1989, 1994) and to understand black women’s empowerment and multiple 
oppressions (Collins P Hill  1998, 2000), and is increasingly entering the discussion on diversity in 
European equality policies (Thorvaldsdorrirr 2007) and International Development (Association for 
Women In Development 2004).  According to Yuval Davies (2006) today the issues of identity and 
oppression are not limited to the preoccupation of ethnicity, but continue to be at the heart of 
feminist theory and practice across disciplines.   
 
Intersectionality starts from the basis that women live multiple-layered identities that derive from 
social relations, history and the operation of structures of power.  For example, a Tamil woman  
may experience discrimination due to her ethnicity as a Tamil compared to a Sinhalese woman, 
but her class, wealth and education can give her a privileged status over Tamil/Sinhalese women 
who are poor, uneducated and from lower castes.  Similarly, the women who married into inter-
ethnic groups and ex-combatants discussed in Chapter Four (page 87), have adopted and 
inhabited a different identity to their past identity; and in this sense identity is always becoming.  
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Therefore, ‘intersectionality’ can be vital to understand these multiple identities, exposing the 
different types of advantages, disadvantages and discrimination that take place as a consequence 
of women’s intersecting identities and social relations; and to understand the way in which racism, 
patriarchy, class oppressions and other discriminative practices create inequalities that structure 
the relative standpoints of women.  Intersectionality takes into account the historical, social and 
political context and recognises unique individual experiences resulting from the coming together 
of different types of differences (Association for Women in Development 2004). 
 
Drawing on the scholarly work of Hartling (1996); Lindner (2000, 2006) and O’Neill (2005), the 
concept of humiliation is adopted to argue that violence and conflict has been a response to the 
humiliation that the Tamil community/Tamil women was subject to at the hands of the Sinhalese 
not only based on their ethnicity but also due to their intersecting identities.  In the same way the 
Sinhalese have also been subject to humiliation by some acts of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam such as the massacre of 33 Buddhist monks in Aranthalawa in 1987 and the attack on the 
“Dalada Maligawa” in Kandy in 1998, the most sacred place for the Sinhala Buddhists which have 
contributed to the protraction of the conflict.   Despite the acts of violence carried out by the LTTE 
what emerged from the evidence of this research is that the Sinhala state and its armed forces 
have had the monopoly of violence and continue to humiliate the Tamil community/Tamil women 
using its political and military power. 
 
Humiliation can be defined as the demeaning of a person or a group of people, subjecting them to 
a process that damages or strips away their pride, honour and dignity.  To be humiliated is to be 
put down, may be forcing a person to consent  to something against their will which is a deeply 
hurtful experience as most of the time it involves acts of force, violence and intimidation that 
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entails demeaning treatment, transgressing established expectations within that context. One of 
the characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victims are forced into passivity and are 
made helpless (Lindner 2006).  
 
The helplessness that survivors experience can lead them to act in different forms depending on 
their material and emotional situations/positions, intersecting identities and social relations. These 
may include depression, anger against oneself and the inability to resist or protect their loved 
ones, which can lead to self harm. Some may even turn to revenge as we discover in Chapter 
Five (page 120) and/or taking up militarism as women combatants to resist state violence and 
oppression.  Lindner writes: 
 
“All human beings yearn for recognition and respect, and that the withdrawal or denial of 
recognition and respect experienced as humiliation, may be the strongest force that 
creates rift between people and break down relationships (Lindner E.  2007) 
 
The Tamil community have faced humiliating experiences in the form of violence and oppression 
at the hand of the Sinhala state and its armies.  Seeds of political humiliation were planted when 
the right to language, land and education was withdrawn from the Tamils by state policies adopted 
in post-colonial Sri Lanka (Chapter Three page 67).  Resistance to these humiliations have taken 
the form of violence by young Tamil (and also Sinhala) militants to gain legitimacy and political 
weight leading to further violence, which has developed into a full scale conflict/armed struggles 
where violence and humiliation is re-produced. This is evident in the assassination of the 13 
soldiers in the Jaffna Peninsula in 1983 discussed in Chapter Three (page 68) which led to anti 
Tamil riots.  
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Despite the impacts of humiliation in protracting the conflict, the concept has not drawn academic 
interest in Sri Lanka. While notions around trauma and stress (Parakarama 2009; Somasundaram 
2007) have received more attention when discussing conflict and refugees, humiliation is still an 
area that has largely been overlooked.  Thomas Friedman (2003), New York Times columnist, 
states:  
 
"If I've learned one thing covering world affairs, it's this: The single most underappreciated 
force in international relations is humiliation. 
 
This thesis by investigating the complex factors leading women to take up arms (Chapter Five 
page 120) has attempted to highlight the phenomenon of humiliation in protracting the conflict, the 
way violence is used to humiliate communities and the impact this has on women’s lives.  This 
thesis argues that while humiliation has been a response to the violence faced by the Tamils and 
other minority groups. Humiliation is also a key factor that is protracting the conflict and dividing 
communities along intersecting social categories such as ethnic, class, religion and gender.   
 
Inspired by the work of Galtung (1969) the notion of conflict adopted in this thesis is one that has 
emerged as a complex process involving violence and humiliation that has taken direct forms at 
both structural and cultural levels.  Direct violence can be cited as the series of ethnic riots that 
took place from the early 50’s (discussed in appendix 3), whereas state policies with regards to 
language, education and decolonisation (Chapter Three page 67) can be seen as violence 
inflicted at structural level - the oppressions that the Tamil community, especially women, undergo 
due to their intersecting social and cultural identities, which have led them to take up arms are 
crucial to understanding the conflict.  Based on these complexities it is essential that conflict be 
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understood in relation to its historical context as is clearly visible in Sri Lanka. Therefore, women’s 
experiences are analysed in keeping with the historical development of the conflict, women’s 
inclusion to the militarised nationalistic projects (Chapter Four and Five) and women’s individual/ 
collective resistance (Chapter Four and Seven) to militarised nationalism and political oppression 
in post independent Sri Lanka. 
 
Evidence gathered from the fieldwork establishes that women have resisted violence and 
militarism individually and collectively adopting strategies that have been associated with their 
traditional roles such as motherhood.  Despite adopting strategies that are in line with their 
traditional roles, women’s activism has met with resistance.  Militarism and patriarchy have 
resorted to different methods to suppress women’s resistance and political participation as we see 
with the Mothers Front (MF) – a group of mothers who lost their children and husbands to state 
violence  (Chapter Seven page 208).  However, even if associated with their traditional roles 
women’s resistance cannot be viewed in isolation from their lived experience.  The experience of 
the Mothers Front confirms that women’s resistance is a result of the humiliation and the violence 
they faced at the hands of the state armed forces during 1987 to 1989 (Chapter Three). The 
humiliation and violence these women faced was a result of their identities, as mothers, wives and 
women who did not have political connections or wealth to protect their families. 
 
Along with the key analytical tools of intersectionality, humiliation and conflict the concept of 
representation has been used to understand how women’s diverse experience at times of conflict 
have been used by the military and media to construct highly censored versions of women’s 
stories; and how women have resisted these representations of them as victims and or 
perpetrators by adopting different strategies.  Given the scope of the research I was unable to 
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analyse the concept of representation as a major focus of the research.  Instead I examine the 
popular representations of women at times of conflict in the dominant media forms available and 
argue that women have multiple layered identities rather than the popular representation as 
victims or perpetrators during conflict. 
 
A dominant representation of women, common to many conflicts, is that of a woman refugee 
weeping over the death of her children or relatives.  Along with women victims, another prevalent 
war image is one of a woman with a rifle over the shoulder and a baby on her back (De Mel 2001).  
As discussed in chapter four, the “Armed Virgin” can be cited as the most controversial 
representation of the woman combatant by the LTTE to attract women and promote its double 
liberation ideology of ‘Liberation to the Nation and Women’ (Coomaraswamy 1996).    
 
These representations of women at times of conflict are used by media and military to promote 
political interpretations of war, violence and sexuality as forms of propaganda.  However, the 
research has established that these representations are not the only experience of women during 
conflict.  As evident in this thesis women adopt different roles and identities during conflict. At 
times these identities can intersect and overlap for example a refugee woman can simultaneously 
be a  widow and a woman resisting violence in the camps  Therefore, representing women as 
victims or perpetrators of violence tends to serve as a basis to ignore the diverse experiences of 
women caught up in conflict, their resistance to militarisation and political repression, women’s 
roles in the front lines, in training camps, their lives in refugee camps, in exile and also their lives 
after conflict.  Then it becomes essential to examine women’s diverse experiences during times of 
war to counter the dominant prevailing representation of women (the warrior or the victim) and 
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investigate the extent to which women’s involvement in war/nationalist movements have altered 
and shaped their experience. 
 
The existing literature on national, ethnic and cultural identity (Enloe 1989, Yuval Davis and 
Anthias 1989; Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992) focuses on the role of gender in the construction 
and re-production of ethnic-national ideologies and the representation (Sen 1993) of cultural or 
ethnic national identities, particularly during national liberation movements and the creation of 
nation states (Einhorn 1993; Enloe 1993). Studies have also emphasised that the self-definition of 
political groups and/or ethnic-national communities is markedly gendered (Pateman 1988).  
Moreover, the interrelations, connections and conflicts of class, caste, race, ethnicity and gender, 
with respect to the different positions of women as members of ethnic-national collectives and 
political movements, have been a matter of concern for feminist scholarship (Anthias and Yuval 
Davis 1992; Basu 2005; Jayawardena 1986; Moghadam 1994).  
 
The literature draws from contemporary feminist theory and commentary on women and conflict.  
Key texts dealing with gender, ethnicity and war by feminist writers such as Cynthia Cockburn 
(1998, 2002,  2007), Moser & Clark (2001);  Tickner (1997); Nira Yuval Davis and Anthias (1989); 
Enloe (1993, 1994, 2000); Eisenstein (2007) and Sjoberg & Gentry (2007) have been used to 
understand the gender dimensions of conflict globally.  These texts along with the available 
literature on Sri Lanka have been used in building the framework for the research as they analyse 
women’s involvement with nationalism, militarism and conflict, providing a genealogy of how 
women have both been incorporated and resisted relations with national movements, states and 
militarism.   
 
23 
 
Gender Based Violence (GBV) 
GBV emerged as a recurring theme through the empirical and desk based research and was 
significant to understand how women’s intersecting identities have shaped their experience of 
violence and humiliation and how women resist the stereotypical representation of them as victims 
or perpetrators of violence and men as heroes who protect their women/land.  Therefore, it was 
essential to address GBV at the outset and across the thesis as this is a major grievance for 
women and at times men across the Sri Lankan community.   
 
GBV and human rights abuse continue to be a key arbitrator in the Sri Lankan conflict that is not 
limited to combatants, but affects the daily lives of civilians, especially women.  Women are 
victimised not for their involvement with military groups, but mostly due to their intersecting 
identities such as sexuality, ethnicity, class and political affiliations as Sarlathambi (page 22) as 
well as due to the involvement of the men in the family as in the case of Parvathi (Chapter Eight 
page 244) who was gang raped due her husband’s involvement with a Tamil military group.  
 
GBV, particularly on women, cannot be viewed as an inevitable outcome of conflict.  In Sri Lanka, 
GBV has been used as a deliberate strategy to humiliate women, men and the communities 
women belong to GBV is also used to control women’s bodies and punish their transgression. 
 
On 28th December 1999, Saralathambi saravanbavanath akurukal, a mother of 29, was 
forcibly dragged out of her home in Jaffna by Sri Lankan Navy soldiers. The next day her 
body was found covered with Palmyra leaves with clothes stuffed in her mouth.  It was 
revealed that there was evidence that she had been murdered after being raped. (Centre 
for Tamil Human Rights press release accessed 29/07/2008) 
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Saralathambi’s case is not an isolated incident. There are many accounts within this thesis where 
women especially Tamil women have been subject to GBV.  Evidence from field work shows that 
in most of the cases the perpetrators are men.  Despite the fact that men are perceived as the 
primary perpetrators of GBV against women Sri Lankan experience confirms that men too become 
victims of sexual violence including rape (British Medical Foundation 2000) as a result of the 
strategies adopted to humiliate survivors or the community they belong to. 
 
Men have faced violence mainly due to their alleged involvement with non state military groups or 
rival military groups, as prisoners of war, as soldiers within their own battalions, as people who 
diverge from gender norms (e.g. homosexuals, transgender and male pacifists) and for holding 
different political ideologies. In all these instances GBV has been adopted as a tool of humiliation.   
Despite this reality that men are subject to GBV and its effects on men and women, the politics 
around GBV determine who can be a victim and always celebrate men as heroes who fight for a 
cause and women stigmatised or sympathised as victims (Moser & Clark 2001). 
 
Therefore, when analysing GBV in conflict, a primary myth that needs to be challenged is the 
representation of women as victims of GBV and the denial of women as fighters and their 
absence from the battlefield.  Despite evidence of women’s increased participation in state/non 
state armed groups, the popular belief is that military groups are male-dominated, ‘masculine’ 
institutions (Cockburn 1998, 2002, 2007); Enloe (1993, 1994, 2000); Eisenstein (2007) and 
Sjoberg & Gentry (2007) where men are the main actors in battle, and women are service 
providers (cooks, nurses, office workers, sex workers) for the heroes (active in battle) and fallen 
heroes (sick and injured).  However, in reality this is not always the truth.  Ruddick (1998) argues 
that in all conflicts there are men who are frightened and running or even courageously resisting 
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orders to kill.  This explains the large numbers of armed force deserters (estimated to be more 
than 40,000) in Sri Lanka and the influx of men from the North East to other parts of the country 
who flee the Tamil militants.  
 
It is estimated that one third of the LTTE combatants are women who are actively participating in 
combat and perpetrating violence individually and collectively. There is also an increase in the 
recruitment to the state military and police force.  Among other examples are Chechnya (Sjoberg 
& Gentry 2007), Palestine (Sharoni 1997), Nepal (with the Maoist groups) and the Revolutionary 
Armed Force of Colombia.  The Abugrahib prison scandal in Iraq is evidence not only to women’s 
presence in battle but also to the fact that women can become perpetrators of violence (at times 
sexual violence) against men/other women.   
 
Military groups attract women into these organisations with the ideology of 
liberation/empowerment and agents of change.  Despite the revolutionary rhetoric, experience 
from conflict regions confirms that women in these institutions do not gain any meaningful 
freedom but rather become “cogs in the wheel” (Alison 2003; Coomaraswamy 1997) and not only 
carry out the men’s orders but in many instances become sexual slaves of the leaders of these 
groups (Accord 2005).  Evidence also suggests that no sooner the struggle is over, women who 
took up arms get caught in the same social patterns that existed before conflict (Moser & Clark 
2001; Handrahan 2006) and become invisible (Canadian International Development Agency 
2007). 
 
The realities of militarism are that while women become actors of violence to serve the strategic 
interests of these institutions, the intersecting identities such as age and physical status can lead 
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to women simultaneously becoming victims of the patriarchal/masculine power structures that 
operate within military institutions.  Women within militaries face sexual abuse at the hands of their 
leaders (Accord 2005) and other men in their groups as well as at the hands of the enemies who 
believe that sexual violence is the key to humiliating the entire community that women belong to 
(Lindner 2006).  At times the sexual violence these women undergo are used by their own 
institutions to mobilise war (Dharmin’s case in Chapter Four page 113), further humiliating women.   
Analysis of the agency of the LTTE woman combatant (Chapter Six 176) suggests that the way 
gender intersects with other social categories has meant that while some women become victims 
of the masculine structures, others find ways and means to negotiate their positions and at times 
become more powerful than some men and women. These women even go to the extent of 
inflicting GBV on some men questioning the very basic feministic notion that men (still) have 
power over women.  This resonates with what Sylvia Walby (1997: 1) argues; that “the pattern of 
inequality between women and men has changed as a result, but in complex ways, not simply for 
the better or for the worse”.   
 
In this changing context it becomes imperative to investigate women’s agency when articulating 
women’s experiences as actors within military/liberation movements to understand how women 
have negotiated their status among the militant group they are part of as well as in their wider 
society.  The analysis in Chapter Five and Six explores the reasons for women taking up arms, 
intersecting gender relationships within the organisation they enlist, how women encourage or 
resist the power structures within the movements, how they negotiate their existence/survival 
within these predominantly masculine institutions and their position after the conflict is over. 
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While women are increasingly taking up militarism another myth is that of the warrior man 
defending the honour of their women and protecting their families back home.  The change in 
military strategies has meant that today, wars are fought not in battle grounds, but increasingly in 
the home fronts, on streets, in market places  where women and children would have access to.  
It is increasingly difficult to differentiate between combat and non-combats and the nexus between 
the front line and home front is becoming blurred.  Like Saralathambi above (page 22) and 
Parvathi (page 242) many women have faced violence in their homes, a place considered to be a 
safe space.  This is not only the experience of Sri Lankan women, but of many women living in 
conflict zones (Accord 2005; Coomaraswamy 2005). 
 
These vulnerabilities have meant that women have to re-negotiate their roles and adopt strategies 
to cope with the daily militarisation of their lives. Most of the time women’s coping strategies go 
unacknowledged when exploring their experiences of conflict, as in the case with Thilaga (page 
110) that liaised with outsiders to help militant groups and later assassinated by the LTTE.   At 
times the coping strategies adopted by women like Thilaga are misunderstood as either complying 
or resisting militarism.  A closer analysis reveals that women are compelled to adopt various 
strategies in order to protect/support themselves and their families and fulfil the expectations 
placed on them due to their gender construction as carers.  For example during the final violent 
confrontations in the north of Sri Lanka, civilians who refused to flee from Sri Lankan army’s 
continuous artillery attacks were represented by the state as sympathisers of the LTTE (Interview 
of Defence Minister telecasted on Chanel 4 News on March 09 after the Sri Lankan army was 
accused of the bombing of a Hospital in the safety zone).  However, in accordance with eye 
witness’s reports, these people were not entering the displacement camps due to their fear of the 
Sri Lankan army who were accused of abducting, torturing and sexually abusing them on the 
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pretext of fighting the LTTE2; as well as their fear of the LTTE who were using them as human 
shields and shooting at crowds who were attempting to flee.  This confirms that women do not 
always act on their own will but there can be other intersecting factors that determine their 
support/resistance to militarism.   
 
Another important element that determines women’s support to militarism is the politics of death 
and martyrdom. Martyrdom is so meticulously carved to gain women’s approval and encourage 
their enlistment into military groups while oppressing and reinforcing the subordinate position of 
other women who do not support militarism. 
 
The ideology of the celebration of death and martyrdom within militarised nationalism becomes 
central to women’s suffering across cultural and national divides. Funerals of combatants or 
civilians become major political occasions where women’s sufferings are put on parade to invoke 
rhetoric of patriotism and sacrifice.  In Sri Lanka the “Mahaweera” (great heroes) day, is a public 
mourning ceremony used to politicise death and to promote the culture of martyrdom by the LTTE 
(See figure 5.7 and 5.8).  Independence Day celebrations are used by the government to promote 
rhetoric such as independence from colonial power, terrorism and triumph of the military.  Women 
as weeping mothers and wives become central to this mourning process (figure 5.3 page 142). 
 
Politicisation around death not only makes it a site for grief but also a site of violence that can 
mobilise the nation to war.  Women’s bodies become sites of violence where the culture of 
martyrdom is re-produced and where contesting military groups fight in the name of honour, as 
evident with Dhanu (page 74) the LTTE woman combatant who assassinated the Indian Prime 
                                                 
2 Interview with female Tamil student demonstrating in Coventry City centre on 11/04/ 2009. 
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minster for his role in sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka, who the LTTE claimed sexually abused her 
during their deployment to Jaffna. 
 
Ironically, the society that celebrates valiant deaths and praises the mothers/wives who fulfil their 
duties by sending men to war, socially excludes women who become widows after the deaths of 
their men (Handrahan 2006).  In a patriarchal society like Sri Lanka where marriage is placed in 
high esteem giving women social status aligned to their husband’s status, widows like Puvi (page 
148) who lost her husband at the very early stage of her marriage or women who have passed the 
marriageable age are humiliated and stigmatised. In many conservative families, widows are 
shunned because they are seen as bringing bad luck.  Superstitious relatives go to the extent of 
blaming these women for their husband’s death. Widows can become a liability with no social 
status. Often they are cast out of the husband’s family home and are treated as outcasts 
(Coomaraswamy 1997; Thiruchandran 1997). These women are not only socially excluded, but at 
times can become vulnerable to the political economy of militarism that promotes sexual 
exploitation and even face violence and humiliation. Likewise mothers who resist violence and 
oppose their sons going to war are labelled as traitors and humiliated as bad mothers for failing in 
their duties”.   At times these women are also harassed using various methods including GBV 
violence.  The Mannar Women for Democracy and Human Rights is a women’s group carrying out 
their activities in the midst of the conflict and are facing continuing threats and humiliation 
(personal correspondence with the Secretary in 2006). 
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“Dear Zinthiya, since we got more and more humiliating e-mails, we did not use this 
yahoo email for long. Please send your e-mail to xxxxxxx@xxxx.xxx 3. Also please don’t 
pass our e-mail address to anyone.  Below is my article on the current condition and 
concerns. If you decide to circulate it please take out our e-mail address. Thanks, XXXX  
 
There are women who resist violence and militarism individually and collectively (Hollander 2005) 
using different strategies.  Annai Poopathii (Chapter Seven page 211) who starved to death in 
resistance to the Indian Peace Keeping Force occupation in the North East (page 74) is proof that 
women are not powerless/victims of violence as militarism are eager to project.  These women 
resist violence by transgressing the boundaries set by military groups/patriarchy in relation to 
women’s public participation4 and becoming activists for peace and defenders of human rights.  
What the research reveals is that, whatever their motive or strategies adopted, these women’s 
public activism is met with resistance, humiliation and suppression by the states/militaries using 
techniques of GBV. 
 
Thus the question is how do women who do not support the militaries, address the issue of 
representation and escape state/patriarchal power structures that oppress and violate their 
bodies?  Have the strategies adopted by women bridged or exacerbated the differences that exist 
when addressing intersecting issues connected to class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, (dis)ability, 
religion and nationality and other identities that we discuss in Chapter Three (page 57)?  What 
happens to women who decide not to resist nor submit to violence and take the ultimate step of 
fleeing their communities to live in exile?  How do these women come to terms with the GBV they 
                                                 
3 Field Code Changed 
4 See more information in chapter seven for how patriarchy resent to women’s public participation. 
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faced in their places of origin and how do they cope with their new lives in exile and what impact 
does militaristic nationalism in the country of origin have on them? 
 
Forced Migration 
Internal displacement and migration are key issues that have shaped the lives and identities of 
women in the north east of Sri Lanka.  The increased violence, breakdown of communities and 
loss of livelihood have meant that people are seeing migration as a route to safety.  However, as 
established in chapter eight, such movements cannot always be viewed as voluntary decisions.  
The circumstances that lead to the decision can be economic difficulties, unemployment, 
displacement, insecurity and shifting gender roles which are direct consequences of 
conflict/political instability.  O’Neill (2004 pp: 22) has argued that the distinction between forced 
and economic migration is becoming blurred and there are complex factors that need to be 
investigated to determine the factors that lead to migration.  This is what Stephen Castles calls 
‘the asylum-migration nexus’ (Castles 2003) where the boundaries between economic/social 
migration and forced migration have become interwoven.  
 
Even though forced migration is a result of conflict and political repression, migration can also 
contribute to the prolonging of conflict.  While people in the diaspora may have fled the country 
due to intersecting reasons (Chapter Three and Eight) as this research established many have 
faced humiliating experiences such as GBV and continue to live in humiliation not only due to their 
experience in the place of origin but also due to the stigma attached to being a refugee/asylum 
seeker in the host country.  An observation made during the field work was that the humiliation 
they faced has led to the desire for revenge and a few see that supporting the LTTE as a way of 
doing this.  Some women I interviewed and met at focus groups did not agree with the LTTE and 
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its agenda of violence but at times felt that the LTTE is the only answer to state violence against 
the Tamil people.  
 
I am not a supporter of the LTTE but I think it is because of the LTTE our people are living 
in dignity.  Otherwise the army will occupy our land and bring in all the Sinhalese thugs 
like they did in the 50’s (Vasuki - Tamil woman in UK; September 2005) 
 
In the same way some Sinhala women also agreed that violence should be responded with 
violence and felt that the LTTE was different to Tamil people. 
 
This is evident to the fact that humiliation is a key factor that has mobilised the Tamil/Sinhala 
diaspora to support militarism.  While it may be argued that the financial donations especially 
towards the LTTE have strengthened the LTTE’s military capability, the diaspora also plays an 
important role in building international opinion on the conflict.  Demonstrations in western cities by 
Sri Lankan Tamils as well as anti-LTTE activists have become a method of creating awareness as 
well as shaping international opinion around the conflict. 
33 
 
. 
Figure 1.2 Photograph of British Tamils in London staging the largest ever march, in protest of 
genocide (source http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=28240 accessed 31/01/ 2009) 
 
Most importantly the diaspora contribute to the cultural revitalisation which is an important element 
in any nationalistic struggle by re-producing certain cultural practices that exist in the place of 
origin.  An example of this is where I got the opportunity to participate in the Tamil New year 
celebrations at the Hindu Temple in East London in 2007.  The occasion was marked by 
traditional rituals, sweet meats and colourful decorations that reminded me of a traditional New 
Year celebration in the villages of Sri Lanka.   Having married a Tamil and living in Colombo for a 
period of more than seven years after my marriage, I cannot help but reflect on a time when we 
(our family and many other Tamil families we associated with) celebrated New Year in this 
traditional way as in this Temple.  This confirms what Radhika Coomaraswamy (1996) argues, 
that the diaspora often takes greater care in continuing these practices than when living in their 
places of origin.  
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For some this desire to cling on to old traditions and practices can be a result of the fear that 
displacement can lead to the decay of a culture/language and identity not having the means for its 
re-generation within the host community.  Furthermore, cultural identity and language is lost in the 
assimilation of new identities as people attempt to feel “included” and attain a sense of belonging.  
A teenage girl in her second year at University told me the following: 
 
“I pretend that I am not a Tamil, but a Burgher. This way I am able to keep away from the 
Tamil and Sinhala students. They don’t bother about me or the way I dress. If I tell them I 
am a Tamil, then they will pass remarks on my upbringing so pretending to be a Burgher 
helps me” (Sasha (18) December 2008) 
 
For many who have left the country, the guilt of leaving their loved ones behind can be a major 
emotion that can be manipulated by the military/military groups/national movements. This is 
evident with the series of agitations including ‘starve to death’ campaigns that took place across 
Europe organised by Tamil diaspora during early 2009.  Some protestors publically voiced the 
anger of having to flee their places of origin as well as the guilt of leaving their parents/siblings to 
bear the suffering of the conflict. This anger and despair have lead many to support the war efforts 
either ideologically or financially. 
 
“I passed out as a doctor and was awaiting an appointment when my brother was 
abducted by the army in 2007, thereafter I was scared and sought political asylum in the 
UK, my mother and other family was living in Kilinochchi.  I got to know from one of my 
friends that my mother was killed by the recent bombings. Now I have nobody, and the 
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only thing is left to me is to support these people who are starving on behalf of our 
people” (Interview with Tamil man who took part in the protests UK; April 2009)  
  
This desire of some within the diaspora to keep the culture alive and get rid of their guilt can be a 
reason for many to view remittance towards their families or their place of origin as a way of 
redeeming themselves as well as addressing the financial difficulties facing their relatives.  Some 
participants of focus groups confirmed that they regularly send money to their families in Sri 
Lanka.  But as the Sri Lanka experience confirms, this increased responsibility? Of sending 
remittances to the families in the place of origin has becomes a serious concern, especially as it 
has re-enforced, for some, the class and dowry practices (see  Chapter Five page 146 for more 
information on the dowry system) that are in place among the Tamil community.  
 
Given these complexities around forced migration there is a real need to explore the lived 
experiences of women in exile if we are to understand how the conflict has affected them. 
 
Summary 
Based on the available literature and evidence gathered from the available literature and the field 
work, GBV, constructions of womanhood and sexuality, women as actors of violence, women’s 
political agency within militarism, women’s resistance to violence and militarism, forced migration, 
responsibility to protect and post conflict reconstruction are identified as themes that need a 
broader analysis and are hence discussed in subsequent chapters.  Drawing on these themes a 
feminist analysis is undertaken using intersectionality, humiliation, conflict and representation as 
analytical tools, to uncover real life experiences of women in the conflict of Sri Lanka, informed by 
a feminist participatory action research approach.(O’Neill 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008; O’Neill and 
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Campbell 2002;)  Taking a participatory action research approach to the methodology for this 
research will be discussed in Chapter Two.   
 
The development of the conflict and Tamil militancy is mapped in Chapter Three to get an 
understanding of the background to the conflict and the humiliation faced by the Tamil community 
and Tamil women due to structural and cultural violence by the state that has in turn led to the 
development of militarism. The actors in this prolonged conflict and the military, political, 
diplomatic and civil society response to the conflict are also outlined.  Chapter Four explores how 
gender and sexuality have been constructed in the national projects of post independent Sri 
Lanka and how women’s bodies have become central in the battle of claiming the nation and its 
respectability; and what happens to women who resist violent militarism and nationalism.  In 
Chapter Five the thesis explores how women have taken up arms to resist state and social 
oppression and what factors have pulled and pushed them to join the militaries and take up 
violence.   Chapter Six will look at women’s lived experience within non state military movements 
and analyse how women have negotiated their position within these highly masculine institutions; 
and examines their positions in a post conflict situation.  In Chapter Seven using the case of the 
Mothers Front, I will explore the strategies women have adopted to resist violence and militarism 
of the state, and the militaries who are claiming to represent them. Chapter Eight examines 
women’s experiences in exile. Chapter Nine draws on some post-conflict challenges that Sri 
Lanka will face in the light of re-integrating women combatants and dealing with survivors of 
violence and the main findings of the thesis are then drawn together in conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MY RESEARCH JOURNEY 
WHY SRI LANKA 
The motivation for focusing on women and conflict in Sri Lanka emerges from my experience as a 
Sri Lankan woman living through conflict until my arrival in the UK in 2000.  These experiences 
encouraged me to build awareness of the diverse experiences of women caught up in the conflict 
that are so often misrepresented or ignored.  Through this awareness building, the aim is to 
influence policy that will recognise the real lived experience of women, the scale of GBV that is 
taking place during conflict and work towards combating violence against women during conflict.    
 
Within the context of the available research on Sri Lanka, Alison (2004) argues that ethno-national 
armed conflicts provide an interesting theoretical arena in which to examine gender roles, 
expectations and experiences in war and that anti-state (working against the existing state 
authority) liberation struggles/nationalism often provide a greater degree of ideological and 
practical space for women to participate as combatants than state or pro-state nationalism.  The 
Sri Lankan conflict which has seen a large number of women take up arms with the LTTE, a 
minority ethnic group fighting for a separate state for the Tamils and the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peremune (JVP), a Marxist oriented youth group comprising mostly of the majority Sinhalese 
youth makes it an important case to further explore the issue set out in my aims in Chapter One.   
 
In this chapter, I will present the journey embarked upon as a part time research student from my 
initial registration to completion.  I will map out the key stages of the research form the methods of 
investigation, the data collection and analysis, the ethical considerations that I had to take into 
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account, the limitations faced during my field work in the UK and Sri Lanka and the steps I have 
taken to overcome these difficulties.   
 
METHODS OF INVESTIGATION 
The methodology adopted is informed by a feminist participatory action research (PAR) approach, 
based on the principles of: “inclusion; participation; valuing all local voices, and local ownership 
and sustainability” (O’Neill 1994, 2001; O’Neill and Campbell 2002;, O’Neill 2004, 2006, 2008 
pp.7) and focuses specifically upon women and their lived experiences of violent conflict and their 
involvement in ethnic national movements.    
 
Pioneered by Orland Fals Borda (1991; 1999) PAR is a methodology that strives to include all 
participants who are involved in the research, sometimes from the design to completion.  It can be 
seen as methodology that is grounded in developing “partnership responses to facilitate 
purposeful knowledge, is directed towards social change and is action oriented” (O’Neill 2004: 4).  
According to Bradbury (2001: 2)  
 
“a primary purpose of action research is to produce practical knowledge that is useful to 
people in the everyday conduct of their lives.  A wider purpose of action research is to 
contribute through this practical knowledge to the increased well being economical, 
political, psychological, spiritual of human persons and communities and to a more 
equitable and sustainable partnership with wider ecology of the planet of where we are an 
intrinsic part”.  
 
Rather than relying on the intervention of experts to address the issues, a feminist participatory 
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action approach locates the participants as experts and draws attention to the role of the 
researched in the creation of knowledge (valuing the participants standpoint and their ability to 
describe and interpret their experiences thereby trying to retain the core of the participants 
knowledge in the analysis of the research. (O’Neill 2001). 
 
I wanted to take a PAR approach drawing up on O’Neill’s (1994; 2001) argument that feminist 
research should connect the triad of theory, experience and practice; and listening to the lived 
experiences of women can lead to the development of feminist theory aimed at changing policy.   
This informed my choice of methodology.  Therefore, a key aim of my study is to understand and 
build awareness of women’s experience in the conflict of Sri Lanka that will inform policy that is 
aimed at addressing women’s needs during times of conflict at national and international level with 
their participation in this process. 
 
Originally it was designed to use the PAR model to build awareness and transform policies in 
relation to combating violence against women during the conflict and also in the hope that the 
research findings could impact upon policy at national and international levels to stop the violence 
that is taking place in Sri Lanka. Therefore, I designed and undertook the research with this in 
mind.  As an outcome of presenting the findings of the research at the initial stages at 
conferences and workshops around women and conflict l was invited to publish the work which 
led to a book chapter (Ganeshpanchan 2009).  In 2004, I initiated a group to campaign against the 
violence that was taking place in Sri Lanka and was shortlisted for the Sheila Mckechnie award in 
2006 which was instrumental in helping me find research participants and winning a mentoring 
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scheme5 that was useful for me to build awareness among the international community and to 
mobilise women’s groups to lobby the UK government, EU and the UN to intervene to put an end 
to the GBV that is taking place in Sri Lanka.   As a result I found myself playing simultaneous roles 
as a scholar and activist confirming what Miller argues that PAR is an explicitly political, socially-
engaged approach to knowledge creation (Miller 2002).       
 
As the research progressed it became clear that methodologically, it was too difficult to include the 
research participants as community researchers due to the challenges faced. These are 
documented later in this chapter. Therefore, the research takes a participatory approach and is 
not a standard example of PAR.  It is based on a feminist PAR approach since the findings are fed 
into policy and practice to combat violence against women in conflict, using women’s voices and 
narratives.  In the future, when a reconstruction programme is undertaken for post conflict Sri 
Lanka there will be the opportunity to feed in the findings of this research to understand the 
causes that led  women take up arms as well as to understand the challenges faced by women 
when taking up political activism to draw up policy to address these issues. 
 
Initially, I conducted in-depth qualitative interviews and focus groups with women in the UK and 
Sri Lanka.  (See appendix 1).  Drawing on the findings from the interviews and focus groups 
certain key themes emerged such as GBV, displacement and forced migration that is then 
addressed in the chapters that follow. It is hoped that the findings of the research might help to 
influence and create policy addressing GBV at times of conflict and will help draw up plans for 
reconstruction process in a post conflict situation.    
 
                                                 
5 I was short listed as a candidate for the Shiela Machine award in the category of conflict resolution in 2005 
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Listening to the initial interviews I realised that if I used the narrative approach it would help me 
produce an account of the experiences of women that are not   heard through the media, military 
discourse and the literature. Using narratives gave the opportunity for participants to reflect on 
their lives and experiences and produce richer and more in depth accounts, that in turn might be 
written up in ways that could influence policy especially in the area of combating GBV during 
conflict.  
 
Women’s lived experiences that are revealed through the research challenge the stereotypical 
representations of women as victims or perpetrators that the media and military hegemonies are 
eager to represent (see Chapter One and Four).  These stories could also be a tool of resistance 
as they tell alternative stories to the ones that are produced by the media and military 
organisations. For example, in Chapter Four I discuss the lived experience of women sex workers 
who have been excluded from the grand nationality projects due to not fitting the image of the 
“honourable woman” and women who resist militaristic nationalism individually and collectively. 
These women’s experiences are challenging the rhetoric of the “honourable” woman that 
nationalism is eager to project and reveal the political economy of militarisation and armed conflict 
that is often ignored but has dangerous consequences on women and society as a whole.  In 
chapter seven the research will explore the narratives of the Mothers Front a group who used their 
traditional roles of motherhood to challenge state/military violence.  These narratives of resistance 
create new knowledge that can inform, build awareness, and create opportunities for social 
change (O’Neill & Harindanath 2006:39-53). This awareness can lead to action/mobilisation of 
pressure groups such as the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum to address human rights violence 
taking place during conflict.   Using narratives also gave the opportunity for women to speak out 
for themselves and reveal their own stories, an opportunity that is being denied to women by the 
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hegemonies that are desperate to represent and speak for them (Spivak 1993).  
 
As such, knowledge generated using the narratives of women who are combatants, women 
resisting violence, involved in peace building and women in exile can provide powerful messages 
because they inform society of women’s lived experience of conflict in opposition to the popular 
representation of victims and perpetrators. Knowledge generated from the participants’ own 
experiences and the local context in which participants live provides us with an understanding of 
the militant movement that recruited them and the code of conduct imposed on women, which 
contradicts the propaganda of these same organisations as promoting women’s empowerment. In 
the same way stories of women who have fled the conflict reveal the brutalities women undergo at 
the hands of state and non state military groups, which usually go unreported in the state media 
due to state censorship.  Exiled women’s narratives also reveal the lives and new identities they 
create for themselves as asylum seekers/refugee women and how their lived experiences in the 
place of origin have shaped their new identities in exile.    
 
Further, using women’s narratives having taken a PAR approach can help participants to be aware 
of the knowledge being generated with their participation/involvement.  For example, it was made 
clear to the women who agreed to participate in the research that I would use the interviews to 
produce my thesis and academic publications. I agreed to send them copies of the publications if 
they wished to have them. This at times can lead to feeling a sense of achievement, of contributing 
to knowledge, which may be useful in influencing action/policy. However, at no time   have I 
promised the informants that their interviews will lead to a direct change in policy as I had to be sure 
that I was not making a promise that I could not keep and raise unrealistic expectations among my 
informants. 
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Focus groups organised in the UK became a space where women’s experiences could be shared 
and where women’s voices are heard by me as a researcher as well as other women who 
participated in the focus group.  Even though they knew that many among them had faced many 
hardships as a result of the conflict in general, listening to individual stories or situations seemed 
to be helpful in improving their relations within the group as well as encouraging other women to 
talk.  The participants reflected on their past experience, exchanged information and talked about 
their experience in the UK such as when travelling, registering with the GP and sign posted others 
to agencies they found useful. An observation was that this sharing of information particularly 
helped the newly arrived women to the country/area as well as me as a researcher to get a wider 
understanding of what the woman considered important to them rather than what some 
agencies/authorities believed was useful to the woman. 
 
As a PAR approach is based on gathering the everyday knowledge of the participants, “self-
reflective enquiry” can be an important element to improve the understanding of social situations 
and social practice (May 2000; Kemmis and McTaggart 1988: 5).  The participant’s narratives 
have helped me to reflect upon women’s personal stories that also gave them the opportunity to 
reflect on how their intersecting identities have shaped their experiences of the conflict which in 
turn has been used to inform this analysis.    
 
It is hoped that the research will add to the literature on women and conflict by conceptually 
exploring the linkages between theoretical analysis, women’s lived experiences, and possibilities 
for policy change that emerge from women’s narratives and participation  in the research process. 
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DATA COLLECTION  
Methods adopted took a PAR approach and were qualitative in nature and consisted of; 
• Focus groups developed in participation with the women participants; In-depth 
narratives interviews (in person and on the telephone).    
• Secondary data – Reports from International agencies working in the country.  
• Media and press reports  
• Internal documentation from parties close to the conflict   
• Other gray material – such as publicity, flyers and political propaganda   
 
Focus groups and interviews threw up the key themes identified in Chapter One, such as gender-
based violence, displacement, forced migration, justice and accountability and protection from 
violence that was explored in the chapters. The data was documented in field work that took place 
over a period of five years 2003 - 2008. Interviews were conducted with women from the UK and 
Sri Lanka.  Following ethical guidance, participants were self selecting. Based on the findings of 
the focus groups and in-depth interviews, key themes were drawn up for analysis. 
 
The research was organised into three phases. 
 
Phase one – Literature review 
In the first phase I conducted desk based research that included an ongoing literature review. The 
literature review was carried out through phase two and three and the period of writing up my 
analysis and included reviewing policy analysis and comparative studies. 
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Phase two: Development phase 
In phase two, I developed the research tools, set up of the field work phase made contacts and 
established focus groups in the UK, prior to going to Sri Lanka so that I would be able to start the 
facilitation process immediately after my field work in Sri Lanka.  I also with the support of my 
supervisor established an agreement with the Social Scientist Association, Colombo Sri Lanka to 
provide support with the field work in Sri Lanka.  
 
Phase Three: Field work in Sri Lanka  
Field work in Sri Lanka was carried out in the south (see Chapter Three Fig 3.1 page 59 for a 
map) as I was unable to gain permission to visit the North which is at the heart of the conflict. 
These interviews were carried out during October to December 2004. Thereafter, I was unable to 
return due to the Tsunami reconstruction work and the escalating violence.  During my field work 
in Sri Lanka I interviewed Sinhala Ex-JVP women combatants (n-7), who have now integrated into 
society, former women Sinhala/Tamil activists of the Mothers Front (n-12), Sinhala Women who 
were affected by the JVP violence (n-14), and Tamil/Muslim women who experienced LTTE 
violence and fled the conflict zone to the south (n-13). 
  
Phase four - Fieldwork in the UK  
Since I was focusing on Sri Lankan women in exile, I was unable to limit myself to a specific 
geographical location, as women had been dispersed to locations across the UK, instead I had to 
work in a wider area which included the east/west ends of Newcastle Upon Tyne (North East), 
York, Manchester, the Midlands and London.  Thereafter, I drew up a list of organisations working 
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with refugees/asylum seekers and ethnic minority groups6 and contacts were made with these 
organisations where I discussed the aims and methods of the research with a view to them getting 
involved in the research and introducing me to their service users (women) who might want to 
participate in the research.  These organisations did not set up the interviews for me; instead 
those women who did want to take part were given my contact details, participant information 
sheet (appendix 2) and in some cases I was given their contact details. Thereafter, interviews 
were arranged after contacting the women who gave their consent to participate.    
 
A range of participants were identified for interviewing and consultation. These included Sri 
Lankan Tamil women now in exile as asylum seekers and refugees (n-28) women who entered 
the UK as economic migrants and students (n-15), Former women combatants of the LTTE (n-18) 
who have claimed political asylum; there was one exception to this where I got the rare 
opportunity to interview a woman who was with the LTTE as a combatant (n-1). I was unable to 
arrange a face-to-face interview with her due to concerns of her safety, but carried out a 
telephone interview.  
 
                                                 
6 These organisations/agencies included: 
Byker Area Resource Centre (BARC): A resource centre where weekly meetings and drop-in sessions are held for the 
refugee community in the Byker Area of the Newcastle upon Tyne east end, 
Common Ground -  (west end of Newcastle upon Tyne), 
Dolphin Street Drop in Centre - (east end of Newcastle upon Tyne),  
Asylum Seekers Unit - (Newcastle upon Tyne City Council), 
North East Refugee Services - (Newcastle upon Tyne) 
Medical Foundation North East support group (contact made through the London office)  
Newcastle, First Step voluntary organisation – (Newcastle upon Tyne),  
STAR Project – (Newcastle Upon Tyne Branch),,  
Exile Journalist Network – (London),Tamil Women's association – (East London) 
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Further I interviewed women activists, former military officer of the Sri Lankan, members of 
statutory and voluntary sector agencies working with refugees/asylum seekers and newly arrivals 
and academics who worked on conflict issues.  
 
The majority of contacts in the case of ex-combatants and political activists were made through 
personal introductions from friends and colleagues living in the UK and members of the Women’s 
Network that I coordinated.  Once I was introduced to the women, I asked if they were willing to 
participate in the interviews, and if they agreed we set up a date and time for the interview.  A few 
telephone interviews were carried out with women where face-to-face discussions were not 
possible due to reasons such as safety and distance. 
 
Four focus groups were organised in the UK. Two were conducted in Newcastle and two in 
London.  Each group consisted of 8 – 12 women bringing the total to 49.   
 
I participated in drop in sessions for refugees/asylum seekers organised by other organisations 
and women’s support groups for information gathering.  I also attended events such as exhibitions 
academic conferences/seminars where “work in progress” papers were presented to share 
experience and gather information with other researchers conducting similar research. 
 
Structure of Interviews/Focus Groups  
Participants who agreed to give interviews and attend focus groups were asked a number of open 
ended questions (see interview schedule and participant information sheet Appendix 2), which 
included their experiences of the conflict, why, and when they joined the movement (i.e. 
LTTE/JVP or other paramilitary groups), what made them leave the movement and country, their 
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experience of migration and in flight, and their experiences in the UK as asylum seekers/refugees.  
They were also asked to comment on the key ideals of the movement they joined/supported, and 
to share their hopes for a post-conflict situation.  Thus the research also reflects on the challenges 
that the country will face in a post-conflict situation.   
 
Language and interpretation was not an issue for the research.  Many participants belonging to 
the Tamil community were able to converse in English fairly well; as such I did not have a major 
problem with interviews or note taking.  In a few cases (4) however, even though I carried out the 
interviews in Tamil (as I could speak and understand Tamil), I was unable to take down notes, as I 
do not write Tamil.  Instead, I made notes in English and then read it out to them and made sure 
that they agreed to the notes that I had made.  When conducting interviews with the Ex-JVP 
combatants and Sinhala/Muslim women, language was not an issue as I am fluent in Sinhala and 
many spoke Sinhala and English. 
 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
You need to state that you undertook thematic analysis of the interview material. Due to the 
complexity and challenge of researching a conflict situation such as Sri Lanka it became 
necessary to adopt a range of methods to gather information described above.  This equally 
presented challenges with regards to the handling of the data and establishing a hierarchy of 
reliability, validity and risk of transparency. I had to take extreme care when analysing the data.    
As a result I spent considerable time corroborating the information I gathered in Focus groups and 
via media reports with other sources prior to establishing the validity of the information.  My own 
experience living through the conflict helped me to establish some information and its validity.   
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The research was conducted ethically and sensitively, following the guidelines of the British 
Sociological Association (March 2002).  Ethical agreement was given by the University ethics 
committee. Originally, registration was with Staffordshire University and was agreed by the 
University Ethics Committee.  Informed consent was the corner stone of the interview process. 
Participants were self-selecting.  Confidentiality was observed and maintained throughout the 
research process when dealing with research participants and in transcribing the notes. 
Participants’ names in the research have been changed to protect their identity.  It was hoped that 
self selection and a sensitive approach to conducting the interviews would ensure that the semi- 
structured and in-depth interviews would highlight and support the agency of the women 
participants (O’Neill 2001; Mauther et al 2002).  Ground rules for the interviews were discussed 
with the principal supervisor, and the use of data has been documented and shared with 
participants and formed the basis for an agreement that is based upon informed consent (Mauther 
et al 2002). 
 
Some women both in the UK and Sri Lanka did not want to speak of the past atrocities and did not 
want their children or family to get to know about their experiences, especially if they had 
experienced sexual harassment.  Following the ethical guidelines and my duty as a researcher I 
have taken all possible steps to protect the identity of the participants.  I have also ensured that 
participants were not put under pressure or risk their safety at any time. 
 
Furthermore, it was revealing to note that some support groups (I encountered four during my field 
work) were run by refugee/asylum men, and these men took precautions to prevent the 
researcher from approaching women in their groups.  When reflecting upon this I felt that they had 
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assumed the role of guardian of the women, even in exile and saw the researcher as an intruder, 
or a threat to their male authority.  Such institutions, which were very few in my experience (one in 
Newcastle, 1 in West Midlands and 2 in London) were reproducing the patriarchal structures that 
existed in the community of origin.   One organisation in the Newcastle area was reluctant to give 
me the opportunity even to participate in the drop-in centres they held for women.  The man who 
was managing the centre told me that he did not think that the women wanted to talk to anyone.  
He further stated that he and two other men in the management committee are refugees and they 
know exactly what the refugees needs are.      
 
While these men seemed to have assumed the role of “protector” I also reflected that the women 
may have had interviews with a number of agencies/individuals and repeated their stories several 
times in order to access the available services, thus some of them may no longer find it useful nor 
want to speak to researchers. Some may feel that they are being ‘used’ by some 
agencies/individuals for their own benefit and they had no gain whatsoever.  I made it very clear to 
all participants that the research was an academic exercise aimed at understanding the impact of 
conflict on women’s lives and awareness building.  I had to be very clear that I was not promising 
something that I would not be able to deliver, and this honesty seemed to be reassuring to many 
participants. 
 
I also sensed a degree of “not–welcome” attitude from two Tamil men at seeing their wives talking 
in private to me.  One man went to the extent of coming into the room (twice) and reminding his 
wife that it was time for other chores such as feeding the kids or picking them up from school. This 
man’s wife wanted me to avoid visiting while her husband was at home. She also requested not to 
mention that she had been talking to me about her experience in Jaffna.  Another woman wanted 
51 
 
me not to let her husband know that she told me that he was an ex-militant as he was scared that 
his identity may be revealed.  I assured both women that I would act as they wished as it was my 
duty as a researcher not to compromise the safety, or the trust of my interviewees.     
 
The interview process was at times emotionally draining as the nature of the issues researched is 
sensitive and personal. Some accounts of women’s experiences were very distressing.  I was 
concerned that participants may find it hard to talk about their past experiences as these may 
bring back memories that they were struggling to lay behind and move on.   I made it clear to the 
participants that they did not have to speak about any aspect of their experiences if they did not 
want to.  They were assured that they could stop at any point.  I also made them aware that there 
was professional help available if they decided they wanted help.  At all times I carried contact 
details of organisations such as the Women’s Aid, the City council asylum seeker unit’s and a list 
of local GP’s and voluntary organisations that supported refugees and asylum seekers with me. 
 
Agencies working with refugees/asylum seekers had a code of conduct and confidentiality, to 
which they had to adhere.  This prohibited the agencies to reveal information about their clients 
without prior consent of the client.  These agencies very correctly acted as gatekeepers and 
protected women who were too vulnerable or traumatised from getting involved in the research. 
Therefore, these agencies had to first approach the women first to get their consent to reveal any 
contact information and it was only then that I could contact the women to set up interviews.  As a 
result I had to wait for long periods of time until they provided me with their clients’ contact details 
so that I could arrange a meeting and this was a reason that I could not keep to the strict time 
lines but had to overlap the phases of research.  Despite the delays I understood the benefit of 
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working via agencies, is that there is a further level of support available to women who may need 
support after an interview and was happy to work with the agencies. 
 
Not all women I contacted were enthusiastic about participating in interviews and some refused to 
speak to me.  As I found out later, this was due to a number of reasons, including a fear of being 
exposed and traced by authorities as some of them had entered the country illegally or over 
stayed.  They did not want to be identified or be traced in fear of being deported.   In the case of 
the women who had already been given a negative decision, they feared talking to anyone, as 
they did not want to get into any situation that would jeopardise their appeal process.  Also, many 
had isolated themselves from society and did not want to meet strangers, not entirely due to fear, 
but also due to losing face because of their status as a refugee/asylum seeker.   As they had 
internalised the fact that being an asylum seeker/refugee was somewhat humiliating.  There were 
very few claiming state support but living with their friends and newfound partners who did not 
want to talk openly for fear of being investigated, as they had not informed the authorities of their 
change in circumstances. 
 
Additionally there was an element of fear attached to the ex-combatants and their families, as they 
feared being tracked by the LTTE, or the government authorities, as well as other militant groups.   
Some  strongly believed that the LTTE had a strong network within the UK and internationally7, 
and incidents such as the murder of a Sri Lankan youth in Wembley in 2006 by Sri Lankan gangs 
in London led to this fear.  
 
                                                 
7See report  French investigations highlight LTTE terror over Tamil Diaspora 
http://www.peaceinsrilankan.org/InsideNews/news.asp?newsID=7049 accessed 11/04/2007   
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Labelling 
There was the difficulty of what the label ‘asylum seeker’ ‘refugee’ meant to the women I 
interviewed. It soon became clear that many younger women did not want to be ‘identified’ as 
refugees/asylum seekers due to the humiliation attached to being labelled as a ‘Refugee’.  Some 
women I met at training centres, exhibitions and other public places were very keen to stress that 
they were not refugees/asylum seekers, but later revealed that they were.  When working with 
focus groups, ‘labelling’ was not a problem as these centres were set up to provide support to the 
refugee/asylum seeker community and the service users were clearly asylum seekers/refugees. 
 
Additionally distinguishing refugees/other migrants also became a challenge.  For example, many 
Sri Lankans did not come into the country as asylum seekers but on other grounds, even though 
the underlying cause for their arrival was the conflict, which was proving dangerous to their lives 
and social well-being.  In this case, it was difficult to categorically say they were asylum seekers 
but they were affected by the war and the only option to many was to leave the country. This is an 
example of the asylum-migration nexus (Castles 2003) I discuss in Chapter Eight.  
 
Limitations 
In the UK research phase the geographical dispersal of refugees/asylum seekers made it difficult 
to contact them.  Many agencies/persons had to be approached before successful contacts were 
made.  This was especially so with the Sri Lankan community, as the Sri Lankan population is 
very small (See Table 1 page 58) and the people who fled the country have dispersed throughout 
Western Europe and the numbers living in the UK is therefore, low compared to refugee/asylum 
communities of other origin (UNHCR 2005 pp 501). 
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A large number of refugees fled Sri Lanka during July 1983 and during the 1990’s when the war 
escalated and were successful in their application process and are well integrated into the system, 
which makes it difficult to identify them without them coming forward (and they rarely volunteer 
due to many reasons, including the above mentioned). 
 
In the Sri Lankan phase of the research the main constraint was my inability to go to the conflict 
areas due to security reasons. Therefore, I had to limit my research to the south.  In the south I 
faced the difficulty of tracking down Ex-JVP women combatants due to the lapse of time of the 
uprising (approximately 32 years after the 1st uprising and 20 years after the second).  Even when 
identified some women were frightened to talk due to the belief that the government will track 
them down in the event JVP decided to take up arms again (there were rumours that the JVP will 
resort to violence again if their demands were not met through the political process).   
 
The risk to my own security was also a concern due to my identity as a woman belonging to an 
ethnic minority talking to people who were considered a security threat, I was regularly stopped at 
military check points and questioned and requested  to produce my identification papers and what 
business I had in the area.  Again my language skill helped me to negotiate with the security 
personnel.  However, at times I had to negotiate my security at the expense of being humiliated.  I 
was at times subject to sensitive remarks and jokes which were aimed at my sexuality. I was 
unable to respond to these remarks as the only sensible thing to do was to be silent.  This made 
me reflect on the experience of women who have to live their daily lives with such humiliation and 
injustice but unable to resist due to fear for their safety. It also underpinned the decision to stop 
the fieldwork in Sri Lanka and to focus on interviewing exiled women in the UK. My safety as a 
researcher was a central aspect of the decision taken with the full support of my supervisory team. 
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Overcoming barriers 
A range of methods were used based on the ethical guidelines to promote the fullest possible 
participation, ownership and to gain an appreciation of the issues for women during conflict and 
their lives in exile. 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the work, extra care had to be placed on the emotional effects of the 
interview process.  The format and structure for interviews was prepared in consultation with the 
principal supervisor.  Women were encouraged to participate only if they felt that they could do so 
and on a voluntary basis.  Neither the interviewer nor the agencies that introduced them tried to 
influence their decision to participate. 
 
Even though contact was made through agencies and at times individuals, in order to protect the 
women’s identity the agencies were not informed if and when the women consented to be 
interviewed.  No audio recordings were made of the interviews.  After completion of the interviews 
the transcripts were read to the interviewees, giving them the opportunity to verify their 
statements. Telephone interviews (n-3) were recorded to help write the transcripts and this was 
communicated to the participants prior to the telephone conversation agreeing that no other would 
listen to them other than me and possibly my supervisor, but they were reassured of their 
anonymity.  Once the recorded interview was transcribed, another call was made to read the 
transcripts to the interviewee to make sure they agreed with the interview material.  
 
Skills were attained in the use of interview techniques and research methodology, and I also 
undertook training in counselling skills.  This helped me be more confident when dealing with the 
agencies as they placed greater confidence in introducing their clients to a trained person.  When 
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the need was identified, participants were sign posted to agencies providing support for 
refugees/asylum seekers.  These advocacy skills were gained from my experience of working and 
training within the voluntary sector. 
 
Assistance for the fieldwork whilst working in Sri Lanka was agreed with the Social Scientists 
Association of Sri Lanka (SSA).  I approached the SSA together with my supervisor and it was 
agreed that they would offer me a base and support for the fieldwork to be undertaken in Sri 
Lanka. Due to the escalating violence and political situation, my supervisor advised me that 
fieldwork in Sri Lanka could not take place, as my safety could not be guaranteed. Therefore, I 
had to limit my field work to areas in the South mainly in and around Colombo and its suburbs. 
However, I made contacts with other organisations such as the War Widows Association and the 
Manna Women’s Centre in Sri Lanka along with a few journalists working in the conflict zones who 
sent regular updates.  I have also built professional relationships with the Free Media movement 
and the National Peace Council who regularly updated me on the conflict. 
 
Summary 
The research is informed by participatory action research methodology and seeks to capture the 
lived experiences of women in conflict  (Sri Lanka) and in post conflict situations (i.e. living in the 
UK) using their own stories.   Methods adopted took a feminist PAR approach, consisting of focus 
groups, in-depth interviews, and desk-based research.  Key themes such as GBV, constructions 
of womanhood and sexuality, women as actors of violence, women’s political agency within  
militarism, women’s resistance to violence and militarism, forced migration, responsibility to 
protect and post conflict reconstruction were explored in the interviews and focus groups, along 
with the more qualitative aspects of women’s lived experiences.  
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The research was conducted ethically and sensitively, following the guidelines of the British 
Sociological Association and in keeping with these guidelines, participants were self selected.  
Agencies who introduced the informants acted as gatekeepers protecting their clients. 
  
Based on the findings of the research interviews, focus groups and observations, key themes 
were drawn up for analysis that is explored in the thesis.  Barriers were overcome using a range of 
methods to promote the fullest participation of the informants.  
 
Setting the scene for the analysis of the themes identified, the development to the conflict has 
been mapped in chapter three, which will help readers to understand the background to the 
conflict.  I will explore the ethnic and religious composition of the Sri Lankan people, along with 
the intersecting social divisions such as caste and class that have led to competing identities and 
the sequence of structural violence that is used to humiliate the minority communities, and a 
proportion of the Sinhala community, leading to the development of Tamil and Sinhala militancy, 
that has paved the way for women taking up arms.  The chapter will also look at the various actors 
and the responses to the conflict by various stake holders.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
MAPPING THE CONFLICT 
INTRODUCTION 
It is important to understand the background and the responses to the conflict along with the 
political developments that have taken place in Sri Lanka since independence from the British in 
1948 if we are to understand how women have been incorporated in to the various nation building 
projects that took place after independence and the impact of these programmes on the lived 
experiences of women. This understanding will require insight into social and cultural structures, 
inter/intra community relations, the grievances of the ethnic minority’s especially Tamil people that 
have led to a claim of separate state and the responses of the majority Sinhala state/community to 
these claims.  
  
The conflict even though largely defined as an ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese 
arising from the colonial heritage, cannot be simply reduced to a question of difference among the 
two ethnic groups, or a question of protecting minorities against majority rule.  Neither can it be 
seen as a problem that will cease to exist after disarming the militants and incorporating them into 
the political process with cosmetic constitutional reforms that will give limited autonomy to the 
minorities at regional level.  This research will establish that it is a more complex problem that cuts 
across all these spheres.  
 
Sri Lanka has been wracked by conflict and political turmoil for more than 30 years.  The 
commonly cited year for the beginning of hostilities is 1983, when ethnic riots broke out. However, 
there have been periods of violence and political unrest that date back to the early 1950s 
(Appendix 3).  The conflict intensified in 1983 after anti-Tamil communal violence spread across 
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the island (Gunaratna 1997) making Sri Lanka a country with one of the protracted conflicts with 
an estimation of over 100,000 deaths - both in the North and the South.  Thousands of people 
have been internally displaced (UNHCR 2009) for extensive periods and many more live as 
refugees within a growing Tamil diaspora internationally.   
 
Table 1: Total Refugee population from Sri Lanka – Main countries of Asylum (UNHCR 2005: 501) 
 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
India 64,743 64,061 63,767 60,922 57,274 50,730 
France 15,183 15,774 15,938 15,062 15,304 15,602 
Germany - - 17,403 15,121 12,850 15,304 
Canada 10,591 13,161 12,873 12,563 12,062 11,076 
U.K. 10,605 11,760  9,545 7,993 8,064 8,098 
Other 
(Nordic) 
23,038 17,664 13,713 10,349 8,496 7,329 
 
Added to this is the scale of human rights violations  that have continued under draconian rules 
such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) that gives the armed/police forces authority to 
detain people without charge for prolonged periods. 
 
Given these complexities surrounding the conflict, it is important to understand the social and 
political context that led to the development of conflict.  In this chapter I will briefly discuss the 
ethnic composition, the caste and class structures along with some events that can be framed as 
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having led to the development of Tamil/Sinhala militancy.  In doing so, I will look at the key players 
in this conflict and responses to the conflict by the military, political, diplomatic and civil society. 
 
Figure 3.1 Map of Sri Lanka showing the areas referred to throughout this thesis 
 
Ethnic and Religious composition 
Sri Lanka is a multi ethnic and multi religious country, with a population of approximately 20.2 
million. The ethnic composition is somewhat disputed due to the inability to conduct a full census 
since 1981, at which time, of a total population of 14.8 million, Sinhalese made up for 74% 
Buddhist, 12.6% Sri Lankan Tamils, 5.6% Plantation8 Tamils, 7% Moors and 1% comprising of 
Burghers, Malays and Veddas9 (Pereira & MacSwiney 2002). Sinhalese predominantly live in the 
southern region and parts of the central highland. There is also a Sinhala minority in some parts of 
                                                 
8 These people, who are usually referred to as Indian or Upcountry Tamils, were brought down from South India during 
the British rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work on the tea Plantations as seasonal workers 
and later became permanent workers on the plantations. 
9 Veddas are the indigenous people living on the Island who have now become extinct. 
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the North and East.  The North has traditionally been home to Tamils and the East to Muslims. 
The conflict led displacement has resulted in a considerable number of Tamil and Muslim 
communities moving to Colombo and other urban areas in the south. The majority of Sinhalese 
are Buddhists and the majority of Tamils are Hindus. There is a significant percentage of 
Christians among both ethnic groups.  The breakdown of population according to religion is: 
Buddhist 69%, Hindu 15%, Catholic/Christian 8% and Muslims 8% (Pereira & MacSwiney 2002). 
 
Although religion has not been central to the confrontations, Buddhist revivalism during 
Independence and thereafter the engagement of the Buddhist clergy with the political affairs has 
introduced a religious dimension to the conflict.  Added to this is the encouragement of some 
monks to the war effort.   
“The country has witnessed more religious violence than ever before” (Interview with Sri 
Lankan Sinhala woman who visited UK in July 2008).  
 
Fig 3.2 Image of a protest by the monks (Source www.lankalibrary.com/images/peace7 accessed 
18/08/2007) 
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In 1990 the LTTE forced thousands of Muslims out of their Northern homeland.  In 2006 there 
were attacks on Catholic/Christian churches in the south and central provinces. Presently the 
military victory of the government is represented as a Sinhala Buddhist victory rather than a 
collective victory for the Sri Lankans (telephone Interview with academic who visited Sri Lanka 
after LTTE defeat, August 2009).   
 
Apart from the ethnic and geographical differences, the other divisions that are detrimental to 
social relations are the caste and class structures that are deeply rooted within society and are 
tools used to humiliate people. 
 
Caste and class structures 
The Sinhala/Tamil community is further divided at intra-community level on the grounds of caste, 
class and geography (Tennakoon 1971; Jayawardena 1987).  This division is even visible in their 
dress code.  Among the Tamils the divisions are between North, Eastern and the Plantation 
Tamils.  The caste system deeply rooted within both communities is more complex and 
hierarchical, where the upper class come from the upper castes.   At times these internal divisions 
have proved more significant than the ethnic divide, for example when upper class Tamil 
politicians joined the Sinhalese during the handover of power from the British rather than 
Plantation Tamils because Plantation Tamils are considered lower caste.   
 
Caste is also a fact that has divided the Tamil community (North, East and Plantation Tamils) and 
even visible among the LTTE.  An observation made was that the caste and class has played a 
major role in determining the support towards the LTTE. The LTTE was equally aware of this and 
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have warned people to avoid engaging in conversations regarding caste (Goodhand 2000).Caste 
and class have been used to humiliate minority groups and exclude them from the political power. 
The resistance to this marginalisation has paved the way for the development of Tamil/Sinhala 
militancy that has involved many actors. 
   
Key Players in the conflict 
The key players to this prolonged conflict that have claimed thousands of lives, displaced many 
and made many to flee the country can be cited as the Government of Sri Lanka (SLGO) headed 
by an Executive President who have unlimited power including immunity from prosecution even 
after he/she cease to hold office, the LTTE, the IPKF and the Norwegian peace brokers.  From 
time to time in a fragile political environment, there have been others such as the nationalistic 
Sinhalese parties, the JVP a party that represents an extreme-nationalist Sinhalese view in Sri 
Lanka and is made up mostly of Sinhalese youth, with a potent mixture of Marxism and 
Nationalism, Tamil parties and non state military groups, who are equally responsible for 
exacerbating and promoting violence.  Other minority groups, mainly the Muslims in the Northeast, 
the civil society, and international agencies continue to play an important role.  
 
Two violent insurrections in 1971 and 1987 by the JVP further complicated the social and political 
situation.  The 1971 insurrection was crushed by the then government.  The brutal methods used 
to suppress the insurrection resulted in Mrs. Bandaranike the then prime minister being stripped of 
her civic rights by the UNP government who came into power in 1977.   However, the 1989 
insurrection was even more intense in the form of violence used by the government and the JVP.  
The scale of violence of 1987-1989 has led to approximately 60,000 deaths and 30,000 
disappearances (Commission of inquiry 1997).  Additional effects are the losses to state property, 
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infrastructure and the adverse impact on the economy.  Most importantly, violent methods used by 
the JVP and  state military promoted a culture of impunity, the breakdown of democratic 
institutions, governance, inter-social relations; creating an environment of corruption and mistrust 
that has spread across society. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed mapping of the development of the 
conflict, which has taken many turns involving a number of national and international players.   
Based on a review of the literature the thesis will briefly highlight some mile stones that have set 
the stage for the development of Tamil/Sinhala militancy.  The thesis will argue that the scale of 
violence that was used to humiliate the Tamil community as well as Sinhala community (GBV, 
human rights abuses, suicide bombings and theatrical killings, committed by all state/non state 
military actors), has contributed to the current crisis.  Violence and impunity has become an 
island-wide feature.  Humiliation, structural violence and GBV can be seen as a direct outcome of 
the conflict as well as a factor that is exacerbating the conflict. 
 
From Independence to Republic (1948 to 1972)  
There is evidence to establish that the Sinhalese and Tamils have lived in Sri Lanka, formerly 
known as Ceylon, from ancient times (Zakariya and Shanmugaratnam accessed in 2005) with 
ethnic differences being less important to the strong caste system based on occupation and 
colonial dynamics, which was called the Rajakariya system. 
  
The Portuguese came to trade in spices but ruled the coastal areas until 1658, as did the Dutch 
from 1658 to 1796 until displaced by the British.  In 1815, the kingdom of Kandy was ceded to the 
British who thereafter established their rule over the Island. Railway transportation, 
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communications, western medical services, English education, as well as the plantation industry 
(coffee, tea, and rubber) and banking systems were developed during British rule, thus leading to 
the creation of a new English educated middle class bourgeois (Jayawardena 2000) who made 
their fortune by engaging in these trades and later went on to change the political landscape of 
post colonial Sri Lanka.   
 
Independence from the British was gained in 1948 by a process of peaceful constitutional 
evolution (Jayawardena 1987) as like India and many other countries that fought for 
independence, there was no discourse or struggle over the identity of the state.  The independent 
state was formed in accordance with the Westminster model legislator based on ethnic 
representations giving very limited protection to minority communities. 
  
Under these circumstances and given the deep-rooted caste and class divisions, it did not take 
long for ethnic and social tensions to emerge.  Elections brought governments with a large 
Sinhala majority into power. Power hungry politicians targeting votes often engaged in ethnic 
nationalist rhetoric, undermining the minority communities and their demands for power sharing 
(Sathanathan 1998).  Despite addressing the grievances of the minorities, the Sinhala 
Governments went on to put in place various polices and legislatures which further exacerbated 
the grievances.  
 
Citizenship Act 
The process of undermining checks and balances that were incorporated in the British-drawn 
constitution to safeguard minority rights began with the disenfranchisement of the bulk of the 
Indian Tamil plantation population under the Citizenship Act of 1948.  The outcome of this 
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legislation was the majority of the Indian Tamil population being made stateless and facing 
humiliation as outcasts.  
 
Sinhalese Only Act of 1956 
Sinhala Buddhist cultural revivalism in the 1950s took a new phase when it entered the political 
arena.  Serving the growth of anti-minority sentiments (De Mel 2001), Dharmapala and other 
Sinhala Buddhists like the editor of the ‘Aryan’ propagated the myth that the Sinhalese were of 
Aryan origin and therefore,  superior to the non-Aryan Tamils and Muslims (Zackariya and 
Shanmugaratnam accessed 2005).  The 1956 elections elected a government with a dominant 
Sinhala Buddhist ideology, who passed the Sinhala Only Act.  This act legalised Sinhala, the 
language of the majority community, as the only official language, thereby affecting a considerable 
proportion of people who spoke Tamil and English.  
 
Mr A was among the many affected. The transfer of court work from English to Sinhalese and his 
inability to communicate in Sinhalese made him leave Jaffna for Colombo. Now aged 86 years 
old, he still remembers the hardship he faced. 
 
“I came to Colombo to find work. This was not easy, as several lawyers had come to 
Colombo by this time. I used to go every day to court and wait anxiously till I got work. 
There were days I found work and on other days not. We had a real difficult time, I had an 
unmarried daughter and a son who was about to enter university to support and pay for 
the rent l with my earnings, which was not very certain. This is what the Sinhalese did to 
us” (interview with 86 year old Tamil man living in the UK, 2004). 
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Speaking in parliament about the move, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva a leading socialist pointed out the 
disaster that it would bring upon the country and pleaded: 
 
“Do you want two languages and one nation or one language and two nations? 
Parity, Mr. Speaker, we believe is the road to the freedom of our nation and the 
unity of its components. Otherwise two torn little bleeding states may yet arise out 
of our little state, ready for the imperialist to mop up that, which imperialism has 
only recently disgorged”   (Thevanayagam  2006). 
 
His words soon proved to be real when the policy triggered the first inter-racial riots since 
Independence killing hundreds of Tamil people and destroying property. 
 
Standardisation of Education 
The other controversial policy was the university admission policy, known as standardisation 
where the state aimed at discriminating against minority communities. This placed the minimum 
entry requirements for a Tamil student higher than that for a Sinhala Student (Bastian 1985). The 
effect of this was a drastic reduction in the number of Tamil students entering university  
(Jayawardena 1987).  By this time the North had a well-developed education system with leading 
Anglican/Christian schools being established by the missionaries.  The standard of education was 
high and a large number of students were entering university in comparison to other areas of the 
country.  As such this was a massive blow to the Tamil youth. 
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This not only marginalised the Tamils within the national education system, but led to further class 
divisions among the Tamils.  The upper class, who could afford send their children to foreign 
universities, while youth from the lower classes struggled to enter a local university.  
 
State Colonisation Programme 
In addition to the standardization of education and Sinhalisation of the state, the government 
introduced a policy of population re-distribution that further intensified the tensions. The policy was 
aimed at re-distributing Sinhalese population into the area known as the Dry Zone, which was 
considered by the Tamils to be part of their homeland.   
 
Patrick Peebles (Feb 1990: 32) explains the population impact upon various districts in the Dry 
Zone and claims that the dramatic increase occurred and the change in the population cannot be 
confused with natural growth: “From 1946 to 1959 Sinhalese had increased from 19 percent to 54 
percent. In 1976 they constituted 83 percent of the population. Since independence, the Dry Zone 
has been transformed from a plural society to a homogenous Sinhalese Buddhist one.”  The 
important aspect of this is the association with the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Sri 
Lankan Tamils. It was the beliefs of both sides that led to the region becoming highly contested. 
 
The First Republican Constitution  
The next major junction in the deteriorating ethnic relations was the introduction of the first 
republican constitution in 1972, which changed the name from Ceylon to “Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka”. This constitution, while proclaiming Sinhalese as the official language, 
declared that Buddhism had the ‘foremost place’ in Sri Lanka, thus almost affirming a Sinhala-
Buddhist state (Jayawardena 1987). This was followed by a move towards state socialism that 
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sought to nationalise large parts of industry and services such as transport, railway and postal 
further denying the minority the only available way of fulfilling their professional aspirations in the 
private sector after they were overthrown from state employment by the language policy.   
 
These state policies adopted at structural level coupled with the intersecting social divisions of 
class, caste and ethnicity worked towards marginalising and humiliating a significant proportion of 
the population. The result of this was two violent insurrections by the Sinhala youth and protracted 
vicious military conflict between the state and LTTE consisting of men and women from the Tamil 
minority who are claiming an independent state in the North east parts of the country. 
 
Growth of militancy 
The failure of successive governments to adopt an inclusive policy towards the minorities as well 
as discriminatory programmes aimed at humiliating Tamils and the inability to establish good 
governance and democracy, led to the emergence of militant Tamil nationalist group, the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) in the early 70s.  Both the Tamil political parties and the TULF 
began to put forward demands for autonomy (Rupasinghe eds. 2006).  The state continued to 
ignore these demands due to the pressure from the Sinhalese nationalists, who stressed that any 
concessions to Tamils would lead to a separation of the state. The refusal of the state to take 
Tamil demands seriously deepened the crisis and led to the 1983 riots that contributed to the 
growth of full scale military confrontations. 
 
The July 1983 violence   
On 23 July 1983 the LTTE killed 13 Sri Lankan Army soldiers when the truck in which they were 
travelling hit a landmine on Palaly road in the North of Sri Lanka. The next day the army retaliated by 
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killing 41 people in the Jaffna town (Interview with a retired Army Col. who served as a soldier in 
Jaffna in 1983: UK April 2005). 
. 
The stand taken by the government with regards to the riots was clear by a report published by  
Graham Ward of the Daily Telegraph, in the 18 July 1983 He quoted President Jayawardena as 
saying “I am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people now. Now we cannot think of 
them. Not about their lives or of their opinion about us." These words indicated that the Sri Lankan 
state had abandoned a segment of its citizens and was not prepared to listen to them any longer.    
 
Writings on the July riots (Piyadasa 1984) and interviews with many Tamil people who left the 
country as a result of the violence confirm that the actions were very much planned.  The ambush 
of the soldiers was only a convenient starting point for the already mounting tensions between the 
government and Tamil militants.    
 
 A driver who was working in Colombo at the time of the riots described how he had transported 
Tamil people in his pickup. 
 
“I put three people in my truck and placed a canvass sheet over and filled the truck with 
bags of fibre pretending that I was transporting fibre to the factory and drove as fast as I 
could through the mobs. They (the mobs armed with clubs, bars, knives and buckets of 
petrol) stopped me at several places and asked if I was transporting Tamil – I was scared 
not only for their lives but also for mine.  If I had got caught then all of us along with the 
truck would have been on fire.  However, we managed to pass Awissalwela before dark 
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and I dropped them in my boss’s holiday home”. (Interview with Mr Welivita ; November 
2004) 
 
The rioting spread despite a curfew and moved up-country. Not only Tamil houses but also Hindu 
temples/schools were attacked.  Areas such as Badulla, Nawalapitiya and Nuwara Eliya where 
plantation Tamils lived were severely affected (interview with former Teacher who lived in Badulla 
at the time Colombo October 2004).  
 
The riots made it clear that the government had articulated violence against a section of its own 
citizens. Tamils were not only subject to violence but were humiliated.  Men and women were 
stripped of their clothes in public and disgraced, beaten and at times raped.  Tamil Houses were 
attacked, looted and set on fire; the perpetrators were at times the Sinhala neighbours and at 
times were law enforcing officers such as the police. 
 
The humiliation faced by the Tamil community did not end after the violence. Thereafter, Tamil 
men were emasculated through having to give up their right to ancestral names and a symbol of 
fatherhood when their children assumed their mother’s maiden names and religions in order to 
avoid violence and segregation.  Women had to give up the “Pottu” on their forehead, the symbols 
of their marriage and being Tamil for the same reasons.  Many had to leave their employment, 
house and properties and move into refugee camps or return to Jaffna and live in difficult 
conditions.  For a community that had deep rooted patriarchal structures this was a massive 
humiliation that would never be reconciled. In the midst of this, something was certain. The 
country would never be the same again. 
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The anti-Tamil racial conflagration of 1983, the last of a series of riots can be identified as the 
critical point in the relations between the Tamil and Sinhalese relations.   
 
 
Fig 3.3 A Tamil man being assaulted by Sinhalese mob. (Source: pact.lk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/07/304 accessed 2172008) 
 
 
Fig 3.4:  Mob surrounds a vehicle looking for Tamil people (Source: 
www.sangam.org/2009/07/images/BlackJuly262009 accessed 21/7/2008) 
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Fig 3. 5: Property belonging to Tamil businessmen in Pettah under fire.  (Source: 
www.sangam.org/articles/2004/Riot1983 accessed 21/7/2008)  
 
The riots not only brought back bitter memories of these past atrocities and scarred the Tamil 
people. It also led to the collapse of Tamil parliamentary politics. Armed struggle became the 
mode of call for independence.  Traditional Tamil politicians were removed from their positions 
and militant youth with a more radical view took the place of the upper class, western educated 
politicians.  The political struggle shifted from the parliament to the battlefields. 
 
Politicians of both sides who strived to meet their own political ends kept past tragedies alive. 
Many who fled the country as victims of riots were made to believe by the militants that only a 
separate Tamil state would ensure permanent protection to the Tamil community, a belief that 
many hold to date (observations made during field work). The policies of the state and the 
attitudes of the Sinhala political parties further helped this mind set to develop. 
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India’s Intervention  
The fleeing of hundreds of thousands of refugees after the 1983 riots to India and to the west, 
creating a large Tamil diaspora can be argued as adding a new dimension to the conflict.  Sri 
Lanka’s problem became international with India becoming a key player.   Indian troops were sent 
in to the North East for peacekeeping and to monitor a ceasefire and oversee the disarmament of 
the Tamil militant groups. The riots that broke out on the street of Colombo during the signing of 
the Accord and the attempted assault on Indian Prime Minister by a Sinhalese sailor during the 
guard of honour, suggest that the government’s attempt to get popular support for the Accord was 
a failure. Occupation of the North by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) escalated the 
violence that eventually turned into an armed confrontation resulting in the Indo-LTTE war in 
1987-1990 leading to increased violence against civilians by the IPKF.   
 
Second JVP Uprising 
The signing of the Accord was met with hostility by the JVP who were against any form of 
intervention by a foreign military in the internal affairs of the country.  The JVP responded with 
attacks through its military wing “Desha Premi Balakaya” on leading government personalities, 
government supporters and public servants, university students of rival political groups armed 
forces personnel and their families. 
 
The JVP continued its violence by attacking government buildings, including the parliament and 
calling for a sabotage of the elections. Their violence resulted in the breakdown of transport 
services, closure of schools, universities and other vital government services, thus virtually bringing 
the government to a collapse. In retaliation the Government’s death squad, “Black cats”, killed 
thousands of people who they believed were JVP supporters (see Chandraprema 1991; Gunaratna 
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1991; interviews in chapter six and my own experience of living through the conflict during this time 
in Sri Lanka).  
 
Withdrawal of IPKF 
With the pressure increasing from the Sinhalese political parties and the hostilities between the 
LTTE and IPKF increasing, the government led by Ranasinghe Premadasa who came to power in 
the 1989 elections had no other alternative but to request the withdrawal of IPKF from Jaffna.  On 
21st May 1991, Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime minister of India (1984 to 1989), who brokered the 
Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 that was responsible for bringing the IPKF to Sri Lanka, was 
assassinated by an alleged LTTE female suicide bomber Dhanu.  India retaliated by banning all 
LTTE and listing the leader of the LTTE as a wanted man in connection with the assassination. 
 
War for Peace 
The appointment of Mrs. Kumaratunga under the People’s Alliance (PA) in 1994 is significant to this 
research, not only because she was a president whose parents were both leaders of independent 
Sri Lanka but also because she was a woman who came to power in a male dominated society torn 
by conflict and violence.  Her main opponent United National Party (UNP) candidate, Mrs. 
Dissnayake, dubbed by the media as the lady in white (The Sunday Times  30th October 1999 
was the widow of Mr. G. Dissanayke, who was assassinated by the LTTE few weeks before the 
elections.  Both women appealed to female voters of the country.  They presented themselves as 
women who had lost their husbands and fathers to political violence and appealed to the women 
voters as mothers, daughters and wives who understood other women’s grievances that ran 
within this bitter conflict.   
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This was the first time in the political history of Sri Lanka two women were the primary contestants 
for the highest position in the country, the Executive Presidency.  The two women’s political 
campaigns reproduced the patriarchal structures of society calling mothers to protect their children 
from violence and war and punish those who had taken their right to motherhood and as wives.  
The women voters were not considered as political agents with their right to choose 
independently, but as mothers, wives, daughters and sisters who had a duty towards their 
children/husbands.  The call was directed towards women’s natural instincts of motherhood to 
protect their children/relatives from the regime of violence, rather than an intelligent choice of 
protecting democracy, governance and justice.  
 
Playing to the sentiments of the people, the media covering the election campaigns of Mrs. 
Kumaratunga constructed her as a charismatic leader- seeking a mandate for peace and Mrs. 
Dissanayake as the weeping widow of the assassinated G. Dissanayake.  Apart from their status 
as widows, there was one other thing in common; they had political affiliation (through their 
husbands/fathers), class, caste, education, and connections that the majority of the women they 
represented did not have.  
 
The campaigns of Mrs. Kumaratunga presented her as a catalyst for change (peace), a change 
that the people were eagerly waiting for after long years of bitter conflict. The media was at the 
forefront of reproducing the image of women’s innate desire for peace or passivity. The tactics 
worked and she was appointed president in 1994 with an overwhelming majority. 
    
In keeping with her election pledges, she initiated the “Sudu Nelum Mal movement (White Lotus) 
for peace and began negotiations with the LTTE.  Despite Mrs. Kumaratunga’s efforts to continue 
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negotiations, she was unable to gain the support of her party or the opposition as she had 
alienated the opposition by initiating a commission to investigate the disappeared and the 
Batalanda commission to investigate the alleged involvement of the opposition leader.  At the 
same time there was no serious commitment from the LTTE, who was pushing for unrealistic 
demands such as withdrawal of the army from the North East.  As a result, peace talks broke 
down and the period of 1994 – 2000 saw the escalation of violence and an era where the country   
was placed on a “war footing”, or ‘war for peace’. The country’s economic/social development 
activities were put on hold and resources diverted to fight the war including increasing recruitment 
to the armed forces.  Mrs Kumaratunga narrowly escaped an LTTE assassination attempt, though 
lost an eye during an election rally. 
 
CEASE FIRE OF 2002 
The election of 2001 saw the defeat of PA government but Kumaratunga remained president. The 
new UNP government was appointed in December 2001, which led to a Norwegian-mediated 
ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the government and the LTTE in February 2002, which 
brought hope to the people.  According to analysts (Bullion 2006; Goodhand  2005)  the main 
reasons that made this peace deal possible, was the change of government, strong international 
pressure for a non military solution, external facilitation, and the fact that both sides considered 
negotiations more strategic than continued military confrontations.   
 
The CFA led to immediate improvements in the situation.   Within months the route to Jaffna re-
opened allowing the free transportation of goods and people in and out of the conflict areas.  This 
was a tremendous relief to the people in the northeast who had to bear the brunt of the conflict.   
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“I went to see my parents in Jaffna - I had not seen them for about two years, but 
now that the planes (domestic) are flying, I went during the holidays.  My father 
came with me to Colombo, as I wanted to show his leg to a good doctor in 
Colombo (Telephone Interview with Mathi Tamil woman in Sri Lanka October 
2004) 
 
The diaspora responded positively and took the opportunity to visit the northeast.  On return one 
woman told me:  
 
“Now the war is over everything is fine, and people are happy. I visited Batticaloa 
and Jaffna; we also went to the temple. It was so good to go to Jaffna after we left 
in 1986. I took my children with me, we left Jaffna when my daughter was four 
months and my son has never seen the place”. (42-year-old woman from Jaffna 
and now living in the UK, March 2004) 
 
The atmosphere in Colombo was equally positive 
 
“Thank god now there is no fighting, we can move about without fear, otherwise we are 
scared to get into a bus or go to Fort or Petta, not knowing whether we will come home. I 
am worried when my daughter and her children leave home for work and school-until they 
get home” (Telephone interview Sinhala Woman living in Wattala, Sri Lanka, April 2004) 
 
However, soon there were complaints about the breach of the agreement by both parties (Email 
correspondent with former SLMM member October 2006).  Additionally the Sinhala nationalistic 
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elements (JVP, JHU and other groups) who were opposed to any form of external mediation 
continued to accuse the SLMM for sympathising with the LTTE. 
 
With the ceasefire leading nowhere and with increasing confrontations between the government 
forces and the LTTE a return to war was unavoidable. The subsequent general election in 2005 
brought to power president Mr. Rajappkse, who adopted a hardliner approach.   
 
As CFA violations continued attempts for a political solution failed. The government’s attempts to 
gain wider political support from opposition parties failed and in January 2008 the CFA was 
unilaterally abolished by the government.  Thus, allowing the government and the LTTE to 
continue with its violent campaign for military supremacy. The government’s conduct of the war, 
the abuse of the civilians and the mass scale human rights violence has provoked massive 
demonstration across European countries by the Tamil diaspora (see Fig 1.2 in page 32).  Many 
international agencies and governments have responded by calling on the International Criminal 
Court and the Security Council to investigate and try key members of the government and the 
military for war crimes. 
 
In the wake of the government declaring military victory over the LTTE and where the LTTE has 
openly accepted that “this war has come to a bitter end” (http://www.tamilnet.com accessed  
16/05/09) it is important for us to look at the responses to the conflict by the key stake holders as 
this will help us understand the complexities surrounding the conflict that will need more than a 
military victory by the state to end. 
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RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT 
As pointed out previously, violence and the response to this humiliation (individual, communal and 
military) has been the key factor that has determined the past and present of Sri Lankan politics.  
In the following section I intend to provide a brief overview of the response to the conflict. 
Military 
The conflict has resulted in the militarisation of society. The use of terror, abductions and 
theatrical killings are widespread. Violence in the form of bomb explosions, attacks on civilians, 
abductions, torture, GBV and death has become a daily occurrence not only in the northeast, but 
also in other parts of the country, where political violence has become endemic.   
 
The military has been assigned with the authority to make key decisions not only relating to 
security, but also on governance and other aspects such as culture.  Since the beginning of the 
conflict military groups including the security forces, LTTE and politicians with connections to 
gangs and non state armed groups have gain increased power. There are a number of armed 
groups who receive state patronage but are not accountable to the state such as police 
commandos, armed security guards of MPs, Tamil militant groups and Home Guards, and 
underworld mafia who are largely backed by politicians. 
 
 In spite of the government’s military victory over the LTTE, the war has been badly managed over 
a period of time.  There are thousands of deserters who have become a major threat not only to 
the law and order of the south but also to the safety of women. These men are said to be behind 
criminal activities such s abductions, drug deals(telephone interview with woman who mentioned 
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that her son a former military man is in police custody for selling drugs on the streets), and sexual 
violence against women.  
 
In the east and parts of the north, counter-insurgency functions have been handed over to other 
non-state military groups such as the Karuna Fraction10 who are responsible for widespread 
human rights abuse.  Amnesty international reports reveal illegal torture chambers run by Military 
groups, where civilians have been detained and have been subject to torture and even murder.   
 
In this context even though the government’s military offensives have paid off the price on the 
civilians including the soldiers has been heavy.  The current position of the government seems to 
be that after the death of its leaders the LTTE has been permanently destroyed.  The victory of 
the government forces are celebrated in a way that adds insult to the injuries of the Tamil civilians 
who are undergoing tremendous suffering in the camps designed for the internally displaced. The 
euphoric mentality among many Sinhalese people, who came to the streets to celebrate after the 
victory of the military, leaves limited space for a political settlement or national reconciliation 
(telephone Interview with academic who visited Sri Lankan in August 2009). 
 
Despite the government’s victory it has not yet been able to account for the capture of weapons 
belonging to the LTTE or account for the offshore infrastructure that was possessed by the LTTE.    
While the government forces have captured the territory controlling and holding of the conquered 
territory will requires clear strategy and manpower.  Therefore, it can be argued that defeating the 
LTTE militarily is only a short term solution and there is a real need for a political reconciliation 
                                                 
10 Karuna was the body guard of LTTE leader Prbhakaran later who left the organisation taking with him a group of  
LTTE cadres from the Eastern Province.  Later he joined the Government and was instrumental in the LTTE defeat 
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however difficult it may be to accept.  Even though the government has claimed military victory it 
has lost on the Tamil people’s support due to the unprecedented scale of violence, humiliation 
and suffering it has inflicted on them. This was proved by the recent presidential elections held in 
February 2010 where the candidate of the opposition party Major Sarth Fonsekea (the former 
army commander who was in office during the LTTE defeat) managed to secure the majority of 
votes in the North East region.  There is growing diaspora who has previously distanced itself from 
the LTTE but is now willing to support them if they bounce back (observations made during the 
mass demonstrations that took place across UK during the months of March-May 2009). The Sri 
Lankan government have alienated many western governments by the heavy handed manner it 
has dealt with some diplomatic issues including the human rights violence.  This lethal cocktail of 
unaccounted weapons, unaccounted LTTE senior cadres, people who no longer trust the 
government and who are willing to take revenge, financial and ideological support from a large 
diaspora and a alienated western governments can be very detrimental to  Sri Lanka unless it 
builds an inclusive political culture that will uphold the rights of the minority communities. 
 
Civil Society 
The complexities of the conflict are visible in the way that the civil society has been responding to 
the conflict.  The ethnic divisions and the geographical division between the northeast and the rest 
of the country - have been reinforced by the lack of interaction and frightful experiences 
throughout the war. This has been further inflamed by language barriers and lack of trust. These 
divisions are a result of the war and at the same time factors that further complicate the war. 
 
The limited ability for civil society intervention and the lack of communication between the civil 
society actors of the south and north contribute to this ethnic/geographical divide. On the militants 
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side this is something that the LTTE encouraged among its cadres (see Chapter Six) - to distance 
themselves from their own community.  The differences within the hardliners (nationalists on both 
sides) and moderates (e.g. the peace non-governmental organisations) also have contributed to 
the divisions.  Sri Lanka’s civil society is inescapably shaped by the civil war and its various actors 
engage in a battle over war and peace and contribute to shaping the future of the island and its 
people. 
 
In this environment, the thesis argues that neither military action, nor constitutional changes by 
itself are sufficient to bring sustainable peace.  There is a need to tackle deep-rooted grievances 
and prejudices of all communities including the humiliation inflicted by violence.  The possible 
solutions to the conflict lie within a viable political solution that recognises the intersecting social 
divisions and the acceptance of it by all communities.  As evident in this research civil society can 
be cited as a problem as well as a solution.  Extreme nationalist groups such as the National 
Movement against Terrorism and elements of the Buddhist monks (Fig 3.2 page 60) have fuelled 
the conflict.  On the other hand the hardliners among the Tamil community are equally to be 
blamed for protracting the conflict. The representation of the Tamils/Sinhalese as the deadly 
‘other’ has divided society leaving little room for independent political space.  The State and the 
LTTE have systematically eliminated emerging political competition.  Experience to date confirms 
that actions at political level will always determine the ability of the civil society to build bridges 
across communities. 
 
The response to the conflict is largely shaped by the way the Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim 
community (including military and political) have responded to the humiliation and violence 
including GBV faced by them at the hands of each other.  Humiliation has become a vicious cycle 
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where violence is reproduced.  Therefore, a sustainable solution will also have to address the 
issue of human rights violence, GBV and humiliation at inter-as well as intra community level 
taking into account the intersecting identities of the people across communities. 
 
Summary 
As evident from this analysis of the desk based research supplemented by interview material  it 
can be argued that, the conflict is largely rooted in the post colonial policies adopted by the 
Sinhalese governments to humiliate and exclude a proportion of its people from the political 
process. Therefore, the crisis cannot be simply reduced to an ethnic problem.  At the heart of the 
conflict is the state with its colonial heritage, which has worked towards discriminating and 
humiliating the minority communities at structural level. 
  
Westminster model legislature inherited from the British did not provide any protection to the 
minorities, from the majority rule.  Power conscious politicians have thrived on nationalistic 
sentiments for their own survival, making use of the intra-community social divisions such as class 
and caste to further divide people. Since independence, parties in power have relied on national 
rhetoric to divert attention from the inefficiency of the state. The 1983 riots are evidence of the 
government’s success in the creation of anti ethnic tensions and dividing the people on communal 
lines. 
 
In this battle for political supremacy, significant powers have been granted to the military, which 
have become a powerful force and have used and abused its power to fuel the government’s anti-
democratic ambitions and humiliate the enemy.  Since the beginning of this war, the actions of the 
armed forces have contributed towards undermining the human rights and humiliating minority 
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groups as well as increased GBV.  The response to this by non state armed groups including the 
LTTE and JVP has been no better. Until their defeat these groups work towards achieving power 
and political ambitions through the bullet rather than the ballet.  Overall, continued violence has 
had negative implications for the country.  Civil society influence in the process has rapidly diluted 
due to the intersecting social divisions as well as the draconian rules put in place  by the state to 
silence political opponents and human rights activists. 
 
Despite the cost to the majority of the people, the conflict and related instability have brought 
benefits to others such as those non state-military groups who are operating under the patronage 
of the government and are free to carry out violence. Some key members of the government who 
have benefitted economically.  For some, such as the Jathaka Hela Urumaya (JHU – An extreme 
nationalist political party the conflict has become a means to attain political legitimacy, wealth and 
recognition. As such these groups continue to divide the society for their benefit. 
 
The impacts of conflict are not contained to the North.  There is a legacy of violence in the South 
which has an impact on social relations.  The South and some parts of the central hills have been 
the main recruitment ground both for the JVP and the Sri Lankan army (Observations made 
during field work).  There is also a potential of other armed group to emerge from the areas due to 
the short sighted actions of the government who have provided young men with weapons at 
village level to fight the LTTE (Rathnayake 2007) as well as with the LTTE carders who have gone 
into hiding after the LTTE defeat.  Therefore, it could be suggested that the conflict is the result of 
a complex mix of intersecting factors, which have changed and inflated over time. Any attempt for 
resolution will have to be negotiated within this context. 
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The conflict has not merely affected political and social relations. It has also affected gender 
relations.  Apart from the obvious example of women bearing arms on both sides (Chapter Five 
page 120), in many other respects women’s lives have been affected in different and complex 
ways (Chapter Four and Six) depending on their intersecting identities such as class, ethnicity and 
political affiliation.  Women are caught in the power struggle between the political parties as well 
as the competing militaries.  As discussed in Chapter Four (page 87), in this militarisation process 
women’s bodies have become sites of war where violence has been reproduced.  
 
While there is a tendency to view military victory and a political package as the solution to the war, 
the research has established that it is a more complex situation that requires a wider frame of 
analysis  if there is going to be an acceptable solution to all communities.  Long-term structural 
stability in Sri Lanka depends on fundamental reforms of the state and the institutionalization of 
democratic policies as well as reconciling the humiliation faced by minorities. The longer the 
violence and human rights abuse continues, the harder the task becomes.  Establishing peace will 
involve building a new political culture that can accept and include all intersecting social 
categories such as gender, class and ethnicity and restore the self esteem of the survivors of 
violence and humiliation and to uphold human security.  
 
Women’s situation within this military nationalism has remained neglected for too long by analysis 
of the conflict that has gone along with the representation of women as victims or perpetrators of 
violence with little understanding of the intersecting identities of women.  In Chapter Four the 
thesis will explore the relationship between women and militarised nationalism and examine how 
women and their sexuality have been constructed within the militarised nationalistic discourse in 
its attempt to create the respectable state.  Using examples such as the imposition of a dress 
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code and the cases where women have been subject to humiliation and violence I will analyse the 
impact of militarisation on women’s lives and how the military  have used and abused women in 
their attempt to gain military supremacy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF WOMENHOOD AND SEXUALITY WITHIN MILITARISED 
NATIONALISM 
 
Women and their sexuality have become important to anti-colonial, nationalist movements in late 
ninetieth and early twentieth century South Asia (Chatterjee 1999; De Mel 2001; Jayawardena 
1986). Women’s sexuality has not only been central in the construction of the nation but also used 
in defending the nation’s honour and purity (Yuval Davies & Anthias 1989). This construction of 
womanhood solely based on sexuality have rendered women’s bodies to become sites where 
violence can be unleashed and the communities these women belong to be humiliated and 
punished.  Yasmin Thambiah (2005) suggests that this is due to the idea that any form of sexual 
transgression (consented or forced) outside the marriage has the capacity to make society further 
disintegrated - is a belief that can be powerfully manipulated. This is especially true where long 
term war has compromised social process and institutions that signal normalcy and when national 
identity is seen to be under threat (Palmary 2003).  In this context, it becomes essential to protect 
the honour of the nation by protecting the women who belong to the nation from the “enemy” as 
well as from their own sexual transgressions.  Thus, men fight to protect their women’s honour 
and at the same time dishonour the enemy women or at times even men who are emasculated by 
the act of rape (Zarkov 2001; BMF 2000). 
 
Pettman argues that when comparing nationalist struggles across the world there is a remarkable 
similarity in the way women are constructed in the nation building projects which is a reminder that 
nationalism is always gendered (Wilford 1998).  Although the historical context of nation building 
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can be different from each other for example such as in the creation of Pakistan where a new 
state was formed primarily on religion as, opposed to Sri Lanka where there was no question of 
state formation, there are commonalities in representations patriarchal, patterns of control and 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.  This is particularly so with regard to the ways in which 
excusive national identities are constructed through gendered, hierarchies and how these 
experiences have been narrated (De Mel 2001; Jayawardena 1986).    
 
A key way in which women are represented during armed conflict and national building projects is 
that through women’s caring and nurturing roles.  Through these roles women are constructed as 
caregivers, educators of children and keepers of family relations and assigned the task of 
transmitting social and cultural customs and values (Yuval Davies 1992; Palmary 2003). Often 
women’s behaviour and appearance such as in the clothes they wear become signifiers of culture. 
The transgression of these boundaries (i.e accepted behaviour/clothes) are dealt with severe 
punishment such as disowning by the community, subjecting to violence and humiliation and at 
times even death as evident from the case of Sriyalatha  (page 106) and Thilaga (page 110) in 
this chapter.  
 
In Sri Lanka the relationship women have had with nationalism during the struggle for 
independence from the colonial power and throughout the struggle for the anticipated Tamil state 
have proven to be difficult. (De Mel 2001; Jayawardena 1986; Sornarajah 2004; Zakariya & 
Shanmuganathan accessed 2005).  As identified in Chapter Three, the conflict has led to adverse 
political and social impacts ranging from the militarisation of society, humiliation of a large 
proportion of people due to the structural violence of the state, GBV including women taking up 
arms to fight the state is discussed further in chapter five. The construction of womanhood and the 
90 
 
relationship between men and women have been key to the success of this struggle for the 
“imagined state” (read nations) (Anderson 1983).  Militarism has also called upon women to 
protect the culture and the honour of the nation (Yuval Davies & Anthias 1989) and become 
biological reproducers of valiant sons who protect the land (Sornarajah 2004).  
 
Despite the fact that women are incorporated into nation building programmes in many different 
and contradictory ways, what is common to many militarised nationalistic projects is the 
representation of women either as victims or perpetrators of sexual transgressions, including 
violence. This narrow representation has failed to recognise that women live multiple and layered 
identities and has undermined the diverse lived experience of women at times of conflict and 
militarism.   
 
 As the research established, women experience conflict in many different ways based on their 
intersecting identities and overlapping gendered roles assigned to them within their communities.  
Despite these diverse experiences, representing women only as “victims and/or perpetrators” 
tends to serve the needs of the military and political ambitions of hegemonies that control 
women’s lives/bodies.  
 
Drawing upon the available literature and the fieldwork this chapter will explore how womanhood 
and sexuality have been constructed at times of militarised ethnic national liberation struggles, 
women’s experience within the discourse of nationalism and how women negotiate and resist the 
control of their bodies.   It is expected that these cases will provide insight into how gender and 
sexuality are constructed, represented and controlled in the interest of militarised, nationalist 
projects where women’s bodies become central.  
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Fig: 4.1 A Palestinian women carrying a child in one hand and a weapon in the other. In the 
background is the Flag of the Nation. 
 (Source treyjackson.typepad.com/junction/images/femal.accessed 22/7/2006) 
 
Women’s bodies as the pride of nation 
There is evidence to suggest that during the campaign for independence a significant strand of 
nationalist and colonial agitation took place over the status and bodies of Ceylonese women both 
within and outside the domestic sphere (De Alwis 2002; De Mel 2001).  It was women’s bodies 
and their upbringing that were produced as the repositories and signifiers of local culture and 
tradition through political discourse as well as popular culture (De Alwis 2002; De Mel 2001).  The 
education of women, their employment, their struggle for political rights and taking up public roles 
has been seen as potential threats to tradition and family life.  In their book Casting Pearls Malathi 
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de Alwis & Kumari Jayawardena (2001) describe how the women’s franchise movement were met 
with resistance from senior politicians such as Dr. Ponnamblam Ramanathan and other right wing 
politicians who dominated the political arena at the time.  
 
“Do not throw pearls before swine, for they will turn and rend you.  What suits European 
Women will not suit us” (Sir P Ramanathan in his reply to Donoughmore Commission, 
Nov 1927: 248) 
 
This is evident to how women’s participation in public life has been resented and subjected to 
humiliation by patriarchy even during the struggle for independence from the colonial powers.  
The resistance and violence faced by the Mothers Front from the state and the LTTE (Chapter 
Seven page 208) is evident to that militarism and patriarchy will always restrict women’s 
political/public participation using GBV and humiliation as tools of oppression, when women 
challenges their authority and  existence. 
 
In Sri Lanka the early stages of independency the revival of the nation/culture was set around the 
concepts of land and language (De Mel 2001; Sornarajah 2004). Thereafter during the late 50’s 
women’s bodies became the sites of communal violence.  When ethnic riots broke out large 
numbers of women were subject to humiliation through the use of rape and sexual abuse 
(information gathered during filed work and authors reflections of the 1983 riots).  Violence on 
women was not only from the enemy but also within the community.  Such violence was justified 
as a course to protect the honour and integrity of the community.  Women’s bodies that were the 
sites of violence were considered not worthy of life and Zakriya & Shanmuganathan (accessed 
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2005) reveals how Muslim women were asked to jump into wells rather than being raped by 
Sinhala mobs.   
 
When the political struggle was replaced by the military struggle for a separate homeland, the 
unprecedented scale of violence by the militants and the response to this violence by the state 
(page 68) contributed to the militarisation of society.  The militarisation of society can be defined 
as a process, by which a person gradually comes to be controlled and comes to depend for 
his/her wellbeing on the military and its ideas.  The more a person  is transformed by the 
militarisation process the more he/she come to imagine military needs and militarised 
presumptions to be not only valuable but also to be normal.  This process can also involve cultural 
as well as institutional, ideological and economic transformation (Enloe 2000; Chenoy 2002).  As 
such it could be argued that the formation and ideologies of military, whether of the state or a 
guerrilla movement, are primarily based on power and control that is mostly associated with 
patriarchal structures. These structures privilege certain constructions of masculinity, which 
require the representation of women/feminine as the “other” (Chenoy 2002; Enloe 2000; Yuval 
Davies 1997; Thambiah 2005). Bodies that do not fall within these privileged groups are 
humiliated and punished with the use of GBV. 
 
Under this militarisation process the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE have used various strategies 
to increase their methods of surveillance on public especially on women in the perceived interest 
of national security.  Security itself is narrowly defined in terms such as security of military and 
political personal, machinery and economic targets. This conception of security and the 
representation that the enemy (i.e Tamil/Sinhala) being the most dangerous form of insecurity, 
have raised questions about the intersections of security.  This “fear of the enemy” has ignored 
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other forms of insecurity such as GBV, abductions and extrajudicial killings, child abuse, poor 
governance and domestic violence that humiliate and destroy women’s self respect, identity and 
lives.  This process of militarisation has left no space for intersecting divisions such as different 
ethnic identities, loyalty and political positioning.  Loyalty under militarisation has been demanded 
forcibly through the use of GBV, intimidation and humiliation as witnessed in Sri Lanka.  
 
The state has deployed instruments such as the PTA against political rivals branding them as 
national threats and accusing them of treason to justify its intrusion into the private life 
(Rathnayake 2007; observations made in the field).  This intrusion has gone to the extent of 
surveillance over sexual practices through raids on brothels and guesthouses in areas of the 
capital under the guise of housing terrorists (Thambiah 2005).  Also to communication equipment 
such as checking mobile phones and laptops (Rathnayake 2007; telephone interview with NGO 
worker in Vuniya Aug 2009) and on national media through press censorships, and intimidating 
media personnel who disobey state guidelines. 
 
This censorship has also been extended to films by removing sexual scenes from certain films, 
even though these films were to be released under the adult’s only category (Rathnayake 2007).  
According to Rathnayake (2007) addressing issues around economic crisis, poverty, gender 
discrimination and sexual politics through cinema are crucial in understanding society.  As such it 
is incomprehensible that the authorities are eager to prevent public engagement with these issues 
but rather only provide the people with miss-interpreted information that can be used to inflate 
government and military pride. 
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Critics suggest that (Ratnayake 2007) the reality is that the Ministry of Defence is under 
instructions to prevent anything they consider a challenge to State authority.  Rather they pretend 
that these issues interfere with national security and curtail any public/intellectual engagement 
with such topics.    
 
As evident from the regular humanitarian agency reports, displacements, rapes, disappearances, 
abductions, assassinations, mass killings are not considered a threat to national security. These 
human rights violations and GBV have become acceptable to the state under the guise of 
defeating the enemy. People are told that the government and its armed forces are engaged in 
protecting the country from all insecurities. Despite that, there is a genocide or “war without 
witness” (Channel 4 news 11th May 09) in the North.11  
 
What is shameful is that while the government is engaging in this surveillance of its citizens, the 
conduct of the armed forces and at times politician’s, goes unchecked. Over the recent years the 
human rights violence in the country has escalated beyond comprehension, thousands of people 
have been killed, displaced or imprisoned in displacement camps without access to humanitarian 
agencies. More than 2000 unidentified, mutilated, decapitated and burned bodies have been 
found in the capital and the surrounding region (Telephone interview with journalist in Colombo 
March 2009). While the UN Co-ordination offices for Humanitarian affairs have reported that over 
13,000 Tamil civilians have disappeared from the government held relief camps (http://www.Tamil 
                                                 
11 There is an increase on violence, abductions in the heart of Colombo, intimidation and violence on opposition 
political party candidates at election time. Even when the Eastern province was liberated from the Tigers a woman 
who was in a safe house was raped and most recently two sisters were abducted and raped in Baticoloa (Telephone 
interview with journalist October 2007). 
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Net.com accessed 02/06/2009). These incidents for the state however, are clearly far less 
dangerous. 
 
For the LTTE on the other hand, honour and respectability has been linked to sexual surveillance 
of its women as well as its military and the recovery of dying national culture. The Sinhala armed 
forces are considered morally and sexually corrupt because their occupation of the peninsula has 
increased the availability of alcohol and the visibility of prostitution (Ratnayake 2007; information 
gathered at focus groups).    The LTTE also engaged in the use of the services of women to 
seduce the enemy and blackmail them12.  Further, the LTTE have encouraged humiliating 
punishments on women prisoners (interview in Chapter Five page 140 with ex-woman combatant 
Thavamini who was on duty at LTTE prison). Therefore, sexual surveillance has become essential 
in the interest of military and moral-sexual security of the nation as well as pursuing a Hippocratic 
liberation policy for its women (Chapter Five page 120). 
 
The state and the LTTE’s attempts to cleanse the society have created a binary between the 
respectability of women and women’s sexuality. Women’s bodies have become the battleground 
where competing militaries (i.e. state and the non state armed forces) battle for the honour of the 
anticipated state.  In this contest women are called upon to bear the burden of protecting the 
respectability of the nation and producing valiant sons (Yuval Davies & Anthias 1989). Women 
who are asserting their re-productive rights and making choices are intimidated and stigmatised.   
In August 2008 a horrifying protest took place in front of a Hospital in the suburbs of Colombo, by 
Buddhist monks opposing LRT (a simple, safe method of family planning) operations on women 
by accusing them of a move to drive the Sinhala nation to extinction. Due to the disruption 
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caused, the procedures were stopped and the women were asked to leave.  In a country where 
the cost of living has sky rocketed due to the conflict, it is a woman’s right to family planning. This 
is also legal in the constitution.  While this was not instigated by the government or military, the 
reasons that triggered the protest are that the extremist Sinhalese fear that family planning will 
lead to the reduction of the Sinhala population and that this is a conspiracy by the NGO’s who 
they allege  are sympathisers of the LTTE. 
 
While there is an attempt to control women’s sexuality and reproductive rights, the breakdown of 
social order has simultaneously created space for women to re-negotiate gender positions, 
economic responsibilities, personal security and autonomy including sexual behaviour (De Mel 
2001; Thambiah 2005). This articulation of gender roles and sexuality that cuts across identities 
such as ethnicity, class and political affiliations has increased the security vulnerabilities to some 
women who are deemed a threat to “national security” i.e. Tamil women, and women in public 
roles by entering/associating with communities/groups that are deemed to be the “other” such as 
the Mannar Women’s Centre (page 29) who was threatened by the use of intimidation and 
violence for their campaign for peace. 
 
The disruptions to social structures and processes have created a discursive space for some 
women to transgress boundaries where other women are more tightly controlled.  For example, 
the continuation of class and caste lines becomes difficult in relief camps and creates an 
environment conducive for intermarriages to take place, while at the same time outside of these 
camps there are strict controls preventing women living/belonging to rival groups or interacting 
with men/women who are deemed enemies.  
                                                                                                                                                
12 Interview with former army colonel on the report on the army’s worse scandal in 2007. 
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Therefore, the transgression of women’s sexual and social autonomy that threatens social order 
can be seen as less welcoming within male dominated nationalist agendas.  For the continuation 
of patriarchy values and military can only be achieved through control of civil society and 
especially women’s bodies.  There is no space for negotiation within such strict codes of conduct.  
In this process curbing women’s sexuality and policing women’s bodies becomes essential not 
only to protect the “honour” of the women but also to protect the honour of the nation, loyalty to 
the armies that represent the nation and the sustainability of the patriarchal structures that are 
challenged during war. 
 
In comparing national liberation struggles in places such as Colombia13, Ecuador14 and elsewhere 
it is evident that no sooner the conflict is over, the women who were drawn in to the national 
struggle had to revert back to their place in society (Enloe 2000).  However, for Sri Lankan women 
protecting the honour and containment of their sexuality has become a priority.  The conflict has 
resulted in the occupation of the north by Sinhala military men and the mass scale displacement 
of Tamil people into other areas out of the North. These movements of people across the regions 
have compromised the traditional patriarchal practices by the Tamil community. Thus, the Tamil 
culture needs to be protected and women’s sexuality and reproductive role needs to be controlled. 
At the same time there is also the need to recruit women into combat to meet the requirements 
and fighting strategies. 
 
In 2002, the attempt to re-claim culture and protect the honour of the homeland, the LTTE  
published a handbill.  It called upon women to preserve the culture through a dress code in a 
                                                 
13 See Justice for Colombia http://www.justiceforcolombia.org/ 
14 Documentary on Chanel 4 unreported world on the banning of abortions March 2008. 
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context where Tamil culture and Tamil self-determination had been comprised by the Sri Lanka 
armed forces.  The handbill insisted that women dress in a manner that preserved Tamil culture.  
Married women were accused of dressing like teenage girls rather than in culturally sensitive attire 
that signalled they were married. They also claimed that school going teenagers, both girls and 
boys were loitering on the beach consuming liquor.  It urged students to honour those who had 
martyred15 themselves in the nationalist cause and called for protests against films that promoted 
perversion.  In conclusion, it read “True women’s rights and women’s freedom are based on your 
education and awareness. Love your land, think of its people, think of its future and make your 
decision”16 . 
 
This was not the first and last attempt by the LTTE to control women, even when women were 
recruited as combatants. A poster put up in Jaffna as early as in 1984 imposed the Ten 
Commandments for women.  This dictated that all young women should wear traditional dress 
(sari), married women should not be seen in public in housecoats, and women should wear their 
hair long and not ride bicycles. Women were threatened with being whipped if they chose to 
disobey these commandments.  The LTTE at the time denied anything to do with it, but later they 
issued a statement in which it called for a similar code of conduct.  
 
“It is important for women to take care in their dress, in their pottu and make-up. It does 
not mean that we are enslaved if we dress according to tradition. Some married women 
say that it is expensive to wear saris. This is not acceptable. Women should dress simply, 
and they should not attract men by their way of dressing. Some women say that is difficult 
                                                 
15 This was an example of how the politics of sacrifice and martyrdom worked towards influencing women’s lives. 
16 A hard copy of this hand bill is available at the Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo Sri Lanka 
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to maintain long hair. These pretensions are wrong. We are engaged in a struggle for 
national liberation. But the changes, which have been taking place in our culture, only 
demean our society.” (De Mel 2001: 216) 
 
This statement directed at women and the younger generation at large can be seen as a 
desperate attempt by the LTTE who on the one hand were unable to cope with the cultural/social 
changes that were sweeping across the Tamil society that they themselves were largely 
responsible for; and to re-gain support from the conservative older generation within the 
community.  When there was no visible “compliance”, other statements were issued in 2005 
showing how determined the LTTE were to control and restrict women’s behaviour and dress. 
LTTE issues dress code for Tamils  
Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers have imposed dress restrictions for Tamil youth, sources in 
Jaffna said. Posters put up by the LTTE have detailed separate dress codes for females 
and males. The growth of beard and long hair has been forbidden for young men. For 
girls, close-fitting shirts and skirts have been banned along with the wearing of trousers. 
Instead girls have been asked to wear the Tamil costume of Shalwar Kameez 
.(Udayan, October 17, 2005)  
 
 
The response to this from the Tamil community in Jaffna as reported in the same news item was:  
 
“This seems worse than the Taliban. But how to protest?” a young Tamil university 
student wondered, lamenting that her student allowance was not sufficient to invest in a 
whole new wardrobe. “Normally a directive like this would bring us out onto the roads in 
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fiery protest. But this is Jaffna and for us it is like living in a killing field,” a woman rights 
activist said. 
 
However, while the response from the women’s groups in the northeast was of anger one woman 
in the UK told me this: 
“I don’t think it is a bad thing, especially things like short skirts are not very good for 
women. More than that now even the low caste girls our dressing like our girls and they 
behave like our children. Those days we  even don’t give them water in cups, we use 
glass jars  and once they use we throw it away, but now they even wear clothes like us 
and want to be equals”. 
 
This woman in her early forties wore skirts and trousers and was adopting the western style of 
living.  Reflecting on what she said made me think that this woman’s approval of the dress code 
was based on her anger that women from lower castes17 wore clothes that were usually worn only 
by the upper castes and she thought that such dresses should only be worn by women of higher 
status.  This was a clear example of how the dress determined the caste and class in this highly 
divided society.  
 
The imposition of the dress code by the LTTE in preserving the culture seemed incomprehensible. 
Despite the claims (De Alwis 2002; Balasingham 1993; Hoole 1990 et al,) that the Jaffna society 
was a traditional society, there were people who were very much urbanised even in the mid 70’s.  
Young boys with long hair and bell bottoms (the beatle styles) were seen in Jaffna during the mid 
70’s and early 80’s.  I met two men who were educated in the UK and lived in Jaffna during the 
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early 80’s.  They showed me old photos of themselves wearing such styles. It was not only the 
clothing but sex out of wedlock was a norm for young men who were being educated in western 
countries in the 70’s (Interview with two men who were studying in the UK in the mid 70’s.  One 
was living together with his ex-girl friend who was also a Tamil 2006). This was also true for some 
women (interview with woman journalist Helen (page 244) who lived in the UK during the 70’s and 
returned to Sri Lanka in 1991). While the other admitted that he had several girl friends during that 
time (interview in 2004). Alcohol on the beach was a recreation to many youngsters (without the 
knowledge of their parents) and love affairs between young girls and boys of school going age 
were not uncommon18.  Films produced in India featuring famous actors and actresses such as 
Shivaji Ganeshan and Jayalalitha were regularly screened in Jaffna. These were films full of 
music, dance and erotic love scenes.   
 
If the cultural changes were already in place, especially with the mass flux of people to western 
countries for education, employment and as a result of displacement to other parts of the country 
(mainly to the capital Colombo) and the winds of change were already blowing across society, 
protection of culture could not be the primary reason for imposing the dress code. 
 
This research has identified how the containment of women and their sexuality, (in this case via 
the dress code) is essential for the military machine. Enloe (1989, 2000) demonstrates how 
gender, women’s sexuality and sex work inform military ideologies and the process of 
militarization, with different and even contradictory consequences depending on their position 
                                                                                                                                                
17 See chapter three page 66 for how the Sri Lanka society is divided on caste. 
18 I came into contact with many men and women who are now in their middle age who had formed love affairs during 
their school years. Some of them continued with their relationships and went on to marry each other, while other 
relationships ended due to many reasons. 
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either as combatants, wives of military men and diplomats, workers and sex workers and 
mediated by factors such as class, ethnicity.  
 
As analysed in Chapter Five, the recruitment of women combatants was vital for the LTTE’s to 
capitalise on its double liberation ideology (Coomaraswamy 1996) and promote the rhetoric of 
liberation to the land and liberation to the women.  While it was essential to recruit women on 
ideological/strategic reasons at the same time the inclusion of women would have jeopardised the 
masculine nature of the military. Hence it became essential to assimilate women to become 
masculine “objects” to minimise the risk of sexual transgression among cadres. The dress can be 
considered a primary tool in this de-sexualizing process.  LTTE women are required to wear 
combat gear and have short or tied up hair with no makeup or jewel other than the cyanide 
capsule on their neck (Interview with former woman combatant Thavamini (page 140).  When they 
were not fighting women were given trousers and white shirts rather than any other attire that 
would impose any signs of femininity.  
  
Traditionally, white colour within Sri Lankan culture is associated with passivity.  Women dressed 
in white are considered to be in mourning.  Therefore, it is considered not suitable for young and 
married woman to wear white unless they are in mourning. 
  
While the women combatants had to be de-sexualised, women within the community needed to 
be constructed as feminine and submissive so that, they would not challenge the authority of their 
men, i.e. the LTTE.  While the sari and long hair-imposed femininity, the behaviour that refrained 
them from interacting with other men in the community or cycling (mobility) was to contain their 
sexuality and independence, so that they would always seek to be “protected” by their men.    
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Controlling women’s sexuality and behaviour was also imperative to preserve the patriarchal 
structures that are the corner stone of the Tamil society.  As a result of the recruitment of men into 
military groups, many married women are left to survive on their own.  In the absence of their 
men, these women need to be protected from interacting with other men in the community as well 
as outsiders (i.e. men of the armed forces who have been dispatched to these areas).   At the 
same time there is a risk that these women who are deprived of sexual relationships within 
marriage may turn to relationships outside marriage.  Even though I was unable to find evidence 
of this during field work due to the sensitive nature of the issue, a Tamil language newspaper 
Virakesari on 2 April 2006, reported  an Member of Parliament for the Tamila National Alliance Mr. 
Ariyanethiran in a speech at a seminar on Women & Culture chaired by the LTTE district 
commander for Ampara stating that he had evidence of 'sexual misconduct' of women Non 
Governmental Organisation workers in the East and of numerous abortions that were taking place 
as a result of such misconduct19.  
 
Therefore, restrictions had to be placed to preserve the pride of the community (nation) as well as 
the honour of men and women who are fighting.  It was also not advisable to expose the young 
militants to the luxuries of life, which they were not privy to in the jungles.  
 
Secondly, the changing life styles of women and girls meant more mobility and access to modern 
life styles that give women social and economical independence.   Many men who are returning 
from the war have not developed social skills that can attract women (this also can be true in the 
case of some men who are more modernised and who did not join the armed groups).  During my 
research through the interviews I had with the Tamil diaspora and the observations made I was 
                                                 
19 http://www.peacewomen.org/news/SriLanka/Jun06/use_of_culture_to_control.html accessed 03/03/ 2009 
105 
 
able to gather evidence of many parents who had children of marriageable age who were anxious 
about finding suitable partners for their daughters and sons, who were westernized. As the 
woman in an earlier interview told me: 
  
“I can’t force my daughter to marry a boy from Jaffna because I know their way of living 
will not be acceptable to her, also I can’t allow her to marry any other than a Sri Lankan 
because that will  disgrace  the family – I don’t understand what to do, so I pray for her 
daily” (Saroja (45)  London 200620) 
 
Apart from the risk of women entering into relationships outside their homes to satisfy their sexual 
needs, there was also a bigger risk of women taking up sexual activities as a means to survive the 
economic hardships.  Unrestricted sexual freedom also posed the threat of unwanted liaisons with 
men, which could result in distraction to the LTTE cadres and to the recruitment of cadres as men 
who have lovers or family would be reluctant to join the LTTE.   
 
Added to this is the politics of martyrdom that is essential for the uninterrupted recruitment of 
cadres to the LTTE.   To become a widow of a hero is the ultimate sacrifice that a woman can 
make for the nation and such sacrifice had to be placed in high esteem. It was a way to keep up 
the morale of male combatants who chose to fight in the knowledge that their wives will remember 
them forever by not marrying again and at the same time for the women in the community to 
appreciate the “widowed” women as role models who have contributed to the cause by sacrificing 
their men.   
                                                 
20 See also chapter eight pages for the narrative of another woman who told me that she encouraged her husband to 
strengthen friendship with another family who had a young boy they considered suitable for their daughter. 
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There is also the danger of liaisons between Sinhalese military men and Tamil women, which can 
contaminate the “pure race” ideology, and would dishonour the community.  This would also send 
signals of disloyalty to the military, which is associated with the nation (in this case the LTTE).  
Any form of sexual activity regardless of the circumstance can often be considered risky because 
this leaves space for compromising the loyalty to the military or national body (Thambiah 2005). 
 
In these circumstances it is of the interest of the LTTE to put restrictions on women to control their 
sexuality and the most effective way of this controlling process was imposing a dress code and 
putting restrictions on women’s behaviour. 
 
Dress as a symbol of ‘othernesses 
As discussed above while being associated with culture, women’s honour and a way of de-
sexualising women, the dress code also became a symbol which differentiates one from another 
(person/culture) and through such differentiation enhanced national pride. As we have seen in 
Chapter Three (page 57)  the dress code has been a way of identifying the community/class or 
caste of a person and also dividing the community on these lines such as up country/low country 
Sinhalese, or Sinhalese and Tamils.  For example, when President Mrs. Kumaratunga wore a 
shalwar Kamiz for a ceremony, there was controversy as to how could the president of the country 
be wearing such an outfit, which was not traditional Sinhalese attire.  Here, the issue became not 
of her immodesty, but the fact that the outfit she chose did not portray a Sinhala woman.  The 
political impact of this was not immediately visible, although Kumaratunga was later accused of 
being a traitor for granting concessions to the LTTE as well as adopting western values. 
    
107 
 
The dress code became a symbol of not only women’s honour but also women’s ethnicity and 
transgressing this  was bringing dishonour to the community she represented. 
 
“I married a man from Jaffna, my sister married a Sinhalese, on the first day my 
mother-in law met my sister she was wearing the Kandyan dress (osariya) and she 
never liked my sister thereafter just because she did not like Kandyan people. At 
the same time my husband did not allow me to wear a kandyan osari, even though 
I liked it because it look beautiful on my figure - this is how divided our people can 
be”. (Interview with a woman married to a Tamil UK 2005)  
 
The potential of being identified as the other through the dress also increased the vulnerability 
Tamil women who are considered a threat to national security.  At times women who transgressed 
the dress code were vulnerable to danger and humiliation 
 
Sriyalatha’s case which took place in Colombo in March 2000 just before I left Sri Lanka and 
reported in the media is an example of this21. The woman Sriyalatha (pseudo name) was dressed 
in a salwar kameez, pants with a long loose top and a shawl draped over her upper body. It is also 
a dress worn by female suicide bombers because it helps conceal explosives.  Security officers 
became suspicious of the woman’s behaviour and asked for her identity card.  She did not have 
one in her possession and had responded in faltering Sinhalese. The security men alerted a 
nearby military checkpoint.  The armed personnel, all men, forced the woman at gunpoint to strip 
in public.  On finding that she had no explosives, “embarrassed” police official took her to the 
                                                 
21 See   Sri Lankan police order female LTTE suspect to strip publicly at gunpoint Source Tamil Canadian  
http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/hrights/index.php/FULL=1000863 accessed 29/07/2004 
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nearest police station where her identity was established as a Sinhala woman from Kurunegala, a 
predominantly Sinhala town close to Colombo. It was also established that she worked as a sex 
worker in the city. 
 
Subsequently, it was revealed that she was from a poor rural family.  Her lover, a soldier had died 
in service. Unable to obtain his salary or any compensation given to families of dead soldiers 
because she was not legally married to him and having no other way to support their child, she 
had come looking for work and had met some other sex workers, and seeing no other alternative 
joined them. As she had no place in Colombo she spent most of the nights with a client or 
otherwise at the central bus station. She had lost her identity card and was unable to obtain a new 
one since she did not have the necessary documents such as a birth certificate.  . 
 
On the day of her arrest she arrived in a place expecting to meet a client. When he did not turn up 
she began loitering to find another. The Temple Tree area in which she arrived was considered 
vulnerable as it was the official residence of the prime minister but occupied by the President at 
the time and was under surveillance. Two armed forces men approached her and asked for her 
identity card22, when she could not produce one, they asked her to raise her arms. Out of fear that 
she would be shot, she kept still. At gunpoint she was asked to raise her kameez and remove her 
undergarments. Later she was taken to the police station and held there for four days, during 
which time she was physically assaulted by those who bombarded her with questions for which 
she had no answer, she was eventually taken before a magistrate on the charge of “failing to 
identify herself properly” and released. 
                                                 
22 This is a photo card issued to all citizens above the age of eighteen stating their, name, DOB, ethnicity, sex and place 
of birth. 
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The only reason for this woman’s humiliation and harassment  which is also routinely directed by 
the security forces against anyone who is deemed to be Tamil (interviews in focus groups and my 
own experience in the field), was that she was dressed in attire, which was commonly worn by 
Tamil women of her age.  While the politics of the dress code is one side of the coin, her story, 
which was covered in the newspapers reveals the other side.  Women have become more 
vulnerable to entering sex work as a result of conflict related economic and social vulnerabilities. 
There are more than 8,000 sex workers in Colombo district, according to Community Strength 
Development Foundation, an NGO (2010). On one hand, it is the outcome of recreational 
schemes of the armed forces, as Enloe (2000) discuss in the context of international militarization. 
However, it is difficult to locate evidence of a policy on sex work by the armed forces in Sri Lanka. 
Yasmin Thambiah (2005) suggests that there is a positive reception by senior officers to offer 
awareness training to their troops on sexually transmitted diseases/HIV, which indicates that the 
military is well aware that men regularly visit sex workers and they do not forbid this.  
. 
Enloe (1989, 2000) has drawn clear links between the military and prostitution/sex industry, 
showing how prostitution has been strategically used to boost the morale of the military.  I did not 
find evidence in my research to suggest that brothels or sex houses were organised exclusively 
for the military in Sri Lanka, unlike in the Philippines.  Instead the sex industry is organised by 
civilians in places such as Anuradhapura, which is the main transit point for the military 
(observations made during field work; Rathnayake 2007) and Katunayake around the free trade 
zones, where there is a large military presence.  There are many brothels, which are run by 
women.  Politicians, police and armed personal become the key clients23.   Having clients from the 
                                                 
23 See report “Deputy Minister sips beer in brothel  Sunday observer 
http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2004/06/13/new14.html  accessed 16/6/2004 
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police forces or the armed forces is vital for these institutions not only to boost their profit, but also 
to safeguard themselves from arrest24.   Sex work for many women has become a response to the 
breakdown in economic and social systems, which are a direct outcome of conflict and violence 
and the result of poverty and unemployment. Others had been sex workers prior to the war.  The 
sex industry is a hidden part of the society and is becoming increasingly visible due to the 
militarisation as well as the tourist industry in Sri Lanka (Thambiah 2005; Ganeshpanchan 2000).  
 
Transgressing the boundaries of respectability  
If women’s sexuality and respectability become the corner stone of the nation building process, 
then what happens to women who transgress these boundaries voluntarily or involuntarily?  In a 
militarised environment sex workers or those perceived to be sex workers become especially 
vulnerable to the accusation of being traitors and informants.  Primarily because, they are unable 
to select their clients and are compelled to provide services to any person who pays.  Sometimes 
their services can be solicited by force.  An example of this emerged during my fieldwork when I 
contacted an informant for an interview. A brothel operating in Colombo was visited by a group of 
policemen who were off duty. The men who had been drinking and gambling early that evening 
did not have the money to pay and were asked to leave the place.  Angered by this, they raided 
the brothel the next morning on the pretext of the brothel being illegal. The women including the 
owner were arrested and released on bail; my informant was among them who were arrested and 
later released. 
 
                                                 
24 Sex work remains criminalised in Sri Lanka under the vagrants ordinance and brothels ordinance of the Sri Lanka 
Penal code. 
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At times women’s transgression and prejudice against them can result in these women being 
subject to extrajudicial punishments including death. Thilaga’s (pseudo name) story was narrated 
to me by a relative of hers in the East London focus group.  During 1989 Thilaga was living in 
Jaffna with her children. Her husband had abandoned them some time back and she received no 
support from him or her relatives towards bringing up the children and was facing financial 
difficulties. Soon rumours spread that she was prostituting herself. The reason behind this was 
that she had male university students as lodgers. This is a common problem faced by many 
women, who live in and around universities even in areas in the south. The simple fact that they 
keep male lodgers for an extra income is seen as a sexually transgressing incident even if they 
are married and living with their husbands. On the other hand having female lodgers, is not 
viewed in such a way and has no repercussions on the man of the house.  She was also helping 
out the ‘boys’ a term commonly used by local people in the north east when refereeing to the 
militants  in numerous ways. As such, her house was open to regular visitors who were invariably 
men.  Such interactions ensured that the allegations of prostitution persisted. 
 
According to my informant Thilaga had been a helpful person who interacted well in the 
community. She always helped others in matters such as liaising military (state and non state) 
who were primarily men. This was also a reason for the rumours to intensify– simply because she 
was transgressing the sexual code of conduct that dictated women should not interact with men 
outside the family and she paid the ultimate price for her transgression.  In 1989 she was shot 
dead by the LTTE.  Her murder was justified by alleging that she was a loose woman with a “bad 
character” a label also accorded to women who ideologically disagreed with the LTTE (De Mel 
2001; Thambiah 2005). 
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Why did Thilaga become an enemy? Was it her sexual relations or her political affiliations? 
Thilaga’s interactions with members of rival military groups without any fear meant that she could 
not be trusted.  In real life as revealed by my informant she was a woman of integrity who went 
out of her way to help her friends as well as the “boys” and hence could be perceived as disloyal 
to the LTTE.  The LTTE in its bid to become the sole representative of the Tamil people wanted 
the elimination of other military groups, this required total support and loyalty from the civilians.  
Women like Thilaga25 were not acting in keeping with this.  Her support to other military groups 
and the interactions with outsiders meant that, the LTTE‘s authority was being challenged, which 
is not what they aspired to in their image building process. Thus she needed to be eradicated, to 
heal the wounds of their dented pride as well as to terrorize the community.  However, the 
rumours they spread constructed her as a loose woman that dishonoured the community and 
needed eliminating to protect the respectability of the community and the imagined nation sending 
out the message to other women that such transgression would not be tolerated.  
 
Thilaga and Sriyalatha became symbols of immorality to a nationalist discourse that punished 
defiance of marriage, which is the foundation of the patriarchal society.  These women’s non-
alignment with social norms rendered them interacting with men from various backgrounds and 
entering into a sexual relationships outside marriage. Both these women did not conform to the 
what is expected of a woman within the Sinahla/Tamil community. 
 
While Thilaga and Sriyalatha became agents of moral corruption in the eyes of the an institution  
that demands honour and respectability from women (but does not place it in high esteem for 
                                                 
25 There were numerous other women, who were impassioned by the LTTE for not obeying orders or who were 
supportive of other military groups. See chapter 4 for more details. 
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women who are deemed the “other”), they had to be punished for their defiance. However, at 
times women who transgressed these very norms are made icons for achieving the (sick) 
ambitions of the institutions when it suits them revealing the hypocrisy around these institutions.   
Dharmini whose case is discussed below was one woman who became vulnerable to the political 
economy of militarisation and paid the price for it with her life.  Understanding how women’s 
sexuality can become a powerful sentiment that can mobilise the community against the “other” 
the LTTE choose to avenge war in her name rather than disown her. This is a clear indication that 
women’s bodies become sites of war that can be used and abused to fulfil the needs of the 
state/military – military groups that claim to represent women. 
 
Bodies as sites of war 
 
As discussed in this thesis women's bodies have become sites where violence have been 
unleashed.  It can be argued that the sexual violence women experience are not just by-products 
of war but are used as a deliberate military strategy, to control women and humiliate the 
community these women belong to.  However, women are not only victims of physical violence at 
times of conflict.  Time after time women’s bodies have become sites of war, where violence is 
waged and legitimised between nation states/military in the name of women26.  Dharmini’s story 
revealed to me by a woman journalist during a telephone interview (2005) shows how a sex 
workers body became the site of a war. 
 
                                                 
26 For example the US decision to wage war in Afghanistan was justified by the treatment of women by the Taliban 
regime and even today the success of the interventions is projected in terms of women’s freedom.  
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In December 2005, Dharmini a Tamil women from Jaffna went missing. The next day her dead 
body weighted down by stones, was found in a well.  To date there is no evidence to what led to 
her death.  However, according to my informant, Dharmini was a sex worker who serviced the 
naval personnel27 - and therefore, that was the reason for her death. 
 
No one to date knows if Dharmini was another victim at the hands of the armed forces or weather 
she was punished by the LTTE like Thilaga who ‘serviced’ the enemy?  But interestingly a few 
days later a landmine killed several naval personnel in Mannar. The LTTE claimed responsibility 
for the attack as revenge for the killing of Dharmini.  
 
Until now I have not been able to find any  evidence suggesting who killed Dharmini or the motive 
behind it, but what is certain is that that after her death she became a player (or a pawn) in the 
battle of the nation.   Retaliatory attacks were carried out over her death.  A sex worker, who had 
no place in the honourable nation, became an important character in the continuation of violence.  
This woman’s body, became central to the military’s ambitions. Thus, the LTTE who would have 
gone to any extreme to punish her as they did with Thilaga (page 110), used Dharmini to wage 
war in the name of the nation. 
 
This is not the only time that the fight over the meaning of a woman’s body has been appropriated 
by nationalism.  Dhanu (page 74), who killed Rajiv Gandhi was one such woman celebrated for 
her violent act by the LTTE. Justifying her deed, the LTTE put out a statement claiming that she 
                                                 
27 See also http://tamilweek.com/Jaffna_University_flash_point_of_tension_1225.html accessed 10/05/2009 for a brief 
mentioning of the event. 
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was subject to rape at the hands of the IPKF and that her decision to assassinate the Prime 
minister was an act of revenge (De Mel 2001).   
 
In reality, Dhanu by her rape became a woman that needed eliminating, for she was a woman 
who brought shame on her community, she like Dharmini (page 113),Thilaga (page 110) and 
Sriyalatha (page 106) did not belong to the notion of  “purity and respectability” and had no place 
in the “honourable nation”.  However, by joining the LTTE and appropriating an identity as a 
combatant Dhanu (Page 74) was given the opportunity to redeem herself, and her community 
from the humiliation by assassinating the man who was instrumental in the humiliation she/the 
Tamil community suffered28. This way her new identity as a Tamil woman combatant gave her a 
more privileged status than Thilaga and Dharmini who were Tamil women but who chose to 
provide sexual services to the enemy rather than join the LTTE and fight the enemy.  By 
portraying Dhanu as a woman who killed for revenge, the LTTE gave meaning to her act of terror, 
sending out the message that “death is better than being sexually contaminated” or in other terms 
the option for women who have lost their chastity even involuntarily is only death.    In the same 
way the story of Koneswari Murugesupillai (page 134)  a young mother, who was gang raped by 
police became the cause for the central policy camp battle described in Chapter Five. 
 
As evident through these cases women and sexuality are interlinked with militarised 
Sinhalese/Tamil nationalism. Militarisation has constructed strict gender roles, but at the same 
time has also created the space enabling women to transgress these, whether as combatants, 
refugees or as sex workers (Thambiah 2005) creating new identities for women within the 
                                                 
28  Later Dhanu’s family was honoured by the LTTE leader for the act of her bravery and the service to the Tamil Nation. 
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dominant Tamil identity. In this nationalist encounter, women are also expected to safeguard the 
land and reproduce the culture (i.e. Tami/Sinhala culture), through their sexual conduct and dress.  
Women have been figured as territory to be conquered and claimed, appropriated and 
mythologized (De Mel 2001; Thambaih 2005; Sornarajah 2004). The case of Dharmini (page 113) 
reminds us of this ambiguity - on the one hand, she is a site where national pride is asserted.  On 
the other hand, as a sex worker selling her services to the enemy she is hardly the woman who 
Tamil nationalism would want to lay claim to.  Rather, she is a traitor to the cause, betraying the 
purity of the nation and its women.  
 
The women in Sri Lanka especially in the North are well aware of what could result in LTTE’s 
discovery of a woman interacting/providing sexual service to the military.  Ultimately, if Dharmini 
wasn’t already dead, she would have been killed by the LTTE who went on to mobilise violence in 
her name.  This exposes the hypocrisy of LTTE nationalism that cruelly value lives like Dharmini’s 
(page 113), Dhanu (page 74) and Koneswari (page 134) only in death. 
  
The lived experiences of these women caught up in the conflict gathered through field work are 
also part of a wider trajectory of the militarised nationalist discourse – about lives that are 
forgotten. These are women that have simply disappeared from the myth of nationalism, the 
“protection of the motherland/the respectable state”.  In reality, these are invisible lives that have 
been created by the militarised national agenda that will never be visible, accepted or accounted 
for.  
 
If this is the humiliating treatment rendered to women who do not fall within the notion of the pure 
and respectable state, then what happens to women who transcend these very notions and 
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possess intersecting identities such as widows, women who suffer from disease and who are 
disabled– where do they belong within this able bodied, militarised national project? 
 
Ratha was an elderly lady in her early 70’s when I met her. She was the second in a family of five 
children who were all girls.  
“I became a widow when my husband met with an accident.  Thereafter, I lived with my 
parents and after their death by myself. Since I had no children I looked after all my four 
sister’s children.  Even when my elder sister died I took over her responsibilities and 
cared for the children.   Despite all this I never was able to attend any of the children’s 
weddings happily, everywhere I went I had to always sit at the back, and was not allowed 
to wish them well, as I was a widow.  I feel so sad when I think of all this but what can I 
do, I can’t bring them bad luck, and my sister’s children are my own (Interview with 
woman in Sri Lanka 2004). 
 
Despite the increased number of widows (a majority of these women are very young women) as a 
result of the conflict and LTTE calling for women’s liberation from oppressive structures, there is 
no evidence of the LTTE trying to change the existing social attitudes towards widows within the 
Tamil community. As such these women continue to live outside the social sphere at times facing 
tremendous economical and social vulnerability.  Equally appalling is the situation of older women 
who have been displaced without any social/ family support and are also subject to security 
vulnerabilities that need exploring in depth in a future study.  
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Summary 
Militarised nationalism has used symbols such as the dress code to divide, control and humiliate 
women who have resisted and transgressed the boundaries set by society.  While controlling 
some women’s bodies, militarism has created space for other women to transgress the 
boundaries and appropriate intersecting sexual identities such as victim of sexual violence or 
women exchanging sexual services for profit.   In this process of reconstructing womanhood and 
controlling women’s bodies, sexuality has been dangerously associated with respectability and the 
nations honour, little taking into account the vulnerabilities faced by women and the lived 
experiences of women caught up in this prolonged and vicious conflict.  
 
Caught up  between two military opponents, each claiming to represent the interests of the nation 
and security of its people, the woman addressed in the LTTE handbill, Sriyalatha, Thilaga, and 
Dharmini due to their intersecting identities and lived experience have become potentially 
dangerous women who must be humiliated, controlled or eliminated using GBV.   The danger 
these women pose is their ability to transgress sexually and enter into sexual relations outside 
marriage which is the corner stone of patriarchal society.  Other women like Dhanu who are 
deemed “impure” due to the sexual violence they have faced at the hands of the enemies are 
given the opportunity of redeeming themselves by becoming human bombs and causing 
destruction to the enemy rather than  live and humiliate their communities. 
 
With the expansion of militarism there are an increasing number of women entering into sexual 
partnerships with military men either through conventional marriages or through unconventional 
relationships such as Sriyalatha who lived with a partner.  There is also an increasing amount of 
sex work taking place in and around military camps in areas such as Katunayke, Trincomalee and 
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military transit centres such as Anuradhapura.  The conflict related displacement and breakdown 
of subsistence economies have increased women’s  economic vulnerabilities;  with  increasing 
pressure to provide for their families in the absence of their men who are either being killed or 
disabled in the battle or who have lost their income generating avenues due to the conflict and 
displacement.   
 
Sriyalatha, the woman who was stripped and humiliated in public at a check point in the heart of 
Colombo and Dharmini who was dumped in the well, tells us a story that uncovers the veil of this 
social denial of the relationship between militarism and sex industry which is well documented by 
Enloe (1989).  Their stories reveal the lived experiences of women living in the margins in and 
outside of the conflict zones that have been affected by the reality of the militarisation.  The reality 
is there are many more women who have become vulnerable to the same humiliating life styles as 
these women (observations made in the field), but yet the wider society seems to be blind to  the 
reality of the sexual exploitation of women that is taking place in the context of the militarisation of 
the society. 
 
In this attempt to re-claim the nation and the honour of its citizens, women who transgress the 
boundaries are presented as the other and are subject to humiliation and punishment using GBV. 
In contrast to this militarisation also creates space for some women to transgress the set 
boundaries of womanhood by becoming combatants.  The hypocrisy of these military institutions 
are such that at many times women engaged in prostitution or who have been subject to sexual 
violence have been used to fulfil the ambitions of the military by deploying  them to seduce and 
coerce the enemy.  At other times women like Dhanu who have lost their respectability through 
sexual violence have been recruited to blow up the enemy - making themselves into walking 
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human bombs.   Most ambiguously women like Dharmini who is said to have provided sexual 
services to the navy have been used to mobilise the nation into battle.  
 
In becoming combatants, women like Dhanu (page 74) and many more whom I have interviewed 
(in Chapter Five) create a complex intersecting binary as a) defenders of violence as well as b) 
protagonist of the wars that are waged in the name of women.  However, a closer analysis of 
these women’s lives tells us a story that these women live multiple overlapping lives as women, 
mothers, daughters, sisters, victims of sexual abuse, prostitutes who are caught up in the military 
economy of sexual exploitation as well as combatants who have taken up arms to resist 
violence/militarism. Their support to militarism as discussed in Chapter Five is due to the 
intersecting and at times humiliating lived experiences that they have encountered that is so often 
ignored by the hegemonies who are eager to represent and construct “what it is to be a woman” 
during times of conflict. 
 
In Chapter Five the thesis will explore the lived experiences of the women combatants of the 
LTTE and examine the various discourses around women militants. Thereafter using the women’s 
narratives the thesis will explore the intersecting factors that have led women to join the militarism 
and take up violence. I will argue that women’s enrolments into military units are not always 
voluntary as claimed by the LTTE by providing evidence of forced recruitment and child 
recruitment. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WOMEN COMBATANTS OF THE LTTE  
 
As evident in Chapter Four militarised nationalism, while denouncing and eliminating women who 
do not fit in with the “honourable state” due to their sexual contamination or transgression, have 
simultaneously created space for some women to transgress the boundaries set by society by 
recruiting them as combatants.  In this process of “inclusion” the women combatants are subject 
to sexual control through prohibiting them to have any sexual relations inside or outside the 
movement and their bodies transformed to meet the needs of the military body (i.e. masculine 
heterosexual, single, young, and healthy) through a rigorous training regime 
 
In Sri Lanka women have played diverse roles in the Sinhalese/Tamil nationalistic movement (De 
Mel 2001; Samuel 2006) as in other militarised nationalist movements in countries such as 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Chechnya (Sjoberg & Gentry 2007).  A large number of women have 
been recruited to the State and non-state military groups. According to the history of the Sri 
Lankan armed forces Women's Corps (SLAWC) was formed in September 1979 as an unarmed, 
non-combatant support unit with the assistance of the Women’s Royal Army Corps29.  Hence 
there has been an increase of women’s recruitment into the state armed forces as well as non 
state military groups.  However, the majority of the female recruitment has been into the LTTE, 
which will be the main focus of this chapter.  
 
                                                 
29 See http://www.flickr.com/photos/8586609@N04/2386121573/ for more details of the Sri Lankan Army history and the 
Women’s Corps. 
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The primary aim of this chapter is to explore what motivates women to join militarism and support 
violence.  In doing so this chapter will briefly look at the history of Sinhala/Tamil women’s violent 
militarism and the military/public discourse around women combatants. Thereafter, using 
narratives of ex-women combatants who are in exile in the UK, the chapter aims to explore the 
factors that have motivated women to take up arms and analyses their lived experience within the 
organisations. Given the intersecting identities women possess, this sample is not a full 
representation of the experience of all women within the LTTE and the JVP.  However, it is hoped 
that the narratives of women and their lived experience will facilitate an understanding of the 
reasons women give to support violent militarism and what happens to women when they leave 
the movements and return to their communities.  
 
HISTORY OF WOMEN’S VIOLENT MILITANCY 
JVP combatants 
Evidence can be gathered from the fading public memory, few media reports, various documents 
(Basu 2005) and websites to confirm women’s participation in the early stages of the JVP (1971-
77).  As to the number of women within the organisation in 1971 it is estimated that there had 
been 2000 women on its "A List30” which comprised of 1,000 full-time members. There was also a 
"B List" made of sympathizers who were not directly involved in combat and a "C List" made of 
those who could be approached for help. There is evident confirming that women were on these 
lists (information gathered from a woman who was with the movement at the time and continues 
to be a JVP supporter).  However apart from this limited information I was unable to gather in-
depth information of the women cadres and their lived experiences within the organisation during 
1971 other than for the work by De Mel (2001) who gives us a glimpse of information into 
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Manamperi and a another woman cadre Juliet (pseudo name) who lived in the jungles of Wilpattu 
during the 70’s with a few other women.  
 
Premawathi Manamperi, crowned a beauty queen in the Kataragam, was the most celebrated 
woman cadre of the JVP31.  Her murder remains a public memory32 to date.  
 
Manamperi age 22, who was crowned a beauty queen was arrested on April 16 by Police 
and taken to the nearby Army camp where she was allegedly raped and tortured.  A day 
after her arrest, she was stripped naked and made to walk nude in public, repeating the 
words "I have followed all five classes33" After she had walked about 200 yards, she was 
shot. They left her thinking her to be dead. Later realising she was still alive; she was shot 
again in the head. (As revealed by an elderly woman during field work in Sri Lanka 
October 2004) 
 
While there is evidence that Manamperi participated in classes, there is no evidence suggesting 
that she was an active combat. Her role had been mainly in a supportive capacity.  During field 
work I was able to track down three women who joined the movement in the 1970’s through 
                                                                                                                                                
30 These lists indicate how the organisation ranked their cadres and the rank they belonged to. 
31 She has been made an icon like Dhanu of the LTTE, in both cases the violence suffered at the hands of the military 
has been used and abused to gain sympathy. 
32 There is a song by Anton John dedicated to her memory and still  popular to date that describes her ordeal. 
33 Indoctrinate classes. The purpose behind the five lectures was to explain in simple and plain language the politics 
of social revolution. The leftist and the Marxists in Ceylon expressed their views in an abstract doctrinaire fashion, 
with lot of high-sounding phrases, which were alien to the ordinary common man in the country. Wijeweera and his 
men formulated lectures on such topics such as: 
•  Crisis of the capitalist system in Ceylon;  
•  The history of the left movement in Ceylon;  
•  The history of the socialist revolutions;  
•  Indian expansion, and;  
•  The path of revolution in Ceylon   
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personal contacts; however, they did not agree to an interview.  Two women wanted to leave the 
past behind as they said they have lost faith in their leaders and the entire political system and did 
not want their children or the community they now live in to know of their previous political 
activities.  Both these women confirmed that they were in active combat and took part in 
organised attacks.  The other woman was still actively supporting the party but did not want to be 
identified as she feared any future repercussions.  In her words: 
 
“The political situation is now worse than the 80’s. One never knows when they (army) will 
come for you, especially in the future if our party decide to take up arms again34 we will 
be the first people that the government will haunt” (interview with Parami (pseudo name) 
in Sri Lanka October 2004) 
 
These women’s lived experiences confirmed that women joined the movement due to various 
intersecting factors such as poverty, class oppression, unemployment and political discontent. 
The second insurrection35 during the 1987/1989 was one of the darkest periods in Sri Lankan 
history.  Many women who joined the JVP faced the consequences of their transgression36. Some 
narrowly escaped death at the hands of state forces while others were imprisoned and faced 
humiliation, sexual violence and abuse. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 There was high speculation that the JVP will resort to militant activities again if the Government is not keeping its 
promises. 
35 Details in Mapping the Conflict Chapter three page 57.  
36 Commission of Inquiry (1997). 
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Tamil women’s militancy  
When speaking of Tamil women’s militancy the focal point becomes the LTTE woman combatant.  
However, there have been a number of Tamil militant groups like the Eelam People’s 
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) (Gunaratna 
1997; Hoole R et al, 1990) who began recruiting women to combat before the LTTE37 which 
highlights the differences based on political, class and caste among the women combatants.  
Despite the fact that there has been other groups who recruited women, the LTTE women have 
drawn the attention of the world due mainly due to their military supremacy.   
 
Since the formation of the LTTE woman’s wing, through their attacks, suicide missions and high 
profile assassinations these women have been subject to not only security scrutiny but also to 
scrutiny by the media, academics and the public (Alison 2003; Coomaraswamy 1996; De Mel 
2001; Sornarajah 2004). These women are identified and feared (Gunaratna 1997) as the most 
deadliest and efficient guerrilla forces in the world.  
 
Represented as Birds of Freedom (Balasingham 1990; 1993; 2001) the LTTE women have been 
represented as the symbol of women’s liberation, who have taken up arms to fight injustice and 
oppression. The women undergo a rigorous military training similar to the male cadres38.  
Recently there have been many films such as the “Terrorist” by Santhos Sivan39 and another 
                                                 
37 The EPRLF began recruiting women in large numbers for military training since the 1983. This was followed by the 
People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in early 1985 with the establishment of five training camps 
for girls in Rathatha Nadu, Tanjaore Tamil Nadu. The Eelam Revolutionary Organization for Students (EROS) also 
developed a large women’s wing.     
38 There are many photographs on the Tamil Net showing the training of women. 
39 For more information http://www.terrorist-thefilm.com/  and to purchase the DVD on Amzon. 
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controversial film by Norwegian producer Beate Arnestad “My daughter the terrorist,"40 which has 
dominated the media headlines.    
 
 
Figure 5.1 LTTE Combatants in Training (Source Tamil Net, http://tamilnet/ accessed 26/06/2007) 
 
Engaged in some of the most dangerous attacks, these women have been killed in large numbers 
in battles and suicide missions41.  Like their male comrades, women fighters are also celebrated 
as “heroes” romanticising the culture of suicide martyrdom among women. The effectiveness of 
their training is proved by the women’s capability in the use of very sophisticated military 
technology and the attacks they have carried out.  Some women have been recruited to the Sea 
                                                 
40 can be accessed www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTF7Png8S9Y. 
41 See file://C:\DOCUME~1\zgan\LOCALS~1\Temp\triODBJP.htm accessed 07/06/2005 for a list of LTTE suicidal 
missions. 
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Tigers and Black Tigers squads.  These squads can be named as the killer machine of the LTTE 
and comprise of men and women who are groomed for suicide missions42. 
  
The role and function performed by women combatants during the early stages of the struggle is 
acknowledged in a document entitled Women and the Revolution: published by the LTTE (1983) 
 
“Our women unit co-ordinated and worked with popular women organisations, trade 
unions, industrial training centres, health and welfare associations, educational institutes 
and were campaigning and organising women for the national struggle”. 
 
According to Balasingham the , the first training camp exclusively for women is said to have been 
set up in Jaffna in October 1987 and got its own leadership in 1989 (Balasingham 1993). Prior to 
this there is evidence (Rupasinghe et al 2006) that the women were trained in India in Tamil 
Nadu during 1985.  While this was the period that saw the highest number of women recruited to 
the organisation, it is also the time that saw an unprecedented scale of violence against women 
at the hands of the IPKF in the north east as well as by the Sri Lanka army and the JVP in other 
parts of the country. 
 
Balasingham (1993) claims that the first battle women participated was against the Sri Lankan 
forces in July 1986 in Mannar. Thereafter, women have faught against the IPKF and state 
military participating in suicide missions against political and economical targets including the 
                                                 
42 The First Black Tiger Miller drove an explosive laden truck on Sri Lanka Army (SLA) troops garrisoned in a school 
in Vadamaraadchi, killing more than 40 SLA troopers on 5th July 1987. Since his death, 81 Black Tigers, 63 men and 
18 women, have died in action on land, and 241 cadres, 169 men and 72 women, have died at sea, (Source July 
2007 Tamileelam Heroes Secretariat). 
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assassination of Indian Prime Minister Women combatants are deployed to man checkpoints and 
defence bunkers in the areas under LTTE controlled, at times in close proximity to army camps, 
increasing their vulnerability.  These women have been carrying out their work in difficult 
conditions demonstrating that women are not passive victims of violence but are able to 
appropriate multiple, intersecting identities that derive from their lived experiences.  The woman 
combatant’s physical ability, courage, commitment and dedication to the task have refuted the 
notion that militarism is a job for the men.   
 
Women combatant’s contribution has been crucial to the military advancement and operational 
strategies of the LTTE.  Women have not only been involved in fighting but also involved in non-
combatant roles such as medical care, food supplies, transportation of arms and ammunitions, 
which was essential to the war effort.  It was the women who lead the “organising” and 
“mobilising” of the public, in street protests, in boycotts and other forms of demonstrations.  It is 
also note worthy that the participants in these protests and demonstrations during the IPKF 
(page 74) occupation were mainly women. 
 
According to the LTTE, in the Indo-LTTE war (page 74) twenty-six women fighters have been 
killed.  These figures are the LTTE version of the deaths. Given that the women’s wing were only 
trained for battle two years before and until then had been untrained civilians, let alone the IPKF 
being the world’s third most powerful army, there is much evidence to disbelief these figures than 
to accept them.  The LTTE never admitted the actual number of women combatants enlisted or 
how many have been killed in battle (women or men) or any loss to military equipment and 
ammunition.  The University Teachers for Human Rights estimates that (UTHR October 1987) 
there were approximately 1,700 women killed during the period. 
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The defence ministry estimates that since the formation of the women’s wing in 1984, 3,728 
women have sacrificed their lives in these battles (Defence Ministry 2000). The most number of 
deaths occurred in the year 2000. Given the fact that government sources traditionally exaggerate 
enemy deaths this is also not an accurate figure. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain how many 
women have joined the armed struggles or how many hundreds have died in these battles.  My 
analysis is that in the count up to 2009, this number of deaths is bound to be on the increase as 
there have been several suicide attacks and continuous military confrontations in the North which 
has led to the military defeat of the LTTE.  
 
In a context where the Sri Lankan armed forces have numerical superiority over the LTTE, the 
female suicide bomber has become an invaluable instrument and a tactical weapon in the LTTE 
military strategy and the battle against power.  The most famous among them is Dhanu (page 74) 
who blew herself up killing Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Shobhna was the first Tamil 
woman to sacrifice her life in the Karainagar Naval Base attack in 1985. Despite this Shobanha’s 
sacrifice is hardly mentioned as she was not a LTTE cadre and Malathi is widely acknowledged as 
the first woman martyr (LTTE literature/propaganda material) who died after swallowing cyanide 
capsule43.   The exclusion of Shobana from the public memory is evidence to LTTE’s politics of 
martyrdom that only celebrates the deaths of LTTE carders and not the “other” however great 
their acts of sacrifice are. 
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Figure 5.2: LTTE Women Cadre in the early stages of their struggle-(Source: 
http://sangam.org/taraki/articles/2006/05-05_LTTE_30th.php?uid=1720 accessed 29/5/2006). 
 
CHANGING ROLE OF WOMEN 
Caught up in the battle for political autonomy the lives of Sri Lankan women have changed 
significantly (De Alwis 2002). Women have transformed themselves into public figures engaging in 
activities that have traditionally been the men’s domain.  Women have faced endless sufferings 
and humiliation as victims of violence and political oppression. They have been stigmatised and 
harshly punished for being seen to be disobeying social norms as evident in the field work.  Such 
sufferings have been inflicted upon them due to their intersecting identities and the gendered 
constructions that prevail within the Sri Lanka society.   Despite these obstacles women have had 
to take on the roles assigned to men in their absence by protecting their families (young children 
and old siblings) and becoming bread winners proving that identity is not fixed and that is always 
evolving as well as overlapping and intersecting, especially where the social order is disrupted in 
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times such as conflict.   As refugees and internally displaced women, they have had to take on 
additional responsibilities in volatile situations.  Apart from their domestic responsibilities women 
have assumed the added burden of searching for their missing loved ones either abducted or 
killed by the armed forces/military groups. They have spent days and months travelling from one 
detention centre to another, meeting politicians and agency staff to seek justice (communications 
with Visaka Dharmadasa War widows Association) stepping into public activism (Mothers Front 
Chapter Seven page 208). This has blurred the nexus of the battle field and the home front.  
However, in the myth of men as the protector and women as victims, their resistance, coping 
mechanisms or compliance with military groups has been under acknowledged leaving a gap in 
how  women’s experiences  in times of conflict have been perceived in the context of Sri Lanka.  
 
Women’s incorporation into the military especially the non state military groups has shaped the 
way in which women are seen in society.  The inclusion of women into military has seen her 
advancing from a supportive role at the early stages to a combat role.  Through her involvement in 
the political duties of the LTTE/JVP organisations she has been given the opportunity to engage in 
more public activities such as organising protests, marches, mobilising other women/civilians.  
Women have been given the opportunity to build on their political awareness, for example, the 5 
lessons of the JVP (see note in page 122)/training within the LTTE. On the military front, her 
decision to take up arms has challenged the way that women are perceived within Sri Lankan 
society as well as the discourses around women and militarism itself. And these women have 
emerged from the position of “protected” to be the “protector” once again denouncing the 
representation of women as passive victims of violence.   
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Though these women’s participation is perceived to be shaping the future of society especially in 
relation to women’s position and the military/military groups’ struggle, their stories that contain 
their lived experiences and memories have been censored, ignored or under represented.  Even 
in the limited instances where they are being given a voice (Balasingham  1983; 1993), they have 
been subject to the politics of representation by military organisations that represent them and 
“talk for them” rather than talk with them (Spivak  1993) like in the case of Dhanu (page 74) who 
was represented as a woman who killed for revenge.  
 
DISCOURSE AROUND CAUSES FOR ENLISTMENT 
The recruitment of women into the military or the mobilisation of resource for war can be argued 
as a gendering process.  Militarisation  draws on the stereotypical representations of gender in the 
definitions of “masculinity” and “femininity” for its functioning and maintenance ignoring that 
women live multiple and layered lives and appropriate intersecting identities based on their lived 
experiences.  Women are widely categorized as “protected” and “defended”. This definition and 
the separation of protector from the protected are essential to both sexism and militarism.  Then 
the question that needs exploring is that what makes military groups move beyond this 
stereotypical representation and recruit women as combatants?  
 
Equally important is the destruction of militarism of women.  As the case studies presented in 
chapter four shows time after time women have been exploited by militarism and have been 
subject to GBV and humiliation.  Yet what motivates women to join military groups and perpetrate 
violence?  When mass destruction is unfolded on the streets, and one witnesses the 
dismembered body parts scattered on the streets, one cannot avoid asking these questions.  Why 
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do these young women take up arms to cause such destruction to themselves leave alone their 
enemy?   
 
It is public knowledge in the North and East that until the LTTE military defeat there were women 
enlisting as combatants (Interviews with women in exile Chapter Eight; Vidurupola 2005) and 
engaging in violence.  There are other women such as the JVP activists and the Movement 
against Terrorism who actively advocate a military solution to the ethnic conflict challenging the 
myth that women are naturally peaceful.  
 
Military leaders of the state and some experts have (Coomaraswamy 1996) argued that the 
recruitment of women into LTTE combat was a result of the Tigers facing difficulties in manpower.  
For others (Balasingham 1983; 1993, and LTTE sympathisers) these women are leading the 
battles because they are fierce fighters who are resisting state oppression. For the LTTE 
propaganda mechanism their women cadres are the ultimate symbol for women’s liberation.  
 
 “Though the armed resistance campaign of the Liberation Tigers has a history extended 
to seventeen years, the women's military structure has a six year old history. The 
conservative nature of our social formation, its oppressive structures against women, its 
gender discrimination, has contributed to the delayed development of women's 
participatory role in the armed struggle”. (LTTE Propaganda material, February1990). 
 
In a society based on patriarchal traditions, the introduction of feminist ideas like “liberation” and 
“empowerment” can be powerful messages that encourage women to join military organisations.   
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But is the enlistment of women purely based on these feminist and political ideologies?  What are 
the other motives that drive women to take up militarism and violence?  
 
The military/public representation around why women join military groups as active combatants in 
the context of Sri Lanka is critical to our understanding of the politics of representation.  For the 
LTTE, these women are the “birds of freedom” (Balasingham 1983; 1993) fighting oppression.  
For the anti-LTTE groups (i.e. state/military) these women are “somewhat abnormal or brain 
washed” and the public/feminist discourse consider these women to be victims of an oppressive 
system (Social/State/LTTE).  While various discourses are eager to represent the woman 
combatant in a manner that meets their agendas, it is clear that the lived experience of women 
who have decided to take up violence have been completely ignored and the combatants are 
labelled as “young Tamil women” fighting for a separate state.   
 
Contradictory to this popular representation, the research has established that there are other 
identities within this dominant category of “Young Tamil Women”.  For example, there are 
Sinhalese women who have joined the LTTE for many reasons (information gathered from focus 
groups) refuting that all female combatants are Tamil women. Similarly there were Muslim and 
Burgher women within the JVP confirming that all JVP combatants were not Sinhalese.  Prior to 
analysing the narratives of the women regarding the reasons for their taking up arms, the 
following section will briefly discuss the various discourses surrounding the LTTE combatant. 
 
LTTE representation  
On August 20th, 2000, at the central camp police station in Amparai, a town in the East, 
policemen were preparing for an inspection by a senior official the next morning when the LTTE 
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surrounded the police station. The attacks killed 15 policemen and many more injured. Some had 
run away from the LTTE unable to stand the attack and the LTTE drove away with the weapons 
belonging to the camp.  Later it emerged that most of the attackers were fighters from the 
women’s unit of the LTTE. 
 
“We wanted to avenge the rape of Koneswari Murugesupillai and were proud that we 
were able to destroy the police station where she was raped and killed,” said 25-year-old 
woman Banukah, the political leader of the women’s wing of the LTTE for eastern Sri 
Lanka. (Ganeshpanchan, unpublished MA dessertaion Staffordshire 2002) 
 
She was referring to the alleged gang rape and murder of a woman in front of her family members 
at the police station in 1997.  The retaliatory attack was carried out on the anniversary of the 
incident. (Ganeshpanchan 2002 Unpublished MA dissertation Staffordshire University) - this was 
later supported by a journalist working in the area and also with the many reports on the murder of 
Koneswari44. 
 
These are the dominant categories in which the LTTE represents the women combatant: either 
victims of oppression/violence or empowered by taking up arms.  By this narrow representation, 
the LTTE like the other discourses (state, military and public) have failed to take into account hat 
women do have other identities that go beyond the representations of victims and perpetrators. 
 
                                                 
44  http://www.tamilnation.org/indictment/rape/001222dbs.htm accessed 22/2/2007. 
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In an address to women cadres on International Women’s day on March 8th 1996 the leader of the 
LTTE is quoted to have described the liberation of the Tamil women as 
 
“The fervent child that was born out of the Tamil ‘national liberation movement’. The 
women’s liberation. Its rise and progress is an incomparably unique chapter in history, for 
the awakening of the nation and the salvation of the women. The Tamil Eelam 
revolutionary woman has transformed into a tigress fierce and fiery, she has taken up 
arms to fight injustice” (Source http://eelamweb.com/1996 accessed 11/09/ 2004) 
There are many such views about the women cadres in the writings of Balasingham (1993, 2001). 
 
Like the LTTE leader, Adele Ann is eager to construct a binary between the national struggle and 
women’s militancy.  Through this, there is a deliberate attempt to maintain that women’s liberation 
can come only through the engagement with the LTTE/miltary groups. This representation  
ignores the wider engagement of  women such as Nay sum Saravanamuttu who was a member in 
the state council as early as the 1920’s and Meenachi Ammal Natesa Aiyar who was a prominent 
activist during the Suffrage movement in 1928 within Tamil society who has actively worked for 
social change even long before the LTTE came into existence45.   Associating women’s militancy 
with the national struggle then excludes those women such as Dharmini (page 113), Thilaga 
(page 110) and Sriyalatha (page 106) identified in Chapter Four and other women’s groups who 
faught for the right to vote and lobbied for independence from the colonial rule.   It also leaves no 
space for women from other minority communities such as the Muslim women who have faced the 
violence of the LTTE when they and their families were forcibly evicted from the North.  Muslim 
                                                 
45 More information about suffrage movement in Kumari Jayewardene & Malathi de Alwis, Casting pearls 
(SSA)Colombo). 
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women have been subject to violence and humiliation for a prolonged period (Zakariya and 
Shanmugartnam accessed 2005).  These women are also placed in a subordinate position due to 
the cultural and religious practices that exist within the Muslim community and face multiple 
oppression.  
 
Then as the LTTE leadership claim is liberation only for women who take up arms and is the 
enlistment of these women purely for the causes of liberation or defending their homelands?  
What other possible motives could there be for the women to take up arms and to choose to kill 
and be killed?  In search of answers I turn to the military that have had firsthand experience of the 
fighting capabilities of these women.  
 
Military representation 
The Military representation of the LTTE female combatant is of revenge and grievances and 
somewhat abnormal and brainwashed. 
 
There is no doubt that these women are drugged. if not how can they fight like men, how 
can a normal person blow up themselves like they do knowing that they will be dead in 
the same time (Interview with former military spokesperson UK 2006).  
 
Despite the military’s public face to construct these women as abnormal; three military men I 
interviewed completely rejected the idea that these women are abnormal, 
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“A soldier is a soldier for me despite being a woman or man, they are ready to kill, I know 
there will be lot of people who believe that these women are drugged but I don’t”. 
 
When I asked about the quotation of their spokesperson one said:  
“In any military there will be men and women who are drugged and brainwashed, but then 
one only tells the side of the story that one want to hear.  I have come across several 
women combatants during my posting to the North, they seemed to be very normal like 
you and me, and some are very young attractive women.  Once we fought a women’s 
battalion and killed several women, we managed to remove the bodies of a few of them to 
the camp.  I left the bodies in charge of a junior officer and went out. On returning I caught 
the junior officer tampering with one woman’s body.  I kicked him out immediately, but 
what I am trying to tell you is that these woman look so normal even when they are dead 
(Interview with a former Military officer UK 2007) 
 
All three men had been deployed to the front line and  experienced  the fighting capabilities of the 
LTTE women which led them to privately contradict the image of the woman combatant that the 
leaders of the state military is trying so hard to portray.  I was also unable to establish any past 
history of use of substance by any of the ex-women combatants I interviewed.  As for the 
allegations of brainwashing the women said they underwent regular training using various 
mediums such as political lessons, physical activities and visual and audios that elaborated and 
re-enforced the culture of LTTE martyrdom which they had internalised. 
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Public representation 
While the LTTE and its sympathisers project women combatants as brave women fighting for the 
liberation of their sisters and the land the public discourse (academics/feminists/segment of civil 
society and segment of the media) look at the women in a more ambiguous way.  For some, these 
women have turned to violence as a result of social oppression and believe that women gain 
limited empowerment by joining the LTTE but raise questions as to how they should be treated in 
a post conflict society (De Mel 2001) for their violence, while for some (Coomaraswamy 1997) 
they are fulfilling the manpower needed by the LTTE rather than the liberation rhetoric. 
 
Dr. Rajini Thirnagama, was an LTTE sympathiser in its early stages, but due to her strong feminist 
ideologies was later rejected and distanced herself from the movement. The price she paid for this 
resistance was her life.  She was shot dead in Jaffna while cycling home in 1989, allegedly by the 
LTTE. A book she co-authored, the Broken Palmyra, gives us an insight into the circumstances 
that have attracted these young women to the organisation and take up weapons for change 
within the Tamil Society. 
“One cannot be inspired when one sees the women of the LTTE, two by two in the night 
with their AKS slung over the shoulder, patrolling the entrances of Jaffna City. One cannot 
but admire the dedication and toughness of their training, seen in the video films put out 
by the LTTE. One could see the nationalist fervour and the romantic vision of women in 
arms defending the nation.  This becomes a great draw for the women to join the militant 
movements, our social status quo, and its restriction on creative expressions for women 
and the evils of the dowry system are some of the social factors that led to their initial 
recruitment. Moreover, the political climate created by the struggle in the past decade and 
the increasing loss of men to state terrorist and the world at large as refugees and 
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emigrants are some contributory factors necessitating women’s recruitment.   However, it 
would be an over statement to say that the it is the climate of “liberation” the kind of 
literature that is available, the knowledge of the experience of women in other struggles 
from far flung corners of the worlds or the rebelliousness against being kept out of the 
centre of the struggle that was drawing the fertile minds of young women to active 
participation” (Hoole et al 1990 pp 325) 
She suggests that women were drawn into the organisation not only by this romantic notion of 
“liberation” as its leader and advocates are eager to stress, but also as a result of the social 
inequalities that they are faced with.   
 
While the LTTE, military and public representation of the women combatants are not only divided 
this representation has ignored the multiple and layered identities and experience of Tamil women 
such as Dr Thiranagama who were educated and married to a Sinhala man but yet supported the 
LTTE in its early days and other women such as Thavamini (page 140) who are caught up in the 
conflict.  Using women’s narratives of their lived experience the following section will try to 
facilitate the understanding around the motives that drive women to join and support militaries.  
 
Women’s Voices    
From interviews with ex-women combatants now in exile in the UK, I have tried to understand the 
motives that have led to their enlistment so that it might help us understand some issues 
surrounding women’s support and involvement in militarism.  In addition to women’s narratives 
and interviews, I have used evidence gathered from secondary sources such as human rights 
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organisations, publications of women’s organisations working in the north east and media reports 
for a border analysis on why women join militarism. 
 
The following intersecting, push and pull factors have emerged in my findings as trigger points 
that motivated women to take up arms. However, it is essential to bear in mind that there are  
other intersecting factors such as the notion of humiliation that the Tamil community and the 
structural violence carried out by the state that have encouraged the recruitment to the LTTE. 
 
Push Factors   
Victims of Violence 
As discussed in chapter one GBV has become a key arbitrator in the conflict. The occupation of 
the North by the army and IPKF resulted in large-scale violence including GBV on women and 
girls.  The natural reactions to the humiliation inflicted by these horrendous acts can be the desire 
for revenge.  This was evident with the case of the attack on the police camp (page 134) that 
murdered Koneswari.   But however great the desire for revenge, the question is how one 
individual would take on a mighty army? The only alternative for people who wanted revenge was 
to join the LTTE or any other armed group who could match the power of the enemy and this is 
what the LTTE manipulated and thrived on. 
 
During interviews two participants confirmed that they had suffered violence.  For one woman, I 
will refer to her as Thavamini (below), violence was the primary cause for her to join the LTTE.  
The other woman Ranu (page 239) fled the country in fear of further violence, seeking asylum in 
the UK.  According to Thavamini there were other women in her unit who were subject to sexual 
violence that led to their enrolment.  
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Thavamini’s (then 22) story  
“After coming from the market, I was alone when I heard knocks on the door. It was two 
IPKF men asking for water. While I went in they followed me inside and closed the door. 
One man told me, that if I shouted he would shoot me while the other pushed me on to 
the floor. When I fell he pulled my clothes off (silence…) when he finished the other one 
took his place. (By now she was clearly in distress her face turning red and choking-I told 
her that she did not have to continue……) After a few minutes she continued… they left 
and I was devastated…  I knew what happened to the other women who faced such 
things in the village….  A few weeks before a woman committed suicide because of such 
incidenti… I must have stayed there for a long time –– I was a virgin until then.  I wanted 
to kill myself, but then the whole village will know what happened to me and it will be a 
shame on my family….  Next day I took my dirty clothes and burnt them- I watched my 
virginity burn in that fire; I walked to the sentry point…never to come home again. 
“Nobody in my unit knew why I really joined. I told them I was scared after what happened 
to my neighbour46-later I got to know other girls who had faced the same kind of things. 
But we did not talk about these things openly because we did not want others to know 
and also it was not encouraged. (Interview with ex-woman Combatant in exile in UK May 
2006). 
 
Thavamini served the LTTE for several years, during which time she says, she fought the IPKF 
and the Sri Lanka army and suffered gun injuries that resulted in the in amputation of her left leg.  
Thereafter, she was discharged and fled the country with the help of a relative in fear of being 
apprehended by the army.  
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Apart from the violence to their own bodies, many have also experienced the violent deaths of 
their husbands, brothers, fathers or other family members and have witnessed extreme violence 
against other women like Krishanthi Kumarasamy a school girl abducted at a chek point gang 
raped and murded by Sri Lankan army soldiers, Saralathambi (page 22) and many more.  
 
As such the experience and fear of violence and the humiliation caused by such violence is a 
primary factor that has pushed some women to support the LTTE.   
 
 
Figure:  5.3 Women weeping for their relatives on Maha veera47 day (Source http://tamilnet .com 
accessed 22/8/2007) 
The LTTE continue to re-ignite the memories of these gruesome events by celebrating 
anniversaries with further acts of violence. Celebrating death and martyrdom are strategies 
                                                                                                                                                
46 A married woman in her neighbourhood had been raped few weeks ago 
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adopted by the LTTE to justify violence and the suffering women/men have to undergo.  It is also 
a strategy adopted to shift the blame onto the Armed forces/other groups and to distance civilians 
from the state forces culminating in fear and hatred. The physiology of fear, anger and humiliation 
leaves them with no other alternative but to extend their support to the LTTE who claim to be 
fighting to avenge the pride of the Tamils and re-claim the land from the invaders.  In this battle 
women’s bodies have been transformed to sites of war where violence is reproduced to achieve 
the military ambitions of the state and LTTE. 
 
Inflicted by either party, GBV is used to humiliate women and the community they belong to.  
Further, violence is used to extort information on perceived involvement of women or the 
involvement of their spouses and other relatives, to suppress dissenting voices and to instil fear 
among the civilians.  At all times, the methods adopted are humiliating, brutal and extreme. 
Sexuality has been a central theme. Methods used have been sexual assaults, gang rape, placing 
hand grenades in the vagina, the cutting/burning of nipples, inserting S-lon pipes48 into the vagina 
and other forms of torture49. 
 
While violence from state armed forces have become a main factor for joining military groups, 
violence at the hands of the LTTE have also encouraged  women to join them out of fear of the 
repercussions of not doing so (case of forced recruitment in this chapter page 169). The LTTE 
                                                                                                                                                
47 The day celebrating the heroes- where LTTE combatants who died in battle are remembered. 
48  S-lon is the trade name given to these pipes which made of a material stronger than plastic and is used for 
construction purposes. 
49 See reports of the Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights wathch , the report of 
the commission of the involuntary removal  (1997) full reference cited in the reference section and case studies in this 
research . 
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have been forcefully recruiting civilian women to join the organisation as well as training other 
women to fight.  
I  
 Figure 5.4: Training of Civilian women by a LTTE woman cadre.  (Source: 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/4753509.stm accessed 22/8/2006) 
 
. 
 
Fig 5.5: Training of Civilian womenwww. (Source: tamilnet.com/img/publish/2006/02/self_def 
accessed 22/8/2006) 
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“They to come to the village at night and threaten us and take away all the food left in the 
house. At times they clash with the army and come running into houses and hide forcing 
us to lie to the army putting our lives in danger.  (Reflections of a woman now living in the 
York, UK; March 2005). 
 
It was evident that violence and the fear of it has been a key contributing factor for women to join 
military groups. While violence has become a key factor, another intersecting factor has been the 
humiliation women face as a result of social oppression. 
 
Social and Cultural Oppression 
Social and cultural oppression can be argued as the biggest enemy in the lives of Tamil women. 
The oppression women undergo is not limited to caste and class as documented in Chapter Three 
(page 61).  Poverty, the burden of dowry and social exclusion are other common oppressions in 
many women’s lives which have driven them to find alternative choices.   
 
Mathavi’s story 
Mathavi (then 18) was the youngest of a family of four.  Her father a rich and respected 
man in the village took pride in educating all of his children.  After completing her 
Advanced level50she received a scholarship to enter a university abroad.  There she met 
a man not so wealthy as her family.  Despite the differences in wealth, Mathavi’s parents 
agreed to the marriage and the groom was given a handsome dowry in cash and 
property.  The boy who completed his degree went on to further education rather than 
                                                 
50 University entrance exam conducted by the Ministry of Education of Sri Lanka. 
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gaining employment. He used all the money he was given as a dowry to pay the dowry for 
his sisters.  Mathavi was left to work and earn for the family. She was forced to ask for 
more money from her parents to provide for the man’s family, which she did in fear of her 
husband and the in-laws.  She carries the scars of this to date (Interview in May 2004 in 
the UK when she visited her brother). 
 
According to Sornarajah (2004) and as evidence gathered from the field work, dowry and the 
ideology surrounding dowry is an issue of anxiety for Tamil women across class and caste.  
Women are faced with the burden of dowry that is deeply rooted within the Tamil society51. The 
ideology of dowry cannot be viewed in the superficial context as a gift that is given to the new 
couple to start their life together.  It can be argued as a more complex patriarchal process, which 
has been adopted to undermine the value of women. Through dowry the family transfers the 
ownership of the women who is traditionally viewed as a dependent due to her not earning a 
wage, to the family that she is married into. Even when the woman is educated and earning it is 
the woman who pays the dowry and not the man which confirms that in patriarchal cultures 
women are considered a burden. 
 
While Mathavi’s parents were able to afford the dowry and even supplement it further, many 
parents of young women are not able to meet the demanded dowries resulting in many being 
given in marriage to incompatible men who did not seek large sums of money.  At the same time 
there is also the issue when parents can afford to pay large sums of money, in such cases women 
were given in marriage to men who were above their status either in terms of caste, class or 
education. Women who got into such marriages suffer in silence not being able to cope with the 
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families they married into as the man’s family constantly looks down upon the woman either due 
to her being from a lower caste or being uneducated. As such, the system of dowry affects women 
in different ways. 
 
Abirami (then 26), from a wealthy family in Colombo was given in marriage to a surgeon 
paying a large dowry. Unknown to the girl’s family the man had several affairs. He in fact 
had been living with another woman. However, when offered the amount of money he 
gave up his relationship and married Abirami. After marriage the mother of the man 
moved in to live with the couple and there was constant rift between the mother and 
daughter-in-law.  This rift came to the point of the couple being separated for a while. 
Rumours spread that while the family was falling apart the man had again continued to 
carry on with his extra marital affairs encouraged by his mother.  Abirami by now was 
pregnant and not working and was suffering with depression. However, after much 
intervention the couple were re-united and they moved to the UK.   As of today they live a 
life that is full of rift and suspicion, but put up with the marriage for the sake of the child. 
(Story revealed by a woman in the East London focus group in 2005 UK) 
 
In the fieldwork women gave examples of the breakup of families, domestic violence and at times 
even suicide caused by dowries.  The issue of dowries sometimes even haunted the young 
women after their marriage and at times even after the death of the husband. 
 
Puvi’s story related to me by her sister who now lives in the UK (2006) 
 
                                                                                                                                                
51 This is also practiced among the Sinhalese. 
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Puvi the elder of four girls was given in marriage to a public servant with a dowry in cash 
and jewellery.  After marriage at the age of 24 she went to live with her husband’s family.  
Unknown to Puvi’s family the man was an alcoholic and was in debt.  A few years later 
her husband committed suicide.  After her husband’s death, she stayed with his relatives. 
When her father went to bring her home and they got ready to leave the house, his 
mother-in-law asked Puvi for all the jewellery that she owned as those were a part of the 
dowry and that the dowry belonged to the husband and in his absence to his parents.  
Puvi’s father, without further questioning asked his daughter to leave the jewellery behind.  
It was only years later that they got to know that Puvi even took the savings from her book 
and gave to the man’s parents to settle the debt that they said the man incurred due to his 
drinking habits. Puvi never got married nor wore any jewellery there after (Puvi was the 
Aunty of a woman in one of the Focus Groups 2005) 
 
The majority of women joining the LTTE are said to be from lower castes and class, for the conflict 
related displacement has seen the outward migration of the well to do, affluent people out of the 
north and east either to other parts of the country or overseas.  Their prospects of marriage are 
bleak as a result of the intersecting social problems such as poverty, the burden of dowry and 
caste systems that prevail in society.  Many young women have no social status, no educational 
attainment or wealth, which are prerequisites for marriage.  The war has also taken away the lives 
of the many thousands of young men while many have left the country as asylum seekers.  
 
Even though the LTTE has pledged to end the caste and dowry system they have not been 
successful in this.  Today the expected dowry is ever much higher than it ever was and there is 
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much pressure on parents to find new ways of paying dowries rather than the traditional ways of 
paying by property as lands do not fetch much value due to the conflict.  
 
Evidence gathered from the field work showed that there are intersecting reasons for the dowry 
system to be intact within the Tamil community and for the LTTE not actively promoting its 
abolition. 
 
Firstly, the war has seen an increase in the number of men leaving the north east, joining military 
groups or being abducted. As a result, young suitable men are in much demand and the parents 
of boys seek large amounts of dowry (money, jewellery property outside the conflict areas) from 
girls as this has become a viable lucrative trade. 
 
For the women living in the conflict zones marrying a western citizen is a passage to safety.  
Parents of these women will pay the sums demanded by men rather than sacrificing their 
daughter to the LTTE or to face violence from military forces. During my filed work in the UK I met 
a young woman who had paid SL Rs. 40 lkhs (approximately £20,000) to a man who had 
residency in the UK as dowry. 
 
Parents of women pay the dowry and in the absence of the father it is the responsibility of the 
brothers to find dowry for their sisters.  In the light of many young men joining the LTTE or being 
unemployed or dead, the only way for them is to get girls with large dowries so they can pay 
dowry for their unmarried sisters. 
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Promises by the LTTE to end the practice of dowry can be seen as a way to make women buy 
into the liberation rhetoric. There is no evidence suggesting that the LTTE has earnestly 
attempted to end the practice of dowry.  The LTTE was aware that if it had to gain support in the 
wider community, they had to adopt a blind eye, as it is a fundamental part in the contract of 
marriage and the Tamil community have relied on it as a financial instrument to top up their family 
wealth for centuries as well as to boost the pride of the family.  For the family that received the 
dowry it was a pride that their sons were valued at a “high price” as well as for the families offering 
dowry, the pride is associated in the purchasing power of a son-in law who brings status to their 
families.  In such circumstances, the abolition of the dowry is not something that the patriarchal 
Tamil society is likely to approve and if the LTTE had adopted a different policy, it would have not 
been in the favour of the LTTE as it would have led to a reduction in the support they received 
from the Tamil people. 
 
On the other hand, the realities of the conflict have created a more conducive environment for the 
oppressive system to flourish, which is also partly the responsibility of the LTTE and therefore, 
they were unable to force such a fundamental change on the people. 
 
More importantly it is also a way for the men who joined the LTTE to evade their responsibility of 
earning for the dowry of their sisters as the LTTE in no way wants them to be seen as people who 
are tied up by family responsibilities but only dedicated to the organisation. 
 
Equally oppressive is the caste system that has been deep rooted within the society, inhibiting 
women’s progress; even at times leading them to take their own lives. This is a case where one 
woman had to take her own life 
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Saratha from an upper caste family fell in love with a boy from a lower caste in her 
neighbourhood.  With growing intimidation towards the boy and  virtual house arrest for  
Saratha by her parents, the young woman saw no prospect of her getting married to the 
man she loved so she chose what she thought  was the only option available to her to 
commit suicide. She set herself on fire, sustained severe burns and succumbed to her 
injuries. (Story as narrated by a family member living in Newcastle May 2005 UK). 
 
Despite the changes taking place within the Jaffna community, the practice of dowry, caste and 
class continues to play a prominent role in determining social relations.  Even while the upper 
class Jaffna man/woman sympathies with the cause of the LTTE, one thing that keeps them 
distanced from the LTTE is the caste consciousness.  
 
This was the answer I got from one man when I asked him if he would ever return to Jaffna- 
 
“How can we live under those low caste men and women telling us what to do… our 
family was a leading family in Jaffna, we never even entertained lower caste people into 
our court yard” 
 
Another woman was furious when her daughter decided to sell their ancestral property (now 
abandoned) to a low cast woman who lived on rent from the property. 
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“What would our neighbours think of us… all who lived in that street were upper caste 
people, and now when we sell our house to some low caste people? They will be very 
angry with us” (Woman in Newcastle focus group; May 2005) 
 
In a society where caste is deep rooted for young women and men who are from lower caste and 
low classes within society - the few ways for upward mobilisation is education, economic status or 
marrying into an upper caste family.  However, social memory is such that even when such people 
attain some status within society - their social interactions are being scrutinised by the lens of 
caste - an example of this can be the situation of the late Sri Lankan president Mr. Ranasinghe 
Premadasa and his wife Mrs. Hema Premadasa.  Mr. Premadasa was a man from a lower caste 
and class - despite his hard work and achievement of president in the country his every move was 
interpreted with the stigma of a lower caste man. 
 
As such social oppression within the same community has become another key factor for young 
women to support militarism.  While in the same way caste and class have also become factors 
for some women to oppose militarism 
 
“I can remember when we went to get our papers signed to leave Jaffna, Kittu was riding 
on a motor bike and every one had to give room for him to pass as if he was the lord-the 
boys at the desk who were issuing the papers were from our own village-low caste 
fellows, so how can we go there and live again, you know when low caste fellows get 
power or money how they try to show off” (reflections of a woman of her flight to safety  
now living in  UK 2006) 
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The burden of the dowry system combined with the caste, class and the loss of livelihoods due to 
the conflict has meant that women also face economic vulnerabilities that have pushed them 
towards the organisation. 
 
 
 
Economic reasons 
In her study of the El Salvador conflict under the dictatorship of General Hernandex that cost 
30,000 lives over a twelve-year period Ana Cristina Ibanez (Ibanez 2001) recalls that the majority 
of women were found in the neediest social class.  She suggests that this might explain why so 
many women joined or supported the guerrilla’s and responded to the call to build a better future 
for their children and fulfilled their social identity of self-sacrifice and ‘giving themselves for others’. 
This has also been true in recent conflict in Nepal (Interview with an NGO worker stationed in 
Nepal UK 2006).   
 
In a the context of Sri Lanka the social crisis in the deep down south of the country in the early 
70’s and late 80’s described in chapter three was an example where the young men and women 
of the JVP took up arms to fight a regime that excluded them from the mainstream social and 
economical benefits, a core concept they even hold today after entering mainstream politics (see 
interview with Vijitha Rohana, published on info Lanka 31/12/2007).  Unemployment and 
economic inequalities played a major role for the JVP to gain support, but the political 
indoctrinated classes they conducted reinforced the youths' anxieties and persuaded them to 
embark on the path of violence.  
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This has been true among the Tamil community, if one carefully analyses the context in which the 
LTTE came into existence, was social exclusion and injustice against the Tamil community from 
the state as well as their own community i.e. the upper class Tamil politicians who betrayed the 
common people during the early post independence era (see Chapter Three page 57). Pushpam’s 
story is an example of a woman choosing to join the LTTE to escape the economic situation she 
was in. 
Pushpam’s story 
“I was 19 years old when I ran away from home.  My parents wanted me to get married to 
a man who I did not like.  I begged them to leave me to study. They did not listen to me. 
The man whom they arranged was rich and had promised my father that he would 
redeem some land for us, which my father mortgaged to give my elder sister in marriage a 
few years ago.   He also did not ask for any dowry so my parents thought it was a good 
marriage for me.  
One afternoon in the pretence of going to see my friend I went to a check point and told 
the woman guards there that I want to go with them.  They asked a few questions about 
my family and I told them the truth.    
I was not angry with my parents because I know they wanted me to marry that man 
because they wanted me to be happy and my family was poor they could not afford to 
teach me or give me in marriage to a better man, but then I felt let down so I did not want 
to go and visit them. 
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I stayed with the LTTE for almost ten years, during this time I fought in many battles-one 
day a few of us were manning a road side barrier and came under heavy shelling, one 
died and I was injured – so there after I could not continue and I was discharged. 
What do you think about the LTTE: (she laughs loudly)- 
 “At least there is a place for women like us who have nobody to turn to- they teach us 
how to be courageous and not to be shaken by defeat, which are things you can’t learn by 
living in Jaffna society.  But I think women need a better life - for that matter anything than 
living in the jungle and fighting - sometimes it is fun but then it is not a way of life forever-
even when I was with them I missed the life outside, I like nice things in life, but you don’t 
get them there. 
Have you killed anyone?  
“how do you know how many you kill when you fire a weapon in the dark, may be one 
may be a dozen or may be none - you go to kill and they come to kill so the lucky ones 
escape and others get killed”. 
 
Do you regret killing? 
 “I will not kill anybody now, but then I had to do it and if I did not do it - I would have got 
killed” (Interview with Pushpam ex LTTE combatant in UK March 2005) 
 
Pushpam joined the LTTE to escape a situation that she did not want to enter into due to 
economical difficulties. She had no hatred towards the LTTE or the Army as she thought they 
were all fighting a war and they were performing a job - the only regret she had was not being 
157 
 
able to get a university education - and being disabled52 she finds it difficult now, but is constantly 
reading and trying to improve her knowledge of the outside world. 
 
While economic oppression is a primary cause for enlistment the economic benefits also have 
been an important element in the support to militarism. As we have discussed earlier in Chapter 
Three (page 57), in any conflict there are people who benefit from the conflict. 
 
It can be suggested that economic oppression was a common factor that linked women from all 
ethnic groups to join military groups.  Also this has been a common fact for men and women to 
join military groups. 
 
However, while the LTTE claims women’s liberation, it has made limited effort to eradicate the 
existing social inequalities that exist within the Tamil community.  As pointed out in page 146 the 
LTTE did not adopt effective measures to end the practice of dowry, class or caste systems.  The 
conflict has further exacerbated these social problems and women have become more vulnerable.  
There are a large number of women who have become widows and elderly women are struggling 
to make a living facing humiliation and trauma.  As evident in chapter four this vulnerability has 
lead to women taking up alternative income generating avenues such as sex work (Dharmini page 
113) and working as domestic aids (see Parvathi in page 243) facing further exploitation.   
 
The breakdown of the economic system has also meant that there has been limited opportunity 
for many young men and women to get an education mainly due their parent’s inability to pay for 
                                                 
52 Face partly burnt, and  paralysed below the knees. 
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schooling.  While economic reasons are only part of the story, the fear of sending children out due 
to the fear of violence/abduction has meant that more and more girls are dropping out of school 
and seeing the LTTE as an alternative. 
 
 
Breakdown of education 
The breakdown of the economy and the education system due to the conflict has raised several 
problems at community level that have led to the falling number of students from school and the 
falling standard of education. This is not only a problem in the conflict zones, but also the latest 
Ordinary Level results in Sri Lanka in 2007 showed that 51% had failed the exam, this is due to 
many reasons. There are many children who are unable to attend school due to the army 
occupying school buildings, destruction of school buildings, refugees being placed in schools, and 
therefore these children are vulnerable to easy recruitment to military groups. 
 
 
Figure 5.6, shows LTTE women, show a group of school girls in uniform, how to handle weapons. 
(Source: http://www.irmep.org/essays/hf.htm accessed 22/02/2006). 
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The regular LTTE drills often take place outside schools in order to attract young children –this is 
a further pull factor. This was also confirmed by Thavamini in her interview (page 140) 
 
Furthermore the fear of sending children to school due to harassment at check points, recruitment 
by the LTTE or other military groups and aerial bombardments has seen children drop out of 
school.  While increased economic hardships on the families also mean that girls drop out of 
school early.  For a society, where education for men is a must for upward mobility and a means 
of attracting a woman with a large dowry, there is little encouragement for women to take up 
education in difficult circumstances.  
 
The recruitment drive of the Sri Lankan forces are also playing an important role for the Sinhala 
youth to take up military and para-military activities as a solution to unemployment and lack of 
educational facilities (Ratnayake 2007).  Many young men and women are leaving school after 
achieving their Ordinary Level to join the forces (personal observations made in the field).   
 
While the push factors are documented above that may support women to join military groups 
there are also other intersecting factors, which can pull them towards the cause that military 
groups are fighting for. 
 
Pull Factors 
Nationalism and Ethnicity 
Nationality and Ethnicity are sentiments that can be manipulated towards mobilising people 
against each other that lead to violence as seen in the cases of the partition in India, Kosovo and 
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many other conflict zones.  This has been equally true in relation to the post independence nation 
building process in Sri Lanka, where people with political interests, used nationalistic rhetoric to 
divide communities and gain political legitimacy.  Nationalism while creating the notion of “us” 
versus “them” calls in women to play diverse rolls such as reproducing the culture (Yuval Davies & 
Anthias 1989). These roles created for women demand the loyalty to the nation and its armies that 
represent them as seen in chapter four. Women who do not comply with these demands are 
excluded from the nation state. Despite the political manipulation surrounding militarised 
nationalism which we have discussed through this research, these aspirations have played a 
significant role in women’s motivation to support military groups. This support not only comes in 
terms of ideology, but also women have chosen to join military groups and become active 
combatants. Participants in the research echoed the sentiments of nationalism and national pride 
and quite often related to them as Tamils who were being oppressed by the Sinhalese.   
 
While nationalism was a complex and hidden factor that has motivated women to join the armies, 
they also see the LTTE as an alternative to mainstream politics; the Sinhala political hegemony 
that they thought had denied them their rights. 
 
Alternative to mainstream politics 
Hammani (1997) suggests that joining secret terrorist organisations may be a way for women who 
live in oppressed communities to see themselves as fighting for social justice. In its initial stages in 
the 1970’s the LTTE presented themselves as an alternative to the crippling Tamil parliamentary 
politics, which was dominated by the upper class, western educated, male Tamil politicians who 
had failed the Tamil people.  This was made more feasible by structural violence by the state 
discussed in length in Chapter Three.  As a result, the LTTE was successful in making people 
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believe that an armed struggle and a separate homeland would be the only way to address the 
grievances of the Tamils.  This was a major drive for the younger men and women to join the 
organisation. 
   
This was the case with Rajini Thiranagama and her sister Nirmala (page 138) who supported the 
LTTE cause in the early stages, when it presented an alternative political solution for the 
grievances of the Tamil community. Nirmala was even imprisoned due to her support to the LTTE. 
These women were educated women of independent thought, but when they realised the real 
face of the LTTE, they distanced themselves and faced severe repercussions; Nirmala had to 
again go into exile and Rajini was murdered.  
 
In any society young people are naturally in search of radical solutions to the political and social 
problems faced by the community. This has been proven by the JVP experience, where many 
who joined the movement were young men and women and the majority university students.  
 
The universities have always provided a fertile ground for social change. For example, the 
revolution that brought Fidel Castro into power began in the University of Havana53.  As such, it is 
no surprise that we see a large number of university students joining the militant movements at 
the early stages giving the LTTE a socialist outlook rather than of a guerrilla group.  These young 
people may have believed that they would realise their dream of a separate state/revolution within 
a few years and reap the benefits; which not came to be so54.  When the LTTE and other armed 
                                                 
53 Information gathered from various books on Fidel castor and Chef Guevara and my visit to Cuba in 2009. 
54 I made contact with many University students at the time, who are now in the UK. They all knew at least one personn 
who had joined the militants (LTTE or other group). One recalled how his best mate a young bright medical student at the 
time, left his career and joined the LTTE and lost his legs in a lond mine and later was murdered by the Army.  
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groups were deviating from the promised path of liberation and taking up the root of violence it 
can be that many students were disillusioned and wanted to leave.  Some of them who left the 
LTTE had to flee the country, many were trapped and could not leave and sacrificed their lives in 
the battles  “he was in the Medical faculty with me in the first year and then left to join the LTTE-
after that I got to know he lost both his legs” (interview with a Tamil doctor now in the UK .  Others 
like Vijithaharan55, who wanted to leave, paid the price with their lives for their defiance. 
 
The authoritarian nature of the LTTE is such that even if members left the organisation, in very 
rare circumstance due to reasons such as disability, they still had to assist the organisation in 
other ways, but they were not allowed to return. Therefore, they are more likely to stay with the 
organisation rather than leaving and be intimidated.  
 
While for some the LTTE was an alternative to mainstream politics, some women (and even men) 
saw the life that the LTTE promised as a new way of life.  This was especially after the 1983 riots, 
when young men who were brought up in Colombo came into the scene, for example, the men 
who had adopted the Colombo urbanised life style wore gear that aroused youth sentiments and 
attracted them to the organisation (Interview with former LTTE supporter now living in the UK 
2007). 
 
Militarism as a way of life 
Contradictory to the “liberation” ideology there are some women who see that militarism can be a 
way of life - another job, as one woman told me. 
 
                                                 
55 Vijithaharan was student at the Jaffna university 
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Kanka’s story 
 
I am happy to be a soldier. One-sees women soldiers in the Sri Lanka army- why don’t 
you ask them why do they join?  Surely some will say for a job, likewise this is a job for 
me-only I did not get paid, but I was taken care of -I also got the opportunity to learn how 
to live in the society which otherwise I would I have not got. Do you think those woman 
out there who wear a heap of gold around their big fat necks walking on the streets are 
happy? Then you are mistaken-do you know how many women are suffering in silence 
within the four walls of their houses, how many are being ill treated by their husbands and 
in-laws?  I am not worried about finding food for my children or my husband; we all do the 
chores here and everyone looks after each other. Even when I see the army I smile - I am 
happy, either I will kill them or they will kill me any way one day we all have to die-and the 
cause is worthwhile so I am happy (Telephone interview Kanka, Woman combat July 
2006). 
 
This woman did not give me any information about her or the movement-she was the only woman 
I had the opportunity to interview within the organisation, therefore, she was reluctant to provide 
any information that would lead to her identification.  With the little information she revealed she 
seemed to be a formidable woman who could face up to any challenge. 
 
It was clear, that Kanka joined the organisation she saw it as an alternative to the life outside. She 
also proved that women are not always driven by their gender or victimisation to take up violence. 
But her reference to “other women are suffering” indicated that oppression she had witnessed was 
164 
 
one reason that led to her decision to join, though it had not directly affected her. She had a valid 
point in her argument – if state military groups employed women then why not the LTTE? 
 
Does the fact that women are recruited by organisations such as the LTTE (either who refer to 
them as freedom fighters or liberation fighters or terrorist groups as their opponents may call 
them) can be less empowering than when women are recruited into formal military groups?  The 
two interviews I had with the women from the formal military (Irangani and Sriyalatha) are 
evidence to that women serving in the formal military do not enjoy any more status than a women 
in a guerrilla movement apart from  a  remuneration that helped support their families56. Kanaka’s  
answer to my question of what will life be when peace comes: “I will only know about it if I happen 
to live until that date, and I am sure our leader will take care of it”, it struck me hard. Even though 
she was a strong woman who made a choice to follow her heart, her dependency on the leader to 
take care of her (women’s) future in a post conflict situation somewhat surprised me.  If women 
are thought to depend on a single person and have no voice in defining their own liberation/future, 
then can it be called autonomy?57  They also see the leader/s as role models that they themselves 
aspire to be and this has become another important pull factor. 
 
Glorification of Military/Role Models 
According to Dr. Thiranagama (page 138) it is clear that many joined the LTTE due to its symbols 
and role models.  The interview with Thavamini (page 140) revealed that the new recruits were 
                                                 
56 See also article in Metro dated 5th July 07 where a woman was sexually harassed by an army sergeant in the 
British army. 
57 My fears for Kanka’s reliance on the leader had proved to be valid with the unexpected defeat of the LTTE by the 
Sri Lankan army in May 2009. The LTTE leader and his top men are said to be killed and the army continues its spree 
of killing suspected LTTE men and women.   
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mainly children of school age.  They usually performed drills near schools or in playgrounds where 
children gather (see photograph Fig 5.6 in page158).  
 
The cult of martyrdom has been embedded in the LTTE discourse though various symbols and 
traditions.  The LTTE practice to built cemeteries for the heroes is entirely radical change from the 
Hindu custom of cremation and scattering the ashes in running water (see picture in Fig 5.3 of 
these cemeteries page 143).  The main purpose of this may be to re-create the images of the 
fallen men and women to arouse people’s sentiments. 
 
Fig 5.7 Memorial arcs commemorating fallen Black Tigers  set up on roads during the Mahaweera  
week in Vanni (Source: www.tamilnet.com/img/publish/2007/07/bt_day_l...accessed 12/10/2007) 
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Fig 5.8 LTTE leader lit the flame of sacrifice among Black Tiger cadres in Vanni  (Source:  
www.tamilnet.com/img/publish/2007/07/bt_day_l... Accessed 12/10/2007 ) 
While all these sentiments are push and pull factors for women to join the organisation there are 
also arguments that the labour shortage was a key factor for the LTTE in adopting its double 
liberation policy. 
 
Labour shortage 
Dr. Coomaraswamy (1996) argues that women have been a major source of labour for the LTTE 
and that while the women’s wing was established in 1984 it is only after years that the women are 
being deployed for fighting, which is also in the period that saw the increase in fighting. 
Thereafter, anti LTTE elements have followed her steps and argued that this is in fact what 
motivated the LTTE to recruit women to its rank, especially as it was the time that the LTTE was 
engaged in a war with the IPKF and were trying to increase their manpower.  The LTTE has been 
interpreting the enlistment of women into their ranks as a result of “liberation” from the Sinhala 
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state  and oppressive structures and have denied any suggestions that the increase in recruitment 
was a necessity to inflate their ranks58.  
 
An analysis of the early stages of the movement confirms that women’s recruitment began during 
the early 80’s when the popularity of the Elam movement was at its peak as the 83 riots saw an 
influx of recruits (information gathered from field work).  As such, it is difficult to state that the 
militants were short of manpower.  Therefore, the recruitment of women can be argued as a trend, 
which began, in the early phase of the Tamil militancy, rather than a shortage of “man power”. The 
LTTE had come under tremendous pressure for excluding women when other militant groups 
were recruiting women.  On one hand, the LTTE wanted to be ahead of other military groups to be 
represented as the leading party; also they wanted to give a human face into their struggle to be 
recognised as a truly liberation army with a pseudo “gender mainstreaming” policy that can attract 
large benefits including international funding.  
 
Later on with the military capabilities and strategies such as using Black Tigers and Sea Tigers 
the “human bomb” was seen as a more effective tool against the sophisticated military weapons 
and the numerical advantage of the Sri Lankan army.  Women became more suitable for this task 
as they were less suspected as well as their ability to conceal the weapons and explosives among 
their clothes.  There have also been many reports stating that women have been used to transport 
grenades hidden inside their vaginas. Virgins or non-virgins have been used in this heinous act 
and the case of Dhanu (page 74) is evidence of the vulnerability of women due to this. There was 
                                                 
58 But have continued with the forcible recruitment of young girls (and boys) (save the Children 2005, UNICEF 2006, 
UTHR 2004, Amnesty International, and National Peace Council 2007). 
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also the added dimension of “surprise” when attacked by a woman as suicide missions were new 
to Sri Lanka at the early stages of the development of militancy. 
 
Based on this evidence, even though one might conveniently argue that the expansion of the 
LTTE in the 80’s and threat from the IPKF is connected with “man power crisis” to which young 
Tamil women were seen as a part of the solution, I would argue otherwise and say that these 
recruitments were a matter based on “the military and political advantage” rather than only 
“numbers”.  Furthermore, used as strategy to gain international sympathy giving the organisation 
a human face and also attracting much needed funds to purchase weapons and build the 
organisation.  But considering the intersecting factors there has also been a compliance from the 
women itself who have chosen to join the LTTE due to some of the reasons identified by their own 
narratives which made it easier for the LTTE to validate its actions of recruitment of women into 
the ranks.   
 
While the LTTE was engaged in this manipulation of people’s sentiments, the women who had no 
social status on their own and were constantly under the rule of their men or faces social 
oppression also saw that joining the organisation was a path to freedom (Balasingham 1993). The 
power they gained in the ranks of the LTTE was something they had never experienced in their 
lives; therefore, this can be a motivating factor especially for young women.   
 
Attaining Power  
A controversy took place when LTTE women refused to remove their belts with the emblem of the 
LTTE symbol the Tiger, in the army controlled areas as agreed in the CFA. It can be suggested as 
a sign of power struggle that runs within the militaristic discourse. The uniform is what 
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distinguished military and a non-military personnel to the public.  Therefore, to remove that symbol 
of power induced rebellion.  In this case the LTTE women did not want to put aside their symbols 
of power even at the risk of being identified as an LTTE cadre and violating the Cease Fire 
Agreement (page 74). Women would prefer to risk their lives and the path to peace rather than 
remove the belt - they wanted to be distinctive and show off their power. The power they enjoyed 
over the normal civilians, to terrorise them, to instil fear and see people go silent in front of them 
and humiliate and emasculate the men who had refused the path of voice by not joining the LTTE. 
This limited power was something that women would have never enjoyed within the Tamil 
community where men are considered the head of household and community and women’s role 
was to obey their men, rather challenge them.    
 
In situations where women have taken up arms and participated in violence confirms that this has 
been the result of patriarchal intervention (Nepal, Colombia, El Salvador, India). It can be argued 
that when women saw violence as means to gain power that otherwise they do not enjoy in 
society.  As such they are inclined to resort to masculine acts.  This has been the case of some 
women who joined the military, they see the power in the military uniform and sense the fear that 
surround their ‘being’ and enjoy it.   As the JVP woman Kalyanimala who told me (page 198) that, 
she enjoyed terrorising a school principal using one single letter.   
 
Also, when one analyses the acts of violence some of the women combatants inflicted on fellow 
women prisoners and child soldiers (see page for interview with about the treatment of prisoners 
by women wardens), it was clear that they had acted with a sense of inflated ego - which only the 
military uniform can provide them with.  For a society that was dominated by men, to have power 
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over those very same men with the use of violence, can be a very attractive incentive to join the 
military/military groups. 
 
Despite these intersecting factors, the LTTE (as many other armed groups) are accused of forced 
recruitment that they have denied to date. However, I found evidence of forced recruitment from 
the literature (Save the Children 2005) as well as in my field work. 
 
Forced Recruitment 
While many informants confirmed that they joined voluntarily it is also common knowledge that the 
LTTE forcibly recruited large number of men and women to combat as well as child soldiers 
(Gunaratna accessed 2004). According to a Save the children report in 2005, there are more than 
5,000 children in the armed ranks of the LTTE. This is one story of a young girl who was recruited 
forcibly 
Chitra’s story 
I lived with my brother who was a student at Eastern University and two younger sisters. 
One night we had a visit from a group of men.  They were in search of my brother; we told 
that he had not come home as he was staying with his friends.  First they did not believe 
and searched the house, after realising that that he was not in, one man told my mother 
that when he came home to ask him to report to the camp. My mother frightfully asked if 
he had done anything wrong, then the man replied it is not him who has done wrong, but 
you, it is a mother’s duty to send their children to fight for the land, what mother are you if 
you don’t encourage him to join us?  My mother begged the man saying that my brother 
was a student and that he had only another year to graduate, then he laughed and 
retorted what is education without a land, there are so many young people giving their 
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lives, why can’t he? If you don’t send him we will take another, so you decide… we will 
give you time till tomorrow afternoon and we will be back…They left us. We all began to 
cry, we all loved our brother and he wanted to be a doctor one-day. How could we ruin his 
future…after much contemplation I decided to take his place.  As said so the next day 
they came back for him… and I asked if t I come and leave my brother alone… the men 
were angry but then another man whispered and they agreed.  So I went with them, if I 
did not they would have killed my brother-the previous week they set fire to one of our 
neighbours house when the boy refused to join and ran away from the village.  If they did 
that to our house what would happen to my mother and younger sisters. We had no 
father. So I joined… 
 
I left after 12 years, and got married to XXXX he was also in the organisation but got 
injured and was discharged, we have no children.  After I joined my brother did not come 
home in fear, he had to go into hiding…. 
 
I would have never joined if I had a choice…but I saved my brother’s life… 
My husband is kind to me most of the time… but at times he has his mood swings and 
gets very angry at me…for the small thing…at times he used to scream in his dreams and 
shout and struggle… I am worried. 
 
There is also the added dimension of child recruitment that has made the LTTE unpopular in the 
eyes of the UN and other human right agencies.  This is also an issue that the government has 
used to criticise the LTTE time after time branding them as child abductors. 
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CHILD RECRUITMENT  
Child recruitment has been a major problem that the Tamil community has had to face. Over the 
year the LTTE and other militant groups have been recruiting children in to their ranks (Gunaratna 
2004; Save the Children 2005).   While there was no organised effort to recruit children at large, it 
is public knowledge that the JVP too had young children in their ranks mostly carrying out non-
combatant tasks. 
 
Selvamani, a Tamil girl living in eastern Sri Lanka was only 15 when rebel forces began 
pressurising her to join them. ‘First they sent letters, then they began visiting my house” 
she said, “they told my family, each house has to turn over one child. If you don’t agree, 
we will take a child anyway”.  Not long afterward in August 2002, soldiers from the LTTE 
abducted Selvamani while she was walking to class.  They took her to a military training 
camp where she learned to use weapons, including landmines and bombs. During 
training when she became too weary to continue and asked to rest, the rebels beat her. 
(Toronto Star 19/12/2004) 
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Figure: 5.9 Photos of young children who are in the LTTE 
(Source: http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/Sinhala/child.htm accessed 13/12/2004) 
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Unfortunately the scope of the research did not permit me the ability to conduct research around 
child recruitment and therefore, I could not gather information to carry out in-depth analysis in this 
area. 
 
While the above are only a few reasons that encouraged the enlistment, there were also some 
isolated cases where children facing domestic violence/abuse in their homes decided to run away 
from home and join the LTTE, but these did not represent a major pattern in the available 
literature or the interviews I conducted. 
 
There is also evidence where women who do not fit into the militaries idealistic body have been 
recruited into military organisations (i.e. pregnant, married, lesbians) to perform tasks that can 
only can be carried out by these types of women.( i.e. spying, carrying ammunition, seducing 
enemies) suggesting that women’s incorporation in to the military/military groups are purely based 
on the needs of the militaristic institution that recruit them rather than women’s autonomous 
choice or their liberation as the LTTE argues. 
 
Summary 
From the field work it is clear that women have been recruited into military groups since the 80’s 
and the early recruitments were into the PLOTE and the EPRLF and fewer into the LTTE.  Later 
there was a rapid increase in the number of women in the LTTE creating debate on whether the 
decision to recruit women was due to its double liberation policy or to fill in the manpower 
shortage.  The research established that the recruitment has not always been voluntary as 
claimed by the LTTE for the purpose of double liberation or forcibly as claimed by anti-LTTE 
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groups. Neither can be seen in the light of being drugged or brainwashed and pure oppression as 
constructed by the military/ public discourse.  
 
Women’s narratives confirm that there have been a number of intersecting factors that 
encouraged their enlistment into the militaries, mainly the LTTE.  Among these are GBV and the 
associated humiliation from the state/other military groups, economic hardships prior to the conflict 
and as a result of the conflict, Social oppression due to the position of women in society, power 
and nationalistic aspirations.  Despite these intersecting reasons the representation of the women 
combatants are either as drugged and brain washed, or for the LTTE propaganda mechanism 
women are liberation fighters fighting the oppression of the state and its militaries.  These narrow 
representations have ignored women’s diverse experience in conflict and confined them to the 
image of victims or perpetrators of violence.   Despite the rhetoric of liberation, evidence gathered 
from the field work suggests that the LTTE recruitment of women combatants has been as a result 
of the strategic value women add to the fighting machines and the operation of the organisations.  
At other times the recruitment has been forced and has included the recruitment of children, 
women who are pregnant, sex workers and older women. 
 
Whatever the reasons behind their enlistment military groups, who recruit women, adopt different 
strategies to maintain the masculine nature of the institutions. The LTTE have been no different. 
The rigorous training that women cadres undergo and the strict code of conduct creating the 
ultimate combatant, have required women to transform into masculine military bodies and adopt 
masculine norms. Through this training women have not only been able to challenge the notion 
that the military is for men but women have also created new intersecting identities for themselves 
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such as Tamil women combatants who are fighting to avenge the humiliation that their 
communities have been subject to at the hands of the state.     
 
In doing so, these women  have evolved from being girls to fierce combatants, stepping into a 
sense of collective purpose and power and, re-enforcing the culture of militaristic violence that is a 
norm of the military especially when engaged in conflict.  Women share some privileges and 
positions of power as a result of their combatant identity, there by refuting that women are 
powerless, inherently peaceful and passive.  However, what is concerning is that military groups 
that take so much care in transforming women into masculine symbols do not take the same care 
when returning these women into society after the conflict.  
 
The following chapter will focus on women’s lives within militarism and explore the experience of 
women within these organisations looking at the structures that are put in place to maintain the 
masculine nature of the institutions. It will explore their lives within the organisations, coping 
mechanism and how women negotiate power within these camps to understand how empowered 
women are, as argued by the LTTE. Using the ex-combatants experience (LTTE and JVP) the 
next chapter also analyses women’s experience in a post conflict society. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
AGENCY WITHIN MILITARISM 
 
In chapter five my research findings identified the interconnecting factors that have motivated 
women’s enrolment in militarised organisations. These included experience of violence, 
humiliation, fear of violence, social and economical oppression, and the belief that these 
organisation like the LTTE would bring radical change, in contrast to mainstream politics that 
denied women meaningful political participation  (other than casting their vote).  For some women 
like Pushpam (page 154) the decision to join the military/military groups was a route to escape the 
situations they are in, rather than a decision they would make if the circumstances were different. 
For others it has been the sentiments of nationalism as well as an alternative way to participate in 
the politics that govern their lives.   
 
Given these findings it is important to question to what extent a decision made by external 
pull/push pressure can be described as empowering/liberating.  What is the extent of women’s 
‘agency’ under these conditions? Or are their ‘choices’ within the very limited constraints I have 
outlined evidence of ideological and structural change?  While there is an increasing scholarship 
around women’s agency within militarism (Coomaraswamy 1996; Enloe 1989, 2000; Eisenstein 
2007; Moser & Clark eds 2001; Sjoberg & Gentry 2007), it is useful to explore how relevant these 
debates are in the context of Sri Lanka where it is estimated that women constitute one third of 
the LTTE fighting force (UTHR 1987) as well as the increasing numbers of recruits in to the state 
military.  
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Using women’s own narratives and my observations in the field, supported by the available 
literature (Alison 2003; Balasingham 1983, 1993; De Mel 2001), this chapter will try to understand 
women’s experiences further and will examine whether their enlistment has been, in any sense,  
liberating as claimed by the LTTE and its sympathisers.  Analysis will begin by exploring women’s 
lives within the LTTE camps. 
 
Training within camps 
There is evidence supported by some of the narratives from my interviewees that after recruitment 
women undergo a structured regime of training. This training includes physical fitness, loading 
and dismounting arms, defence techniques, sabotage, manning checkpoints and explosive 
handling. 
 
“During the early days we were trained in self-defence, use of weapons and warfare. 
When we were not on duty we were given time to read. The readings were most of the 
time material prepared by the organisation. In addition to the weapons training we were 
taught how to kill ourselves if we got caught to the army” (Interview with ex-woman 
Combatant Thavamini in exile in UK May 2006). 
 
 
Thavamini reflected on the discomfort and fear of handling arms.  “Initially I was afraid, but 
gradually got used to it after watching how other girls handled their weapons”.  
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In addition to the physical training, indoctrination is used to increase the effectiveness of the 
cadres as it essential that new recruits develop a strong belief in the cause of the struggle. This 
process is conducted by the senior cadre’s at times using videos and other visuals. A participants 
in one of the Focus Group confirmed that she had seen the LTTE using visuals in a school to a 
group for students where she used to be working in the office.  Thavamini described that these 
materials include stories and photographs of other cadres who had sacrificed their lives to the 
cause. This type of indoctrination is a critical tool in reconsolidating the rhetoric around death and 
sacrifice that was discussed in chapter one. 
 
An analysis of  the training  women undergo reveals such structured training while re-inventing the 
politics of martyrdom is also aimed at breaking down the new recruit’s civil identity and giving 
them a military identity based on the ideologies and subculture of the organisation. Thereby 
effectively distancing the recruits from the wider community and breaking down their 
family/community ties. This isolating process is essential to keep the combatants fully focused and 
motivated to the cause they enlisted in.  
 
Thavamini’s (page 140) and  Pushpam’s (154) narratives made it clear that the girls were 
constantly exposed to danger and violence in the course of carrying out their work as combatants, 
which eventually rendered it as normal behaviour, as in the case of .  This resonates with Kelman 
(1973; 1989) who argues about normalisation of violence and Enloe’s (1989) argument about the 
process of militarisation –which states that when individuals perpetrate acts of violence and 
torture over time they tend to see themselves as performing a routine, even a professional job.  
The women’s reflections on their lives in the camps gave me the impression that they were used 
to a daily routine which they became accustomed to as time went by.   As war drags on violence 
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becomes normative and an act they learn not to question.  This is also evident within the wider Sri 
Lankan society.  The culture of impunity that began with the JVP suppression has continued to 
date with more depth that has become normative, ie., much of the society has not come forward 
to question the violence and human right abuse that are taking place in the North East but 
seemed to be content with the idea that the government is engaged in fighting terrorism. 
 
“In any war there will be these incidents and women will be raped so that can’t be 
changed” (Interview with a female member of the Sri Lankan Lawyers Association, UK 
October 2006)  
 
In this process of constructing the military body and rendering violence routine, cadres who lacked 
the stamina are forced to keep up with the others through punishment, using inhumane methods 
such as regular beatings and standing in the sun without water for hours.  New recruits who try to 
escape are dealt with severe punishments, which are put on display to instil fear in others.  While 
women are trained vigorously to create the ultimate soldiers, there is also the need to have a clear 
division between the sexes for a number of reasons.  Firstly for making sure they are fully focused 
to the cause and Secondly, to “buy in” the male cadres and wider community approval for the 
recruitment of women (Balasingham 1983; 1993).  
 
Sexual Division of Labour 
It is clear that women suffer from the sexual divisions of labour that are reinforced by the 
elaborative cultivation of militant women who are being represented as the symbol of liberation. In 
this image building process, women combatants are pressured to prove that they are as capable 
as their male counterparts.   As we see in Adel Ann’s writings (Balasingham 1993) and the images 
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in Chapter Five (page 120) the female combatant is being inflated to “ultimate militant” Their 
physical capability, training, courage and dedication are reinforced along with their physical 
appearance.  No makeup, some with short hair and others with hair tied up in combat uniform. 
Women who sacrifice their lives are glorified as martyrs.  This construction of the combatant has 
not included women who are unable to meet the physical requirements such as Thavamini and 
Pushpam who were discharged after their disability.  Further while representing the female 
combatant as the ultimate soldier, the LTTE has failed to simultaneously challenge the ideology of 
existing gender roles within the wider community; as such dominant forms of masculinity and 
femininity within the Tamil culture remain intact.  Men and women entering the organisation and 
women returning to the society continue to be governed by these ideologies. 
 
Balasingham (1983; 1993) confirms that in the early day’s women were recruited into supportive 
roles due to the reluctance of the male cadres to accept women’s capability to fight.  Even after 
several years when the women have proved their capabilities, there is no evidence of a significant 
change to this policy.  Women are assigned a combination of duties from support service to active 
combat.  According to Thavamini these roles seem to be multiple and fluid, cutting across 
women’s traditional duties and military duties.  This establishes the fact that despite women taking 
up men’s work they have not been relieved from their traditional roles and hence suffer the double 
burden.  
 
 “We managed our own camps and did work such as cleaning and cooking. We had to 
cook for the boys when we were put on those duties.  We were also used to recruit other 
members and train them. This was often done by means of visiting schools and camps.   
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At times I was also put on duty to guard the women prisoners” (Interview with ex-woman 
Combatant Thavamini in exile in UK May 2006). 
 
At the same time, the LTTE use senior women cadres who are either disabled or who chose not 
to fight any more, to discharge duties associated with women’s traditional role of caring and 
nurturing. These women are assigned roles such as taking care of the young child recruits or work 
in orphanages and elders homes. Contrary to this, injured male cadres continue to carry on as 
combatants or in other political roles despite their age or disability. An example is Thamilchelvam, 
the former LTTE peace negotiator who was disabled and could not fight but was assigned a chief 
political role.  The LTTE policy towards the disabled and injured woman combatants is evidence to 
the sexual division of labour that exists within the organisation that is in line with the wider Tamil 
community. 
 
This ambiguity within the organisation that continues to maintain the division of labour based on 
gender roles, whilst promoting the able bodied, masculine culture has meant that women have to 
negotiate the different power structures operating within the camps and the organisation. 
 
Negotiating power  
Rosalind Coward (1992) warns feminist against the inclination to think about gender relations as a 
straightforward and unambiguous relation of power where men by definition are given the stronger 
position. This she finds not only problematic but also unproductive. While she concedes that 
women are yet still worse off than men in many areas, at the same time, it is important to note that 
the scenario is no longer clearly defined “the picture at the moment is much more muddled and 
uneven, men are still often the beneficiaries of how gender works in society, but now women 
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some times are as well (Coward 1999: 212).  Coward’s argument is proven to be valid to an extent 
when analysing the power relations that exist among the LTTE women cadres. There was 
evidence from the interviews confirming that women enjoy positions of power depending on their 
intersecting identities such as in terms of ranks and duties assigned. The women’s wing headed 
by a senior cadre Thamilini and the duties of the peace secretariat have been handed to a woman 
cadre Interviews with my informants confirmed that governors of the women’s prisons are senior 
women cadres who used violent methods to intimidate the inmates.  The brutal methods used by 
the woman wardens and the tactics junior cadres adopted such as carrying out instructions 
without questioning or not coming forward to help inmates was evident to the fact that as part of 
the official positions of power, there are informal power structures that operate within the camps 
that women have to negotiate.    
 
After hearing about the women prisons from Thavamini (page 140) I wanted to explore this further  
with her to understand the power relations that existed within the camps.  
Who were these prisoners?  
“They were mostly women who were thought to have given information to the army or 
IPKF and supporters of other groups. Some were women who had either their sons or 
husbands join other groups” 
What did you do with them?  
“I don’t know much about them, XXXX and a few others were in charge of the camps, I 
was called on occasionally to guard one, but I know that the treatment woman in this 
camp got was not a good.  Sometimes, I used to hear them scream, and just fallen like 
dead bodies on the ground in the hot sun after punishments” 
  Did you ever try to help them?  
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“No it would be the end of our life, we had nothing to do with those prisoners, we were 
asked to carry out orders and we could not go beyond what we were told to do unless we 
wanted to punish them further”. 
How did you recruit others?  
“We used different methods, sometimes we go to schools and put up displays or 
sometimes-just talk to children and ask them to come with us” (continuation of 
Thavamini’s interview UK May 2006). 
 
Despite women’s subordinate position within the Tamil community, it was clear the LTTE women 
enjoyed a privileged position over other women and even some men in the community due to their 
identity as a LTTE combatant as well as their ability to inflict violence and terrorise the community.   
As identified in Chapter Five power over the other was a factor that encouraged some women to 
enlist into the organisation 
 
While women combatants are governed by the LTTE code of conduct, ideology and the needs of 
the organisation which are instilled from the time of induction, the behaviour of the prison wardens 
and some senior cadres suggests that there are some women who are given powers to use their 
discretion in matters such as the method and extent of punishment/violence they use to intimidate 
inmates or the new recruits.  Women are allowed to go into the villages and recruit children, 
collect (at times forcibly) food items and take ransoms from civilians (information gathered from 
focus groups).  This suggests that even within the dominant identity of the woman combatant 
some women enjoy different statuses and hold different positions of power, at times directly 
reporting to the leader.  
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However, this freedom is conditional and cannot be seen as complete autonomy as independency 
is not a practice that is encouraged by the LTTE/military.  Military groups discourage any sort of 
criticism and cultivation of independent thought. The main reason for this is that these military 
groups gain supremacy by oppressing the other groups and humiliating them through the use of 
violence including GBV. Therefore, blind loyalty and the ability to carry out violence without 
remorse or questioning are essential for maintaining the power base of the organisation.  This has 
been true with the LTTE too. The LTTE gained power on a pseudo liberation rhetoric that 
advocated “liberation to nation and to women” yet their real power was based on the monopoly of 
violence.   A culture of critical thinking or questioning is detrimental to its survival and the LTTE did 
not encourage or tolerate any form of critical thinking or insubordination from its cadres or 
civilians.    This was the problem that the LTTE encountered with Nirmala Nithyananthan who 
supported the LTTE in the early days as well as those like Thilaga (page 110) and Dharmini (page 
113)  in Chapter Four who resisted the LTTE orders and interacted with the enemy men. 
 
Adele Balasingham in her The Will to Freedom (2003: pp 86-87) writes the following:  
Mr Pirabakaran was less than enthusiastic about the prospect of Nirmala joining the LTTE and a 
contradiction in feminist perception was clearly evident.  For him, Nirmala's conception and 
projection of women liberation did not tally with his view or vision of Tamil women's liberation. In 
Mr Pirabakaran's ideological perspective, Nirmala's idea of a women's liberation represented more 
stereotyped conception of Western women's liberation than an emancipation which the masses of 
Tamil women could identify with and embrace as their own.   Delegating the task of building the 
women's wing of the LTTE to Nirmala was not in Mr Pirabakaran's scheme of things”.  
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Thus it can be established that the perception of women’s liberation within the LTTE is that of the 
leaders or the men’s perspectives of what women should be. The organisation has rigorously 
projected the leader as the mid-wife of women’s agency (De Mel 2001) rather than the women 
themselves. Women like  blindly accepted this and relied on their leader’s wisdom.   
 
Similar to the LTTE, within the JVP there is hardly a discourse around feminism.  Rather the JVP 
advocates economic oppression of the working classes; it has not focused on the intersecting 
oppressions that lie within the working class and how class intersects with other social categories.  
So, like the LTTE, the JVP have drawn a binary between liberation to the land and liberation to its 
women without appreciating the intersecting identities and social divisions that exits among the 
Tamil community.  This then raises questions, in a society that has constantly worked towards the 
subordination of women, how is liberation perceived and who defines the yardsticks of this 
liberation. Is it the men, or the women themselves? 
 
Even the limited training women gained through following the five lessons of the JVP or the 
political training within the LTTE, narrowly defines the beliefs of the respective organisations 
rather than critically analysing the wider political theories.  In this sense despite the JVP entering 
mainstream politics in the early 90’s, there have not been any visible attempts to include its 
women’s cadres into the political process, nor to encourage women to come forward to actively 
take up politics.  
 
While the LTTE have given some form of freedom to women to decide on the use of violence and 
to humiliate their enemy, without leaving any space for competing political ideologies within the 
organisation and wider community, they have denied the opportunity for women to engage in 
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political activities, other than activities that benefit the organisation.  The intimidation faced by the 
Jaffna Mother’s Front discussed in Chapter Eight (page 234) is evident to the totalitarian nature of 
the LTTE.  On many occasions the LTTE in their striving to be recognised as the sole 
representative of the Tamil people have worked towards brutally eradicating dissenting political 
voices including the assassination of political opponents such as the Jaffna mayor Ms Sarojini 
Yogeswaran.  
 
Whilst striving to become the sole representative of the Tamil people, the LTTE have worked 
towards controlling women’s potential transgression using the various patriarchal tools that exist in 
the Tamil community such as ‘kinship’ to creating a hierarchy and to avoid any sexual relationship 
among the cadres.  
 
Kinship as a method of control 
Even though the combatants are groomed to end their family and community ties in the 
transformation from being a civilian to a combatant, the Sri Lankan experience shows that military 
organisations simultaneously use the kinship structures that exist in the wider community as 
strategies to maintain a hierarchy and strict division between the sexes and the leadership. 
 
The authority of the LTTE as well as the JVP are vested in the leadership who are addressed the 
elder “Aiiya” or”Anna” and the younger ones “Thambi” (if man) or “Thangattchi” (if women).  Within 
the JVP they refer to each other as “Sahodaraya” (brother) or “Sahodarii” (sister), which continues 
the patriarchal kinship.  Such relationships are an extension of the existing social relations and 
can be seen as a strategy that is introduced into these organisations to help maintain a hierarchy 
as well as to control sexual interactions between men and women.  This is evident to the fluidity of 
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these non state military groups that give them the ability to selectively adopt some practices that 
exist in the community that can be of strategically value to their sustainability. This fluidity is also 
something that these groups dangerously manipulate blurring the nexus of combatant and non 
combatant.   
 
The adoption of such hierarchies actively discourages sexual relationships among its cadres as 
well as working towards maintaining the hierarchy of power, which is fundamental to a well 
focused, disciplined military. The LTTE is widely recognised for its strict code of conduct around 
the behaviour and sexual relationships of its cadres59 .  
 
This may also be due to the rigidly segregated pattern of training and deployment they undergo.  
This is not to suggest that there were no such relationships or incidents. There have been reports 
of an LTTE cadre having sexual relations with a young girl in the community who later became 
pregnant.  Also some of the participants I interviewed revealed that there were some women who 
were attracted to fellow male cadres, but this was not a subject they spoke about in public.  In 
Thavamini’s interview (page 140) she revealed that there were times when male cadres visited 
women held in the prisons at night and at those times they could hear sounds of singing and 
partying until late in the night, meaning that there were interactions between the men and women.  
 
As for sexual harassment within the organisations there have been reports of LTTE cadre 
attempting to rape young girls60.  While there can be some element of truth to this I was unable to 
                                                 
59 Writing of military experts such, Narayanswamy (2004) Inside the elusive mind: Prabahakaran: Colombo, Sri Lanka, 
Vijitha Yapa Publications .   
60 See report  Rumour sparks violence in Sri Lanka   http://www.dawn.com/2005/10/30/int11.htm  accessed 
31/10/2005.   
189 
 
establish the full facts surrounding this report or any other incidents of sexual violence within the 
camps.  However, some incidents of torture methods for dissidents and punishments of young 
combats constituted acts of sexual harassment.  It has been noted that sexually violent acts 
towards women were not reported especially due to fear of the LTTE and also because the crimes 
were sexual in nature they are under reported. There is also a lack of understanding of what 
constitutes a sexual act especially among young children. And therefore, perpetrators are able to 
get away with acts of a sexual nature such as rubbing, caressing and fondling.  
 
I was thirteen years old when I went to spend the holiday with my Grandma.  One 
afternoon I was playing with my cousin, when our driver agreed to join us. We were happy 
as we thought he was a kind man.  Later when I was leaning on the bonnet of the car, he 
came behind me and was pressing his private parts on my body. I never realised or knew 
what he was doing at the time. It is only now I know that it is sexual harassment. Later this 
man was accused of making a domestic aid pregnant – so now I am putting these 
incidents together and thinking how naive I was even at 13 years of age. (Interview with  
female scholar July 2007) 
  
Even though this interview had no direct relevance to the LTTE, it is evidence of the wider attitude 
towards sexual harassment in the wider community. 
  
In this context one cannot totally deny that there were no sexual relationships or harassment 
within the LTTE. 
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While sexual relations are prohibited within the organisation, there is no restriction on married men 
joining the organisation and they continue to consummate their marriages.  Most of the high 
ranking LTTE men are married including the leader himself.  The rule applies only to younger 
cadres. Therefore, the code on sexual relations can be seen as a strategy to curb the sexual 
activities of the younger cadres especially women, in order to preserve the LTTE image as a 
highly disciplined military.   Maintaining this image became particularly important when they saw 
the need to recruit women and the dangers associated with it. Therefore, these restrictions had to 
be imposed.  This also can be the reason for the birth of the concept of the “armed virgin”, which 
is now vigorously denied by the women and the organisation (Interview with Kanka page 161).  At 
the same time, despite the rhetoric of women’s liberation, the policy of recruiting only young 
women  suggests that the organisation sees married women as an obstacle, (as opposed to male 
cadres), due to the responsibilities attached to being a mother and wife and therefore they not 
only avoid recruiting married women but also discourage marriage while in combat.   
 
One of my interviewees described her lack of relationships whilst serving the LTTE   
“No, we were concentrating on the war, it was not practice to have relationships between 
cadres, if found out we would have been punished, but I think there were girls who 
fancied other men but we never spoke about those things openly. At times when I was on 
guard at the prison camps sometimes there were men coming in the nights, which we all 
knew but did not discuss with any one”. (Interview with Thavamini continued) 
 
The JVP had a similar policy and had a ban on relationships between cadres. However, unlike the 
LTTE, the JVP was not successful in promoting this ban on relationships due to fact that the 
support for the JVP came from people who lived in the community rather than in isolation like the 
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LTTE cadres in the jungle. Therefore, only a very few JVP members who lived in the jungles were 
bound by the rule and not the wider membership. 
 
Military body  
This ideology was that the individual members of the military/military group’s body constituted the 
“able body” of the military/military groups and once their bodies were no longer useful to the 
military/military groups they are asked to leave the organisation. My informants Thavamini (page 
140) and Kanka (page 162) were discharged from the organisation after sustaining injuries. 
However, they did not see that their disability rendered them of “no use” or the need for their 
dismissal.  Both women were unable to accept that by being disabled they were no longer part of 
“an able body” for the purpose of the military.  Thavamini told me that when she was asked to 
resign, she begged but was ordered to leave.  While I wanted to know more about the treatment 
of the women I asked her what did she do when she was  sick or tired or  on  the  days when she  
was  menstruating? 
 
I don’t remember a day I was sick, but there are no official rest days, we always had to 
do something or another, there were times when we could have a good laugh with the 
other cadres but usually while doing something.  Life went on as normal, even during 
menstruation.  But there were younger girls who were sometime crying in pain or unable 
get involved in training, but then they were forced to get on with their work. 
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What did you use as sanitary towels? 
(She laughs) why do you ask me these things? (A question back to me) we did not have 
these sophisticated things, like other women in villages we used the normal cloths those 
days.  Yes they were bit troublesome but that is what we had to do with. 
 
The women I interviewed did not elaborate on their sexual lives within the organisation as they 
were deprived of such freedom. Many of them were also unaware of the politics of sexuality 
surrounding their lives because they were not taught to critically look at the existing gender 
relation within Tamil community but only accept it as the norm. This inability to understand and 
comprehend the effects of military and war on their gender and sexuality have been largely due to 
the fact that talking of sex in public has been a taboo in Sri Lankan society.  Also the lack of any 
in-depth study on gender and sexuality within the military/non state military groups renders the 
need for this research to be undertaken. 
 
Politics of sexuality 
Despite large-scale sexual violence and harassment of women both in the community and 
organisation, there is ambiguity in the LTTE/JVP attitudes towards sexual harassment and 
women’s sexuality.  Neither, the LTTE and the JVP have entered into any discourse around the 
sexual violence woman undergo other than when it suits their agendas.  They use incidents of 
sexual violence on their cadres to undermine the enemy rather than seeking justice for the 
women.  Seeking justice for the victims has been left to the human rights organisations and other 
women’s groups. The LTTE or JVP has never reported any sexual violence on active combatants. 
If they did, they would have tarnished the image of the “honourable women”, which the 
organisations strive to maintain.   
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Even though some argue (De Mel 2001) that the LTTE has given the opportunity for women to kill 
themselves when apprehended through the use of the cyanide capsule and open up a public 
discourse on the sexual violence that women undergo, I would argue that is not in the interests of 
women.  Rather it is to protect the organisation and to avoid cadres giving out any information 
under duress.  Women who fail to bite the capsule and are apprehended undergo brutal treatment 
at the hands of their captivators. 
 
As we have identified in chapter four with the case of Dhanu (page 74) it could be argued that that 
this practice implies that a sexually contaminated woman is of no worth and should redeem 
themselves and their community by blowing themselves up.  This is a re-enforcement of the 
existing social practice of stigmatising women who have faced sexual violence.  
 
On the one hand, the LTTE and the JVP while capitalising on sexual violence such as in the case  
with Dharmini (page 113) and Manaperi (page 122) when they had the opportunity, have resorted 
to the same methods against women who are deemed to be enemies.  The treatment of the 
women prisoners by the LTTE was in complete contrast to the policy that the LTTE adopted in the 
propaganda mechanism of women’s liberation.  Some women at the Focus Groups remembered 
the LTTE while assaulting women screamed at these women saying  “What liberation for you all, 
women should be in the house not on the roads ” (Information gathered from the focus group 
2005).  
 
The LTTE also went to the extremes of naming and shaming women as loose women who did not 
abide by their ideology such as Thilaga in Chapter Four (page 110), and Rajini Thiranagam (page 
138).  The JVP resorted to acts of sexual/physical harassment on women who did not join them or 
194 
 
support them like the brutal and humiliating treatment of Sagarika Gomez who they claimed 
disobeyed their orders.  Sagarika a Sinhalese woman was a gifted television presenter and a 
musician.  She was abducted by a group of masked men from her house in Dehiwela. The next 
day her naked body with a broken glass stuck to her vagina was found lying on the beach. Her 
alleged crime was to perform at an election rally of the UNP on the request of the President 
Premadasa (Sunday Silumina News Paper 1989). 
 
Apart from violence directed at humiliating and intimidating women who resisted their authority, 
the LTTE have also exploited the sexuality of women combatants in degrading acts in many 
different ways.  Firstly, women have been portrayed as victims of sexual violence. They have 
gone to extremes to publicise acts of sexual violence against Tamil women for propaganda 
reasons not considering the trauma and humiliation faced by the women and their families.  
Secondly, women have been projected as icons of virginity, representing them as a-sexual and 
depriving these young women of any form of sexual pleasure by restricting their sexual relations, 
thus keeping in line with the Tamil community who try to control women’s sexuality, to gain 
approval from the wider community.  Thirdly, they have used these women as role models to 
encourage recruitment of others in to the organization thereby demonising other women who are 
not in line with this sexual containment. What is contradictory is that while creating this model 
those women combatants must preserve their virginity. As a means of controlling sexuality, they 
have repeatedly exploited women and their bodies to transport weapons hidden under the clothes, 
grenades and at time ammunition hidden in the vagina, taking advantage of the fact that women 
would be less suspicious to the army.   More inhumanly the LTTE have used a pregnant woman 
as a human bomb in order to kill a defence official in Colombo in 2006).  This is also contradictory 
to their rhetoric around “mother and land” as discussed in chapter seven. Through the use of 
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pregnant women as suicide bombers the LTTE have brought more hardship and disrespect to 
women.  Such exploitation of women’s bodies and their sexuality, in no way explains the image 
that the LTTE was trying to portray of women as liberated through militarism. Rather analyses of 
the relationship the women combatants have had with the wider community reveal that these 
women’s relationship with the community is quite ambiguous. 
 
Relationship with community 
Evidence gathered from the interviews and the focus groups revealed that to some extent the 
relationship between the LTTE women combatant and the community is based mainly on fear 
rather acceptance.  The LTTE have not hesitated to unleash violence on civilians if they deemed 
to be challenging their authority.  The women combatants have been in the forefront carrying out 
the LTTEs agenda of violence.  As argued in Chapter Five some women seemed to have enjoyed 
this power that they had over the civilians and at times even over members of other military 
groups. 
 
While the female LTTE combatant gained recognition as “capable militants”, they have not fulfilled 
the expectations of “birds of freedom”, nor have helped to promote Tamil women’s position within 
society.   In fact through the evidence gathered during the focus groups and the observations 
made it could be argued that the tactics used by women cadre’s such as hiding weapons 
underneath their clothes and lifting their garments to fire at the army, have demeaned Tamil 
women’s status within the society.  For a community, which places self-respect and decency in 
high esteem, such behaviour has been humiliating. This sometimes has worked towards treating 
women combatants as loose women with no moral values by the wider society.  
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These military strategies adopted have further endangered women’s lives in the community 
having made them vulnerable to harassment, GBV and sexual violence at the hands of the armed 
forces that have little regard to women’s intersecting identities and social difference but rather 
consider all Tamil women to be combatants. The home, which was once considered safe for 
women, is no longer safe.  Many women have been subject to rape and murder in their homes 
during search operations and army visits and even more humiliatingly have been assaulted in 
front of their children, husbands and other relatives (As Parvathi page 243).   This was virtually 
“social death” for many women and led many to leave their communities and some to commit 
suicide.  
 
Women’s safety has been jeopardized and they faced the risk of increasing GBV. There has been 
an increase of suicide missions by women especially around the suburbs of Colombo, as well as 
women being subjected to increased harassment at checkpoints and other public places. Women 
have been stripped off in the guise of body searches in public as in the case of Sriyalatha (page 
106).  In one incident reported, a Tamil woman was searched by the police at a check point and 
released, the men noted her address and later that night they entered the place where she lived 
and gang raped her (information gathered at focus group 2006). 
 
The conflict and related deaths have made scores of women, widows in the community.  The 
position of a widow like Puvi in the traditional Hindu society is social death (page 147).  The LTTE 
have not made an earnest effort to improve these widows status within the society rather putting 
further pressure on them with the increased military activities against the armed forces and 
civilians.  Further there seems to be an explicit “blaming the victim” culture even within the LTTE 
as evident by the hand bill in chapter four where it says “married women are dressing up as young 
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girls”.  Also unmarried women, have no social status within the society and it is considered 
inappropriate for a woman to be unmarried after a certain age.  A challenge that will face the post 
conflict society is that a large number of unmarried women who have passed the age of marriage 
will be left behind (the woman cadres who leave the organization) which the LTTE is responsible 
for.  The LTTE who in its initial stages articulated the double liberation policy, when confronted 
with the changes it brought on the society seemed to have been compelled to take a different 
approach and have put women’s issues on the back burner. In such a situation then it is worth 
while asking what will be the position of women who are leaving the military/military groups life 
and integrating into the community. 
 
Whatever the reasons that led women to join the military/military groups, the community reactions 
towards returning girls are ambiguous.  In general women who join the LTTE were assumed to be 
of “loose character”, sexually abused or had ‘lost their value’. The organisation itself encouraged 
this especially the way they went on to justify the acts of violence women carried out, or when 
they had to gain international sympathy for their activities and prove that women were abused by 
the enemy.  As evident by the research they have used women’s sexuality when it suited them for 
political manipulation little realising that this would be used again on the women on their return to 
the community.  Whether the girls had left their families by their own free will to join the 
organisation or even when they were forcibly recruited, the attitude that women had dishonoured 
their families/communities seemed not to change.  
 
In my encounters with many Tamil men over the duration of this study who defended the LTTE 
and its ideology, there was a great sense of silence when the issue of women combatants was 
taken up. I asked a man who was so keen to defend the recruitment of women “will you ever 
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marry a woman who fought with the LTTE?” the answers was short “No”- but when I asked why? 
He simply said, “Can we stop this conversation now.” (Interview with Tamil academic in the UK 
2006). 
 
This resistance to take up the issue of women as fighters and the community perception towards 
them after they left their uniforms raised several questions as to women’s position in a post 
conflict society. 
 
 A soldier who returned from Jaffna told me the following story 
A young girl discharged from the LTTE had fallen in love with a man in the area. Knowing 
her past the parents of the boy did not approve of their affair.  Angry with her future 
mother- in- law’s comments about her, the young women visited the boy’s mother one 
afternoon and threatened her with a gun.  Scared for her life the old woman ran to the 
nearest checkpoint screaming for help.  However, no action was taken against her despite 
the fact that she pointed a firearm at a civilian as it was a private matter and no injuries 
had taken place (Telephone Interview with a Sri Lanka Army Soldier in March 2005 when 
he visited the UK). 
 
Reintegration Ex-Combatants of the JVP 
Since the armed conflict between the LTTE and the Government forces have come to an 
unexpected turn with the elimination of the LTTE leadership it is impossible and too soon to 
research LTTE women’s position in a post conflict situation at this moment of the conflict.  
However, it is hoped that the narratives of the Ex-JVP women and other Tamil Militant women, 
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who left the LTTE, as well as the interviews with the ex-LTTE women who have left the movement 
and who are now in exile will help us to understand the situation of women returning from combat.   
 
An analysis of the reflections of LTTE women’s experiences reveal that women were attracted to 
the organisation not necessarily by the romantic rhetoric of revolution or liberation, but due to 
push and pull factors  such as revenage, fear of violence are explored in Chapter Five (page 120). 
These factors are not exhaustive. While it is important to get an understanding of why women take 
up arms and violence in order to address the root causes of violence, it becomes equally 
important to know how they will re-integrate into society and what sort of identities they create for 
themselves if we are to understand women’s political/social advancement through militarism. This 
becomes especially useful in the face of the claim that the LTTE stands for the liberation of the 
nation and women. In my field work I  interviewed an EX-JVP combatant Kalyanimala (198) who 
was with the  movement during  the 2nd  up rise in the late 1980’s  She agreed to give me an 
interview and her story gives us a glimpse into her new life. 
Kalyanimala’s story  
Kalyanimala was 16 yrs old ready to leave school when she was attracted to the JVP in the 1988 
through the brother of her class mate. At first she was reluctant to join but was asked by her 
friends to carry out tasks such as delivering letters or taking a message to designated people. 
Gradually she became accustomed to the dangers attached to the work and then began to enjoy 
it. ‘  
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It was at times very interesting to see a person receive a letter61 and how they reacted to 
the contents, actually I think we enjoyed that part more’ ‘Once I delivered a letter to a 
headmaster of the village school who was hated by the pupils. Within 24 hours he 
became a totally different man, but then later it appeared to be a hoax’… this was the type 
of things we enjoyed more.   
 
Now I have three grown up children. They do not know about my past as they all grew up 
in the town and they have had no contact with the village.  Now I don’t think about those 
things, I was never deep into the movement; it was the thrill of being young that dragged 
me in so for me it was not a difficult thing to leave that past behind me… I would never 
like my children to get involved in such things. (interview with ex-JVP women Kalyanimala 
now living in Narahenpita- Sri Lanka October 2004)  
 
Like Kalayanimala there were other women who joined the JVP and faced the risk of violence. 
Many of them survived to tell their stories but some were not so lucky. 
 
Many women have suffered due to the involvement of their husbands. The Commission on the 
disappeared in 1997 found that 33% of the disappearances and abductions were not because of 
women’s direct involvement but due the involvement of a male family member.  In one case 
reported, soldiers who were searching for the two sons of one woman killed her on the allegation 
that she was “loud mouthed” One of the most devastating examples before the commission was 
where the security forces killed seven members of one family, six of whom were women (one six 
                                                 
61 The JVP used letters as its method of written communication if it was aimed at an individual, if it was aimed at a 
community they would put up a poster/s on a lamp post or a parapet wall in a central location. 
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year old) on the basis of one male’s alleged involvement with the JVP (Commission on the 
disappeared in 1997). 
   
Many times women have become victims of violence due to the involvement of their male relatives 
with the non state militaries. Despite the sacrifices women make on behalf of their men, there is 
evidence that once the conflict is over that women have been let down by the men like Leela 
belwo 
Leela’s story 
Lela was outcaste because of her marriage to Anil who was from a lower cast. Unknown to Lela, 
Anil had joined the JVP and was a co-coordinator for the area.  One night the police came in 
search of him.  
 “I was heavily pregnant with my fourth child, they asked for him and I did not know where 
he was, but they were not happy and started to beat and punch me, they did not have any 
consideration for my physical status....when they had enough they left saying they will 
come back.  We were lucky they did not do any major harm to us.  I have not seen my 
husband ever since. After his disappearance we had a very hard time… I used to work in 
houses and get some money and food and old clothes for my children… we did not even 
have a proper house.  After some years I got to know that my husband is alive and 
married again to another woman.   God must punish him for what he put us through… 
someone also told me that he is now well off and he won a sweep ticket ( lottery)… there 
is no god otherwise a man like him would not win a ticket… any way I don’t want him now.   
I have looked after my children with great difficulty and I will continue to do so (interview 
with woman living in Hendeniya, Sri Lanka October 2004). 
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The breakdown of law and order created opportunities for private militia and gangs to take 
political/personal vengeance over their opponents. Such personal attacks were reported regularly, 
the culprits pretended to be either from the military or the JVP and carried out their underhand 
work without any obstacle since always there was someone to take the blame.  One famous case 
was the murder of a large number of students in an area named Embilipitiya instigated by a 
school principal who sought revenge on the students due to the belief that his daughter was 
having an affair with one of the students. He killed the rest for helping the teenage lovers. (Samuel 
2006).  
 
It was not only the state who was responsible for this culture of impunity. The JVP had to take 
equal responsibility for the violence during these two phases.  There were numerous counter 
attacks by both sides when an incident took place, for example, if police personnel were killed by 
the JVP the next day a JVP member was killed by the police in revenge. 
 
An ex-Air force senior officer revealed how he killed 15 alleged JVP activists (including their family 
members) for assassinating a brother of one of his junior officers. - ‘I went with a group of my men 
and killed 15 people because of him, because this rascal had the nerve to go against me’ 
(telephone interview in December 2005 with the informant who has now migrated to Australia) 
 
The JVP was not as advanced a military organisation as the LTTE.  While they advocated social 
revolution, a closer study of the JVP and its political agenda makes it clear that they did not have 
a clear vision of what exactly was to be achieved from their action for social revolution can never 
be static and is constantly changing. Their political agenda was not an inclusive one. They wanted 
to mobilise the working class, without understanding the intersecting social divisions and identities 
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within this wider category of “working class”.  As such they were far from military capability, 
discipline, and the end result was that the LTTE possessed but also had no defined long term 
objective.  As a result it was not difficult for the state to defeat the military wing of the JVP with the 
use of violence.  After the military defeat and the capture of the leader, the JVP entered the 
political mainstream by continuing to participate in the electoral process.  
 
Women within the JVP were not engaged in combat roles and were not trained or disciplined to 
fight, unlike the LTTE woman. Therefore, women did not have to go through an unlearning 
process and were able to revert back to the traditional roles quickly.  Rather, the insecurities that 
women face during the unrest and the resulting militarization of the society meant that women 
became more reluctant to join in any kind of public activities62 after the uprising (page 73). The 
LTTE woman on the other hand is removed from her community, all personal ties are set aside 
and they live in isolation in the jungles for a longer period. In the process of making the military 
body women are required to learn the traits of the militaristic role model.  
 
As we have identified in Chapter five the circumstances that women took up arms were not purely 
based on the ideology of nationalism or class structure. Women faced multiple intersecting 
vulnerabilities in a society that is fiercely dominated by social exclusion, poverty and oppressions; 
as such the contributory factors for their enlistment were complex. The LTTE women and the JVP 
women cadres have proved that event within the dominant category of woman combatant there 
are intersecting identities depending on the lived experiences of these women.  
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Summary 
From the evidence in this chapter it can be argued that the recruitment of women into the 
militaries is not an automatic path for liberation or empowerment.  Women in military institutions 
such as the LTTE and JVP have to negotiate interesting power relations that exist within these 
organisations.  While there are some women who hold formal leadership roles I would strongly 
argue that this is based on strategic need as in the case of the LTTE who wanted to be 
recognised as a true liberation army and to secure international support.   Military institutions are 
overwhelmingly male dominant institutions and men still head the military and political units. While 
leadership is not the only yardstick to measure empowerment, it is important to take into account 
the decision making power as well, as the ability to make choices for one self is totally absent 
within these military organisations. 
 
A closer analysis of the training within the camps, the sexual division of labour, the kinship 
methods of control and how women negotiate power are evident  so that militaries while recruiting 
women to fulfil the operational needs of the institution take precautions to minimise the risk of 
women’s inclusion in to the organisation. These military groups adopt various strategies to 
maintain the patriarchal structures of these inherently masculine institutions.  In doing so, these 
institutions while distancing them from the society through a code of conduct have not been 
reluctant to adopt some practices like  sexual division of labour and kinship that exists within the 
community.  Further while creating a binary between women’s liberation through joining the 
military, these military organisations such as the LTTE or the JVP have not made an attempt to 
address the stereotypes and social prejudices around women in society. The imposition of a dress 
                                                                                                                                                
62 See interview with  woman who was with the first JVP uprising in 1971 in  chapter five page  
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code (chapter four page 105) and the punishments rendered to women have only worked towards 
re-enforcing the oppressive structures faced by women. 
 
The unwillingness of the LTTE to change social attitudes around women and the attempt to 
manipulate existing cultural practices such as dowry, caste and widowhood has meant that it has 
reflected the way that women cadres are perceived within the community.  It is evident that the 
women combatants have gained limited status among the community as LTTE women and this is 
only as a result of their identity as combatants to holds power to terrorise and humiliate the 
community.  No sooner are they out of their uniforms and ranks than these women revert to the 
traditional role as carers assigned to women in the community.    
 
The experience of disabled LTTE women like Thavamini (page 140) and Kanka  (page 161) and 
the absence of  women in the public spheres within  groups such as the Tamil United Liberation 
Front after the Indo Lanka accord is an example of how women who took up arms  reverted to 
their gendered positions after the military struggle was over.  There is also evidence from the 
women combatants of the JVP who reverted back to their socially assigned positions after the end 
of the revolution.  
 
Even in times of conflict women like Parvathi (page 242) gain an enhanced status within the 
community due to the over lapping of gender roles in the absence of their men, in many instances 
after the return of the men, women also return to their gendered roles and continue to live their 
lives within the structures that are in place within the community (Zaroza 1998).  There is also 
evidence as in the case of Leela (page 200) that men at times abandon their wives and children 
leaving women to face hardships and humiliation.   For some civilian women due to their 
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intersecting identities as single mothers, widow or social activists their time in the military/military 
groups may have transformed their lives, while for the majority of women the situation will be 
different.  Evidence from recent conflicts such as Nepal (Interview with UN worker deployed to 
Nepal, December 2008) proves that no sooner women get out of the military/military groups and 
join the community – unless there is a change in the structures of the society, they continue to be 
subjected to the existing patriarchal structures.   
 
Since the LTTE have not challenged their existing social structures but rather at times worked 
towards re-enforcing them even before the end of the revolution through acts such as the dress 
code (Chapter Four page 105), there is strong possibility that women returning from combat will 
be sucked into the prevailing social order. The thesis argues that unless there is a change in the 
attitudes in the community the status of the returning women LTTE combatants is not going to be 
any different. This has been further proved with the military defeat of the LTTE.  Now the 
remaining cadres have lost their leaders who they completely relied upon they see no future with 
the LTTE.  The Sri Lankan army who has a track record with regard to sexual violence against 
women even when the LTTE was in power is more likely to continue their abuse without any fear 
of resistance.  With the governments military victory the bolstered egos of the politicians and the 
Sinhala nationalistic are viewing the Tamil community as losers and the Tamil community is 
further humiliated.   
 
Hence, there is not going to be any form of empowerment for the returning women and they will 
continue to live in fear of being apprehended by the army and will face intimidation from the 
community who may use them as scapegoats or just blame these women for the suffering the 
community has faced at the hands of the Sri Lankan state. 
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Therefore, as evident from this chapter women’s agency is contingent within the military/non state 
military groups on norms, expectations, structural and social inequalities and are not substantial 
and sustainable. Recruiting women into the organisation has not given women liberation as 
claimed by the LTTE as women continue to suffer the sexual division of labour even within these 
organisations and at times become exploited by the very organisations that recruit them.  
However, what cannot be denied is that they lived experience of the women combatants has 
proved that women if given the opportunity are capable of challenging the social constructions of 
them as passive and peace loving.  These women have also proved that the military and combat 
is no longer a man’s domain but that women are equally capable of engaging in militarism and 
adopting masculine traits and are able to  resort to violence when required.  The Tamil women 
have proved that women are not homogenous category but can adopt different intersecting 
identities and can simultaneously become protectors and perpetrators of violence. These women 
have proved that men are not the only defenders of the land as militarised nationalism is eager to 
project, but women are equally motivated and capable of defending the land and their people. 
 
While the women combatants have taken up militarism and violence to resist the subordinate 
positions that they face within community, there are other women who challenge violence and 
militarism through the traditional roles assigned to them. In doing so these women have set an 
example to their sisters that challenging violence need not be through violence but using their 
intersecting identities such as motherhood.   
 
In the next chapter using the example of the Mothers Front the thesis will focus on how women 
have organised to resist militarism and nationalism despite their intersecting identities such as 
caste, class and ethnicity. In doing so I will analyse how patriarchy has worked towards the 
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resisting women’s public participation with the use of intersecting divisions in society that have 
been used by patriarchy to divide women on ethnic and political lines and how women have 
responded to them. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MOTHERHOOD AS A TOOL OF RESISTANCE 
 
While the thesis has discussed the popular representation of women as victims or perpetrators of 
militarised nationalism, there are other women who resist violence and militarism.  In doing so 
they have proved that women are not homogenous groups but appropriate multiple, layered 
identities, other than the representations that militarism and nationalism are eager to construct.  
Despite extreme repression, exclusion from the political and decision-making process and 
intimidation by the military groups, these women come forward to resist violence, humiliation and 
political oppression by taking up arms and joining military groups as combatants.  Yet other 
women have responded to the conflict in Sri Lanka by becoming activists for peace and Human 
Rights (Samuel 2006) and, openly denouncing militarism and nationalism. Either way these 
women challenge the narrow representation that women are passive victims of violence.  
 
This chapter will examine “The Mothers Front” a group who went on to challenge the state and the 
military holding them responsible for the large scale human rights violence during the 2nd JVP 
insurrection and discuss the strategies they adopted to challenge the state and its military.   The 
Mothers Front has been selected over many other women’s groups as it was able to recruit more 
than twenty five thousand members to its Southern band; this is  an achievement that never seen 
in the history of Sri Lanka’s women’s movement.  
 
In setting the context to this chapter I will briefly look at the women’s efforts to organise against 
violence in post independent Sri Lanka and the birth of the MF as a movement.  
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Organising against violence  
The contemporary Sri Lanka’s women’s movement is comprised of women from diverse 
backgrounds and is focused on a diverse range of social and political issues of concern to 
women (De Alwis; De Mel 2001; Samuel 2006).  However, with the growing state of violence 
women have no longer been able to focus solely on gender inequalities such as equal pay and 
citizenship rights, but had to pay greater attention to human rights and the political violence that 
was becoming a reality of the day. 
 
Women’s activism in opposing violence, as a ‘solution’ to the conflict was first articulated via the 
agitations against the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which came into effect in 1979 (Samuel 2006).  
Women mobilised themselves calling for a non violent solution to the conflict in the 1970 and 
early 1980’s. The results of their activism have given birth to such human rights groups in the 
country as the Civil Rights Movement, The Movement for Inter Racial Justice and Equality and 
the Movement for the Defence of Democratic rights. 
 
In 1982 The Women’s Action Committee (WAC) was formed to advocate for women’s rights, 
human rights protection and a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict.   In 1984 Women for 
Peace was formed which called on all political parties as well as Tamil militant groups fighting for 
self determination in the north east of the country to meet at an All Party Conference.  The 
coalition   also focused on war related displacements which gave rise to the violation of a range 
of social economic and political rights with specific gender discriminations (Samuel 2006). 
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The period between 1987-90 proved to be an unforgettable period in Sri Lankan history. The 
arrival of the IPKF signed in July 1987 and the welcome it received by the WAC drew hostilities 
from nationalistic parties such as the JVP. 
 
“First I received a letter threatening me to resign immediately, or face repercussions. The 
letter accused me of being a traitor to the motherland and said death was the 
punishment.  I was scared and decided to leave, I attended one more meeting to inform 
my decision to the committee as I thought I owed them an explanation, but I did not go 
home that day, I stayed with a friend of mine - the next day I learnt that the  night before 
my house was set on fire. (Woman activist of the WAC-interview in Colombo 2004) 
 
In this context of intimidation, harassment and humiliation the WAC was unable to carry on their 
activities and went into hiding.  Later in 1990 they re- formed as the Mothers and Daughters of 
Lanka (MDL).  The MDL lobbied for a negotiated settlement to the conflict; and appealed to the 
JVP and the LTTE to stop the killings (De Mel 2001; Samuel 2006 and information gathered 
during interviews). 
 
Groups such as the MDL set the foundation for ‘mother politics (De Mel 2001)’ to be re-invented, 
moving away from the nationalistic military discourse of valiant mothers who sent their sons to 
battle (Soornarjah 2004). This time not as mothers who send their sons to battle rather as 
mothers who stood up to protect their sons and daughters from the very same nationalistic 
militarism discourse that robbed them of their right to motherhood. 
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The Mothers Front 
During the climate of fear that resulted with the IPKF occupation in Jaffna many Tamil women in 
Jaffna came forward to challenge the authorities.  Calling themselves the Mothers Front they 
organised a march and demanded the government to release information on the whereabouts of 
the men and youths (husbands, sons, and daughters brothers and other relatives) who had been 
arrested by armed forces (information gathered from discussions during focus groups).  
 
The Jaffna Mothers Front actively mobilised its members against the IPKF violence.  In 1987 one 
of its members Annai Poopathi, fasted to death to protest the presence of the IPKF. Later, she 
was immortalised by the LTTE who continue to commemorate her and initiated a scholarship in 
her name. 
 
"Today, we cherish the memory of a great martyr and salute her supreme sacrifice. 
Mother Poopathi has earned our highest esteem as one of the noble martyrs who have 
become legends in the history of our liberation struggle. As a woman, as a mother, as the 
maternal head of the family, Poopathi amma transcended her ordinary life and the bonds 
of existential attachment in sacrificing her life for the emancipation of her nation”.  
(Speech made by LTTE leader on the second death anniversary April 1988 posted on 
Tamil Net) 
 
Following in the footsteps of the North and East, in 1990, the Mothers Front was formed in the 
south to protest the “disappearance” of children/husbands during the 1987/89 uprising.  Unlike the 
Jaffna Mothers Front, which emerged spontaneously, the Mothers Front in the South were 
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initiated and received political patronage from politicians such as Mahinda Rajapakse63.  De Mel 
(2001) suggests that these, politicians have been influenced by the Mayo de Plaza of Argentina 
and recognised the potential of politicising motherhood.  The mothers demanded a climate where 
they could raise their sons, be with their husbands and lead a normal life (Island 9th February 
1991). 
  
Their mass mobilisation and the adoption of ancient cultural and religious rituals such as 
sacrificing animal blood to the gods had a tremendous impact on the society. These rituals were a 
sign of the anger and the hatred that the mothers harboured against the enemy as well as the 
courage of the women to come forward to perform such rituals that were associated with 
destruction rather than nurturing.  Most importantly, the Mothers actions created a space for other 
civil society groups to come forward at a time when human rights activist were being targeted and 
killed with impunity. 
  
The performances of rituals such as the sacrifice of animal blood and heaping of curses 
challenged the popular notion of women’s desire for peace. A closer analysis of the women’s 
actions amplifies the ability of women when faced by violence and humiliation to transgress this 
notion of passivity and become equally vengeful and violent even without use of physical violence.  
By these acts women created a space for not only revealing their desire for the perpetrators of 
violence to be punished but also for other women who have experienced similar violence and 
have been humiliated to join hands in solidarity to fight the common enemy i.e. the government of 
the day not using political terminology or rhetoric but using the traditional role assigned to women 
which was motherhood. 
                                                 
63 An SLFP Hardcore who went on to become the president in 2005. 
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Using the notion of Motherhood as a tool of resistance 
From observations made of the Indian women’s movement, Raka Ray (1999) suggests that 
protest movements are not only influenced by other social movements but also by local cultures, 
histories and institutions of politics.  As such it is unavoidable that the complex role that is 
assigned to motherhood in Sri Lanka played a key role for motherhood to be used for political 
purposes through groups like the Mothers Front and the MDL.  However, as this thesis will argue, 
it is this very same complexity that surrounds motherhood, which was instrumental in challenging 
militaristic nationalism and contributed to the success of the Mothers Front that also became 
central to its vulnerability in the political environment in which it existed. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three (page 57), Land and Language were central to the post 
independent nation building programmes adopted by the  Sinhala Buddhist and the responses to 
these by the Tamils.  The struggle as early as in the 1956 was around protecting the language.  
When state aided land colonised by Sinhala settlers in largely Tamil areas became intense with 
the colonization of the dry Zone64  the Tamils argued that the state was aiming to permanently 
alter the landscape of the Tamil homeland, the movement to protect Tamil language, reclaim and 
fight for Tamil land became paramount.  
 
The borders of the nation become contested by the geographical limits where Tamil was spoken 
and was represented by the Tamil homeland65. The territorial dimension overtook Tamil cultural 
nationalism to militarised nationalism with aspirations for a separate state (Sornarajah 2004).  As 
                                                 
64 See chapter three for more details page 73. 
65 See full text of the LTTE leaders 2008 heroes day speech which re-articulates the mother land concept LTTE 
leader pays homage on Heroes Day [TamilNet, Thursday, 27 November 2008, 17:30 GMT] 
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=71&artid=27600 
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the struggle evolved and claims for a separate homeland emerged, the image of the mother 
became an indicator for the `mother land’.  This was a shift of the construction of the mother from 
language (mother tongue) to land (mother land).  The land and the mother were presented as 
one and the same.   
 
As Soornaraja (2004) recalls after the 1983 ethnic riots when the militant movement began 
recruiting in large numbers, it became practice for mothers to place a vermilion mark on the 
foreheads of the recruits reminding them they would defend their land with their blood/life before 
training.  Accordingly, young men queued up at the podium during campaign meetings to receive 
similar marks on their foreheads in blood, swearing their allegiance to the motherland.  Here a 
male figure standing on the podium would cut his hand and paint the mark on the forehead of the 
new recruit. Such rituals involving the notions of blood, the Tamil mother's honour, male valour 
rendered the agency of the women inactive, relying on her sons to protect her.  Significantly, 
there was an absence of the daughters in this imagination, keeping in line with the popular belief 
that women were to be protected rather than protectors.   However, as time went with the 
recruitment of women to the militant movement the practice was replaced by the commemoration 
ceremonies for dead heroes giving rise to a culture of celebrating death66. 
 
While the Sinhala nationalist discourse equated the use of language to construct the notion of 
motherhood (Sri Lanka Matha) with the language (Mawu Basa) and land (Mawu Bima), based on 
the field work I would argue that it did not succeed to the extent of the Tamil nationalist discourse 
of the LTTE (Soornaraja 2004).  The LTTE have used rituals such as the vermilion mark and the 
                                                 
66 See full text of the LTTE leaders 2008 heroes day speech with photographs which re-articulate the mother land 
concept- LTTE leader pays homage on Heroes Day[TamilNet, Thursday, 27 November 2008, 17:30 
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hero’s day to project and glorify the brave mother. Instead motherhood became a method of 
resistance deployed by the Sinhala women who lost their sons to state/military violence.  
 
I would argue that the inability of the state and its military to re-invent the brave mother was due to 
many reasons.  First of all, the Sinhala state was constructed as the protagonist of the ethnic 
conflict. The various policies adopted by the state to intimidate and humiliate the Tamil community 
using structural violence further established its position as the protagonist.   Tamil militancy was 
projected as defending the homeland and fighting state oppression. Therefore, the Tamil military 
groups/LTTE was able to capitalise on this demonization of the state and cultivate the idea that 
defending the motherland from the protagonist needed courage and loyalty and the duty of the 
son was to protect the mother/land. 
 
Secondly, the state had the numerical advantage of manpower and did not face the difficulties in 
recruitment. When faced with difficulties in sustaining the numbers or wanting to recruit in large 
numbers during the 1990’s the state used popular culture67 to re-invent the concept of the brave 
mother and the motherland.   However, unemployment and economical hardships in the South 
meant that many young men and women joined the forces in large numbers for the attractive pay 
it offered rather than the government propaganda.  As a result of this economical benefit Sri 
Lankan military never had a recruitment problem, but certainly faced problems in retention.   
 
Added to this was the challenge posed to the state by feminist organisations and other human 
rights organisations.  These groups vigorously condemned the states suppression of the minority 
                                                                                                                                                
MT]://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=71&artid=27600 accessed 23rd December 08 
67 Mainly songs, theatre and television recruitment adverts and drama. 
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communities and the mass scale human rights violence by armed forces (Samuel 2006).   The 
image constructed of the armed forces was not of valiant heroes, but perpetrators of violence who 
went on to kill Tamil/ Sinhala youth.  
 
Thus even the limited attempts of the government to re-invent nationalist sentiments with the use 
of popular culture did not have the same affect that the Tamil militancy projected.   Rather this 
image of the state as perpetrators of violence and the military as the state killer machine deflated 
the powerful sentiment of nationalism and patriotism attaching negative connotations with 
‘nationalism’.   
 
Further, motherhood while becoming a central trope within nationalism went on to challenge the 
militarised nationalist discourse through organisations such as the Mothers Front. This was a 
challenge posed to the state and its armed forces.  Hence, the state and its military could not 
capitalise on the notion of motherhood even if they wished to do so within their political ideology 
and the image of the valiant mother who sent their sons to war was replaced by the mothers who 
were weeping for their children and using solidarity and ancient rituals to challenge the state and 
the military.   
 
Motherhood was to become a greater force in the way it mobilised to challenge the state during 
this time. The priority for the mothers was to trace the disappeared and get the authorities to 
release those that had been detained without charge. The women demanded death certificates68 
and compensation for those missing for over a year (The Island February 1991).  Their aim was to 
                                                 
68 This was essential to establish the death of the persons and to claim any compensation as well as for them to claim 
any property that belonged to the dead persons.  
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support the women who had suffered immensely at the hands of the brutal regime physically69, 
psychologically and economically due to the loss of their husbands and sons/daughters. 
 
They succeeded in recruiting large numbers of women to the movement. The meetings held by 
the organisation were an enormous success. De Mel (2001) notes that within a period of six 
months they had formed offices in ten other districts and in Matara alone one thousand five 
hundred women were elected to co-ordinate the group’s activities.  By 1992 their numbers had 
increased to approximately twenty five thousand. 
 
On the 19th of February 1991, the Front held their first convention at the Town Hall in Colombo 
and 10 resolutions were passed 70 the first being; 
 
“The president and the government release information on the whereabouts of the 
disappeared and what has happened to them and the that local and foreign human rights 
organisations like the Red Cross insist on such information from the Government.” 
 
On the same day a rally was organised in the suburbs of Colombo, where a large number of 
women from the South and a few from the Northeast attended. The rally was addressed by Dr. 
Saravanmuttu71, who was appointed the co-coordinator, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandarnayake72 and 
Chandrika Bandarnayake. One woman who represented the Tamil community addressed the 
                                                 
69 Many women were subject to violence and torture at the hands of the state forces not due to their involvement but as a 
result of the involvement of their husbands/children – see commission report for detailed accounts on the type of 
harassment women had to undergo. 
70  N de Mel (2001) pp 245 for more information on the resolution – full reference in references section. 
71 Dr Saravanmuttu lost her own son Richard de Soyza who was a media person and a human rights activist to state 
terror. 
72 Mr. Bandaranayke was the world’s first women prime minister and represented the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. 
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gathering. The messages of the rally were of solidarity not only nationally, but also internationally 
to be independent from any political affiliations and to hold the government responsible for the 
atrocities it had committed (Researchers experience living in Colombo Sri Lanka in 1991). 
 
Apart from the public appearances many women took to religious ceremonies and pleaded with 
gods and goddesses to protect their loved ones.. They looked towards spirits and fortune-tellers73 
to enlighten them as to the whereabouts of the missing.  Women actively engaged in making vows 
and made offerings at famous places of worship that they believed had the power to perform 
miracles.  This was a moment where the act of grieving, transgressed from being a private act to a 
political act. 
 
Women marched to places of worship to beg the deities to inflict curses and to plead for revenge.  
Many of the curses targeted president Premadasa himself. They used ancient rituals such as devil 
dancing ceremonies, offering blood to the gods (animal blood), chanting spells and so on to 
intimidate him. They even went to the extent of holding an event on his birthday pleading that the 
gods to punish him for the atrocities.  Later in 1993, many women believed that the violent death 
of Mr. Premadasa at the hands of a LTTE suicide bomber on May Day procession in Colombo 
was a direct response to their pleas. There were celebrations on the streets on hearing of his 
death and some even went to the extent to light fire crackers.  
 
The symbolically powerful method of protest adopted by the Mothers Front was turning the very 
act of private mourning to a public spectacle. The weeping women became a part of a 
                                                 
73 This is an ancient and common practice in Sri Lanka even today for people especially women to go to fortune tellers to 
look to the future. 
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performance that they conceived as grieving for violence.  At first this appeared as materialistic, 
reinforcing roles for women built on their passive protective characteristic and exclusion from 
formal political process. However, later the methods turned out to be unavoidably political. A more 
concentrated analysis of these women’s activities throws light on the possibilities of disruptive 
traditional constructs (Helwig 1993 in Sivrsky 2000: 241; Ganeshpanchan 2009) that I have drawn 
attention to in the subsequent sections. 
 
Through the politicisation and manipulation of women’s traditional roles in mourning rights as a 
method of resistance these women used the symbolic strength of motherhood to enable their 
actions. Some women I interviewed (Kusuma, Charita, Indrani, Suriyarachci) connected 
themselves with the simple private mode of protest and the freedom from the dictates of a formal 
organisation.  They said they were able to go to the temple or Devala in their own time and do the 
Kannlaw’s (weeping) apart from the organised ones.   
“This suited me better, because I was able to go to the gatherings without antagonising 
my husband-he did not approve of me of joining any organisations or committees in the 
village earlier, but with the front, I tell him I am going to the temple or to the Devla and he 
does not object (Suruyarachchi- A mother who lost her son to the violence Interview in 
Colombo 2004).  
 
This highlights an important point with regard to how patriarchy dictates women’s political 
participation. When women came out of their private space and took up a public role either 
through protest or politics, it was resented by the patriarchal structures with the use of 
intimidation, GBV and humiliation as with the case of the MDL.  But the strategies used by the 
Front show that the mothers identified the weaknesses of the opponent as well as the limitations 
221 
 
women faced in taking up public roles, collective resistance they therefore, choose to adopt 
strategies which conformed to their traditional roles as mothers and healers and took to more 
private acts such as pleading with the gods and heaping curses on their enemies.  
 
Some women I interviewed (Somalatha, Chandrani and Piyawathi) identified ‘simplicity’ of 
approach as to why they became involved with the Mother’s Front. 
 
“The Front was not like other organisations- it was simple and yet effective-we were 
women with little political knowledge but we were able to understand what went on within 
the organisation and what we were fighting for” (Interview with Chandrani Sri Lanka 2004) 
 
In the context of conflict when women’s traditional obligations are involved in anti nationalist 
discourse as seen earlier and women’s political resistance may thus be limited, due to numerous 
reasons, the use of “acceptable” images provides a point of access from which to subvert social 
orders (Cornell 2004: 109) and mount resistance.  Like other women’s movements such as the 
Women in Black (Ganeshpanchan 2009), and the Mayo de Plaza in Argentina that make use of 
women’s traditional roles as a method of resistance, the Mothers Front was able to do this by 
accessing a language of grief, that itself crossed many borders and is  associated with women’s 
roles as mothers or wives.  The public spectacle of grief and emotion disrupts its association with 
the private realm. This is made more potent by the extension of mourning for the “other” (for the 
Tamils/Sinhala).  In this way the action speaks to not only to local and national audiences, but 
also projects acknowledgement and support to people further and becomes a form of political 
resistance, which can be less confronting and quite distinct from standard protests.   
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State/public response to women’s public participation 
Drawing from traditionalist imagery does not necessarily mean public acceptance.  Negative, even 
violent responses from public audience are common when women are perceived as disloyal to the 
nation/political authority.  Many women reported abuse and violence from state sponsored gangs 
and thugs. While many also faced abuse from people from rival political groups within the 
communities they lived, often from relatives in the armed forces or those who were subject to 
JVP/LTTE violence. 
 
An educated man in the suburb of Colombo commented to me at the time (field notes Colombo 
2004 ):  
“These women come from the mother’s front and fathers back”  
 
Despite antagonism and humiliating remarks from some sections of the community, the public 
sympathy and support that the Front received was becoming clear by the growing members, the 
support from other women’s groups and human rights organisations.  It was the methods adopted 
by the Front that challenged the government of the day. The Women’s actions and the mode of 
protest had a dramatic effect on the government. The president initially responded by declaring 
sympathy for the women.  He emphasised that the children had been led astray by disgruntled 
elements and that the state had taken over the rehabilitation of their children who would be 
released soon.  On the contrary the then defence minister Mr. Wijeratne was more antagonistic, 
he without remorse shifted the blame towards the mothers for having failed in their duty to their 
children as well as to the nation (De Alwis 2002), insulting them for taking part in the 
demonstration; he also increased surveillance on the women on the grounds that they were a 
threat.   
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When they failed to put an end to the protests of the mothers, the government continued its 
attacks on the movement and went on to shame the opposition party for its political opportunism 
rather than supporting the government to eradicate terrorism/annihilation.  Human rights activists 
who supported the mothers were blamed for doing so, by saying that they were the very same 
people who mounted pressure to crush the JVP.  They were tagged as hypocrites who at the 
height of the JVP violence did not come out to organise or protest against its brutality toward 
innocent people, including a number of Buddhist priests, armed soldiers and their family members, 
public servants and women themselves  (The Island June 26; 1992).  
 
From the inception the mothers and the government were engaged in a bitter battle, using all 
possible tactics to out bid each other.  When the government realised that they were engaged in a 
losing battle, it organised a rally to coincide with the international women’s day led by Mrs. 
Premadasa, the wife of the President, in which the mothers mourned the death of those killed by 
the JVP and the LTTE (Researchers experience living through the JVP unrest during 1987-1989). 
This gathering gained much publicity through the state media. Not giving in to the action of the 
Mothers Front the government, later in July 1992 initiated its own Front, which comprised women 
from the Gampaha district where many mothers had faced violence and loss of their children due 
to JVP violence.  The creation of a UNP Front led to tension between the women. 
 
Tension and positioning within the women’s movement 
As evident throughout the available literature, appeals to notions of solidarity in the inaugural day 
rallies and the claims of the non-political alliance were not without difficulties and tensions.  Both 
Mothers Fronts (the first and second) in the South were divided on intersecting divisions such as 
political affiliations and experience of violence and hence associated themselves with the two 
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main political parties the SLFP74 and the UNP75.   The first Mothers Front that was associated with 
the opposition party had a larger support from other women’s groups and human rights 
organisations than the government initiated Front.  On the issue of legitimacy, the Mothers Front 
was further ahead than the government rendition which had affiliated itself with a political party 
who resorted to violence and showed no regard for human rights. However, the fact there were 
women who joined the government backed group, was an indication that the first Mother’s Front 
were unable to cut across the intersecting social and political divisions and unite all mothers 
whose children had been killed or those who had disappeared.   
 
In the same way, the original Southern Front also failed to connect with the Northern and Eastern 
Mothers to strengthen its positioning. Despite the North-eastern mothers receiving LTTE 
patronage at the initial stages (see page for LTTE leader’s remarks) during the campaigns against 
the government and the IPKF, when the LTTE realised that the mothers took a further step and 
were challenging them, they then decided to intimidate the members and suppress the mothers.  
We could speculate that if the Southern group supported the Northern group, there would have 
been a greater possibility that the Northern group would have survived the LTTE intimidation.  
Apart from the inauguration and day rallies where there was Tamil representation, the Front failed 
to network with the North-eastern groups. Even with the inclusion of Mrs. Manorani 
Sarawanamuttu who became president, as we will discuss later, it can be argued her appointment 
was a matter of convenience rather than a matter of acceptance. 
 
                                                 
74 Opposition party 
75 Ruling party 
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This unpreparedness to work across the intersecting divisions such as political and ethnic lines is 
a common factor that can be seen within the wider women’s movement. The women’s movement 
today in Sri Lanka is largely divided on political, ethnic as well as geographical lines. These 
differences have become an obstacle for women to unite. In Sri Lanka, today there are a large 
number of women’s organisations operating on various levels and on various issues. The Beijing 
process saw the creation of a network called the Sri Lanka Women's NGO Forum. This included 
over forty women's organisations from all over the island, representing all sectors of society.  
However, despite these vast numbers of women’s groups, there were no attempts at collective 
action amongst the women’s groups.  Many women’s groups seem comfortable working to their 
own agendas rather than mobilising the limited resources and working in collaboration.   There is 
no clear evidence to suggest that women have tried to reach out to each other and gather on a 
common platform.  
 
As one woman pointed out: 
 
“There is no women’s movement today in Sri Lanka, but only women’s projects - we are 
so divided on so many lines and we can’t seem to agree on a single issue” – (interview in 
London  June 07) 
 
As a result many women’s groups such as the Mannar Women’s association had to struggle on 
their own to bring the human rights violence of Tamil/Muslim women into the public agenda. They 
not only worked in isolation, but also faced intimidation (correspondence with the association page 
29) in their efforts to bring the violence against women to the public attention.  The response to 
the first Mothers Front and other women’s groups/feminists was also a matter of concern. While 
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many celebrated the success and participated in their rallies they were nevertheless divided in 
their response toward the first Mothers Front. 
  
“We were unable to join them in their protests as they were supported by the SLFP, so we 
went on our own- the Lipton circus rally was different it was a commemoration for Rajini 
and that was different (A woman’s group member in Colombo 2004)  
 
Even though the first Mothers Front comprised members from grassroots in the south, it was 
founded, and continued to be co-ordinated by politicians from the opposition party.  As such 
others women’s groups were unable to work with a group who had affiliated themselves with a 
political party.  
 
It was also of concern that the limited agenda of the first Southern Mothers Front precluded it from 
calling attention to similar issues faced by Tamil and Muslim women in the North and the East of 
the Island.  From the evidence gathered in the field and my own experience living in Sri Lanka at 
the time I am aware that the first Mothers Front did not extend its call (in practice) to other parts of 
the country, to areas such as Kandy, Matale, Badulla, where many women had faced the same 
experiences as the women in the Matara district. Therefore, the Front was symbolically associated 
with South and the SLFP, rather than a nationwide movement.  
 
There were many reasons for this. Firstly, the founders of the Front were hardcore SLFP people 
from the down south and the central parts were not SLFP strong holds  therefore, they cling on to 
their political differences rather than addressing women’s needs. 
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Secondly, the social and geographical divide between the Sinhala community as upcountry and 
low country meant that these politicians who represented the low country and were instrumental in 
initiating the First Mothers Front did not want to enter into any alliance with the Kandyan or up 
country politicians even in the face of disaster.   
 
Thirdly, as the upcountry was a UNP stronghold, there was no political backing for the women 
who faced such grievances so they had to fight their battle outside of any political support. As they 
felt that they could not do so without intimidation they were, therefore completely isolated and 
grieved on their own.  
 
Added to this, the women from the  south were more socially and politically exposed than the up 
country women (the  majority came from the poor plantation areas who didn’t have the ability to 
read and write due to poor literacy rates)76 and limited  political awareness and were  not able to 
organise themselves for such mass mobilisation on their own. 
 
Apart from these divisions the first Front also, in its resolution and campaigns always targeted the 
then president and his government as the protagonists and never accused the JVP or the LTTE 
who were equally responsible for the violence This was another reason that the front was subject 
to humiliation and intimidation from local people who had been victims of the JVP and LTTE 
violence.  The JVP who were one of the main contributors to the violence were clearly exempted 
from the call to stop the violence and the blame was on the Government.  Furthermore, the first 
                                                 
76 The plantation women have been living in poverty and deprivation since the colonial times. Successive governments 
have done very little to improve their standards of life due to many reasons that is beyond the scope of this research. 
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Fronts failure to project itself as an independent movement, cutting across interlocking political 
and cultural boundaries that would have brought all mothers together was a concern too. 
 
Summary 
The complexities that surround gender roles at times of conflict become central in the formation of 
the Mother’s Front.  In a culture where mothers are called upon to produce valiant sons to protect 
the motherland, the mobilisation of mothers to protect sons and challenge the state was historical.  
The image of the grieving mother was a slap in the face for the nationalist discourse, which does 
not valorise grieving mothers when their sons are sent to battle. The mother’s grief in public was 
evidence of the gruesome realities of violent nationalism and the intersecting identities women 
appropriate for themselves plus the lived experiences of women in times of conflict.  The coming 
together of the mothers unmasked the realities of the politics of valiant mothers and martyrdom 
that patriarchal state (masculinity) tries to so vigorously defend.  The mothers coming forward to 
challenge the state was proof of transgression by mothers of expected norms of the nation state 
and proved that the state was not able to protect citizens.   At the same time mothers were 
successful in challenging a government and humiliating senior members of the government by 
naming and shaming them, that robbed their right to motherhood in a most brutal way.   
 
The Mothers Front was a unique movement committed against war and political violence. They 
access women’s mobilisation by drawing on their collective grief rather than the representation of 
women as essentially of “peaceful nature”. Public protests drew on the symbolic power of 
women’s traditional roles in grieving and caring, thereby resisting hegemonic representations of 
women as victims and perpetrators.  
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Despite successfully challenging the governments human rights abuse and naming and shaming 
the perpetrators through the commission of the disappeared and arbitrary removals today after 
more than 15 years of the First Mother Fronts formation, it can be argued that the influence it had 
on the women’s movement especially the peace movement is very minimal. The reality is that 
women have not been able to forge a strong movement that is able to challenge the government 
or the political parties who are opposed to any form of peace deal; and women’s voices have 
been totally absent from the peace table. There are many reasons for this. 
 
Firstly, the political patronage received by the Mothers Front (both groups) has been a deciding 
factor. The strong support it received from the SLFP was based on political opportunism. The 
Mothers were used as a tool in shaming the UNP and bringing Mrs. Kumaratunga to power, rather 
than being inclusive and fighting for justice for the mothers who lost their children to state terror.  
This alienated a proportion of women who were faced with similar violence at the hands of the 
JVP/LTTE and therefore, many turned to the UNP Mothers Front whilst many more were totally 
excluded and left to grieve on their own.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three (page 74), Mrs. Kumaratunga’s political campaigns presented her 
to the nation as a woman who had lost her husband and father to violence rather than being 
viewed as a politician, in an attempt to assimilate her with other women of the Front. It was a 
sinister move. This was a deliberate attempt to mislead women.  Mrs. Kumaratunga was first and 
foremost a politician from a political background and she enjoyed many privileges due to her 
affiliations, class and caste, which the majority of the ‘mothers’ could not dream of.  For example, 
a widow from the South or North faced greater economical difficulties, social stigmatisation and 
vulnerability to GBV than Mrs. Kumaratunga. In that sense Mrs. Kumaratunga’s position of a 
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widow, rather than becoming a  hindrance to her, elevated her position within the society and 
gave her a status of legitimacy to power as a woman who had lost her father and husband to the 
violence and would understand the other women’s suffering.   Also a major reason that prevents 
women entering politics is the lack of financial capability and political connection – which was not 
an obstacle to Mrs. Kumaratunga. Hence, assimilating Mrs. Kumaratunga with the women of the 
Mothers Front was a misrepresentation of the women’s intersecting identities and lived experience 
of a woman situated within the social cultural positioning of Sri Lanka.  Apart from its leaders and 
some of the activists the majority of women were from the lover ranks of the social ladder for they 
were the ones who were most affected by state violence. 
 
 You can find the feminists and peace activists in Barefoot77 or in Mango tree in Colombo; 
they don’t understand the common mans problems-(an interview with activist based in UK 
August 07) 
 
Despite its call for solidarity that went beyond the divisions, in reality the Mothers Front was 
unable to escape the intersecting social divisions such as class and political difference that have 
been long rooted within the larger Sri Lankan society, and has even extended to the Diaspora 
(see Chapter Eight page 234). 
 
Once in power Mrs Kumaratunga  became entangled in the same conflict with the LTTE, and went 
on to place the country on a war footing during 1995 which is a clear contradiction to her election 
pledges. The Front was left to carry on its struggle of challenging human rights violence but this 
                                                 
77 A shop, which is situated in Colombo, and caters for the elite and expats. A UK comparison would be a mini version of  
John Lewis, Selfridges 
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time without any political backing.  Now its major champion has become the perpetrator of the 
very same cause that galvanised them. Mrs. Kumaratunga’s government was unable to take a 
stand on the human rights issue, despite instigating two commissions but there were no significant 
efforts to improve the situation of violence or punish the perpetrators. The purpose of this 
commission was mostly to keep her election promises and stigmatise the previous government. In 
fact Mr. Wickremasinghe who was the main target of the Batalanda Commission went on to 
become Prime Minster of the country during her time as President and the JVP who were equally 
responsible for the violence was a main alliance in her subsequent People’s Alliance Government. 
Likewise Mr. Rajapakse’s era (current) has seen a re-invention of the same period of Human 
Rights violence but in a more brutal manner.  
 
In the same way the UNP backed second Mothers front used the women to gain points on the 
violence of the JVP/LTTE, thus both groups were at odds despite their call for solidarity.  On the 
other hand, the LTTE who supported the Mothers Front when they challenged state violence 
became hostile towards the mothers, when they directed their agitations towards the LTTE. Many  
women  had to leave Jaffna (Interview March 2007 with a woman who faced violence and   due to 
her connections to the Jaffna Mothers Front, she is now in Exile in the UK and campaigning for 
democracy in Sri Lanka).    
 
Thus “motherhood” was subjected to power politics that were in place at the time and the front 
was not able to escape it.  The Mothers Front even though it was able to challenge and resist 
violence, was not a movement that incorporated feminist values/agendas, and therefore did not 
have a vision for the future. The fact that it was based on materialistic values and social 
stereotyping of women as mothers rather than citizens with political rights did not give it the 
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advantage of moving beyond the cause it had formed as well as transgressing the social divides 
of class, political affiliations and ethnicity.  The Front also failed to understand the intersecting 
identities such as the political, ethnic, cast and class divisions of women who faced violence and 
lost their loved ones to state/JVP/LTTE violence.  Even Dr. Manorani was seen as Tamil but 
rather than understanding her intersecting identity as a Tamil woman married to a Sinhala man.  
By the act of her marrying a Sinhalese she became included in the ethnic collectivism. While the 
leaders saw her status as a mother who lost a son and as prominent human rights activist a 
woman of Tamil origin could be manipulated to their advantage, and were ever ready to include 
her into the organisation. This can be argued as the real motive behind the inclusion of Dr 
Manorani rather than her ethnicity. As an activist revealed to me she married a Tamil man and 
carried the Tamil name. When she entered into the public domain to challenge violence through a 
Woman’s group in the UK she was cast as an LTTE agent despite the fact that she was of the 
same class of Dr. Sarawanmuttu, a professional in her own right and was not even of Tamil origin 
like Dr. Manorani.  Therefore, it was not Dr. Saravanmuttu’s class or ethnicity that mattered, but 
how her status could be “politicised” to the advantage of the male Sinhala dominated leadership.  
 
“We are so divided; even having a Tamil name seems to be the wrong thing these days. 
When I was in Colombo I was constantly harassed. Now in the UK, the moment they 
(Sinhala) hear my second name, they re-act differently. They distance themselves from 
me as if I am poisonous.  As far as I can tell them what they like to hear, they are happy 
but the moment I talk the real stuff then they brand me as  LTTE.  I have had several 
people call me and tell that there are e-mails going around branding me an LTTE agent…. 
it does not bother me being called an LTTE because I am not one… yet it hurts me…  to 
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think that people are so narrow minded…. even persons who called themselves 
educated…” (Supporter of the Women’s Network-UK 2006) 
 
The Front was entangled in these complexities and had to work within these restrictions. However, 
one could argue that it emerged to campaign for a certain cause and once they had reached a 
point where they could have been satisfied with the outcome that they ceased to become a major 
force, which is a reasonable argument.  But the outcome of their actions that resulted in the 
commission was clearly a political stunt of the Chandrika government and a white wash to gain 
political legitimacy, which many of the women failed to understand or accept. Thereafter, some 
women were given compensation and some women received political favours such as jobs under 
the patronage of the ministers involved but for the women who did not join the movement they 
were left out of such compensation or favours.  
 
The disappearance of the Mothers Front from the political landscape of Sri Lanka goes to prove 
that when women enter politics within patriarchy especially in developing countries where they 
depend on the assistance of the male leaders, they are unable to play a role or radically change 
the sexual politics and end up playing political roles on their leaders terms; or accordance of their 
gender constructions.  However, as we have identified in this research with the LTTE combatants 
when women transgress the traditional roles and appropriate new identities, they also achieve 
empowerment at micro level that if harnessed can lead to greater change in time to come.  Within 
the climate which we discussed above it was inevitable that the Mothers Front would revert from a 
major force to another women’s group that was struggling to overcome major barriers i.e. political 
violence and patriarchal controls faced by many women’s groups in Sri Lanka today.  By aligning 
with the political parties who saw the opportunity to mobilise the mothers against the ruling UNP 
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and later who abandoned them when they came into power the Mothers Front failed to define its 
own political objectives.  
 
The Mothers Front was an example where women rejected violence, militarism and nationalism 
and joined hands to take a stand against violence to refute the notion that they are not victims of 
violence.  There were other women, who did not engage with militarism either as combatants or 
resisters but chose instead to flee their places of origin and live in exile. Chapter eight I will 
explore the lived experience of women who have chosen to flee their places of origin and live in 
exile.  The chapter also explores their experiences in flight and their identify formation in the host 
country I also examine the intersecting identities of women living in what castles (2003) calls the 
asylum-migration nexus 
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 CHAPTER EIGHT 
GENDERED EXPERIENCE IN EXILE 
 
Forced migration and internal displacement have become a key characteristic in Sri Lanka.  From 
the mid fifties there has been a continuous out flow of people to other countries as well as internal 
displacement. The vast majority have been displaced internally and live in relief camps in the 
border villages of the conflict zones and some have moved to other parts of the country.  Many 
have fled to India or have sought asylum in the west. These vicious cycles of displacement have 
been a result of the series of communal violence78, military offences, and activities of the non 
state militaries including the LTTE Due to my inability to carry out research with internally 
displaced persons79 this chapter will look at the issue of international forced migration and will 
research the experience of Tamil women in exile in the UK.  
 
The popular perception is that forced migration is a phenomenon of conflict and political violence. 
In the case of Sri Lanka the early migration is seen as due primarily to economic or cultural 
reasons. However, a closer look at the national rebuilding process and the social cultural changes 
that took place in relation to language, education and land80, after post independence suggests 
that such migration cannot always be classified as economic. The Burgher81 community migrated 
in the mid 50s and early 70’s and thereafter, virtually to the extent of extinction, and the upper 
class Tamils migrated to the west for education and employment purposes starting from the mid 
70’s. Both of these migrations were a result of the discriminative practices adopted by the Sinhala 
                                                 
78 See Appendix three. 
79 The escalating violence meant that I was not able to carry out field work in the conflict areas and the border villages 
due to safety reasons. 
80 See Chapter three  Mapping the Conflict pages 70-73 . 
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government at structural level.  In recent times with the escalating conflict many have migrated as 
dependents of their spouses, students, and as highly skilled migrants rather than asylum seekers, 
but the underlying factor for their migration was the conflict and their inability to live the lives they 
wanted to live due to the increasing threat to their lives and the humiliation they faced living as 
second class citizens in their own country. The causes and consequences of the conflict have 
compelled many to leave the country, using different methods.  People who are able to afford and 
have the skills chose to do so and become economic migrants rather seek ‘asylum’. Therefore, in 
reality forced/migration is a more complex process what Stephen Castles calls ‘the asylum-
migration nexus’ (Castles 2003). He argues that the distinction between forced and economic 
migration is becoming blurred; and there is a need to investigate the more complex factors that 
determine migration (O’Neill 2004, 2010).  The historical context where men migrated to the urban 
cities in search of employment, education and upward mobility whilst women remained within the 
rural base has changed (Ganeshpanchan 1999).  Today women are leaving their rural base in 
search of social and economical prosperity. Such movements cannot always be viewed as 
voluntary choices.  The circumstances that lead to migration can be; increasing economic 
difficulties, unemployment, displacement, social insecurity and shifting gender roles, which may be 
a direct consequence of conflict/political repression and social instability. The latter reasons 
compel people to leave.   
 
Despite the reasons that led to their displacement, the reality is that displacement not only 
changes people’s economic and social conditions, but also alters traditional gender roles and 
creates new identities for people (Zaroza 1998). These new roles and identities affect women 
differently depending on their intersecting identities such as age, class and education.  For 
                                                                                                                                                
81 See note  in chapter one  
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example, while displacement can create space for some women’s enhanced mobility and public 
participation, it can also restrict mobility for others, depending on their intersecting identities such 
as age, the disabled and people who cannot speak the dialect of the host community.  
 
Added to this, the state policies and the public discourse towards migrants in the host 
communities can become an important factor in shaping women’s identity in exile.  For example, 
the host community’s (ie.UK and other European countries) reluctance to accept GBV/persecution 
as a cause for asylum has resulted in many women having to seek asylum attached to their 
husbands as dependents rather than on their own. These women continue to live as dependents 
with limited legal status which re-enforces the patriarchal structures even in exile.  This was true 
with many of the participants.  Even in the event of economic migration, many have entered the 
UK as dependents and continue to live as such. 
 
Exploring some of these issues this chapter will try to uncover the lived experience of Sri Lankan 
women in exile in the UK. Using women’s narratives and my observations in the field, the research 
will try to understand the background to their flight, their lived experience in flight and their lives in 
settlement.  I will discuss challenges faced by women who are seeking asylum when negotiating 
their new identities and how this has shaped their lives in the host country.  
 
Escaping Violence 
Rupa, 37, entered the UK in 1998 not as an asylum seeker but as a dependent of her husband 
Ragu, a UK resident.  The circumstances that led her to leave Jaffna, her hometown in Rupa’s 
words were: 
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“After appa (father) died in 1985 we continued to live in Jaffna. This was the time the IPKF 
were in Jaffna. One afternoon I was at home with grandma, when two IPKF men came. 
They asked me who was at home and I said it was only myself and grandma. Then they 
forced their way in locking the front door behind them. One man grabbed me by my hand 
while the other pointed his gun at me. They ordered me to remove my clothes (looks to 
see if her children are listening). I started to scream and shout.  Then one man hit me on 
my face. Grandma heard me shout and had run out to the garden from the back door 
asking for help.   Her screaming had drawn the attention of the neighbourhood who began 
to make noise running towards our house.  Hearing the neighbours shouting, the two men 
ran away and I escaped only with a swollen face”. Thereafter we left Jaffna where my 
marriage to Ragu was arranged (Interview with Sri Lankan Tamil woman now in UK 2005) 
 
Rupa did not apply for asylum but joined her spouse as a dependent.  However, the reasons that 
led to her migration were the conflict and fear of violence.  Violence is a factor for many women 
living through conflict to migrate but also as evident in Chapter Five (page 120), a reason that 
encourages women’s support towards and involvement in military groups.   
 
Despite the fact that women are increasingly affected by GBV during conflict, there is little 
recognition of the impact of violence on women when deciding on asylum cases.  As a result, 
women like Rupa (above) and Ranu (page 238) who have faced GBV face many difficulties.  This 
was also true of some women who I met at focus groups. These women have had to go through a 
long arduous process of appealing against the decisions to reject their claims for asylum on the 
grounds of sexual violence. 
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“I have waited for more than four years to get my status.  I am fed up with this; I have not 
seen my children for all this time I feel like going home even if they kill me” (Women in 
Newcastle focus group May 2005). 
 
This woman had left the country in fear of her life. She was raped in police custody while her 
husband was on the run; her children are with her parents in Jaffna. Many have faced further 
violence after deportation.  
 
Muthuthamby Vanitha was reportedly arrested on 19 November 1998 by the Kotahena 
police in Colombo. She allegedly attempted to seek asylum in France, from where she 
was deported back to Sri Lanka in early October and detained for one week, during which 
she was beaten with iron pipes on her stomach and not allowed to use the bathroom. She 
was examined by a JMO who is said to have found evidence of torture. 
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture E/CN.4/2000/9.02/02/2000 
(http://www.sangam.org/FB_REPORTS/00UNTorture.htm accessed 14/12/2008) 
 
Torture/bodily harm and fear of further repressions 
Ranu, age 32, fled Sri Lanka in 2001 after been subject to abduction and torture by the Sri Lankan 
Army.  Her claim for asylum was first rejected on insufficient evidence. Later, she was referred to 
a Medical officer and was given the opportunity to provide fresh evidence.  After a long waiting 
period where she had to undergo much hardship, she was granted refugee status.  
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Ranu’s story 
I was detained at a checkpoint and taken to the army camp…they asked about a shooting 
in the area the day before about which I knew nothing, but they refused to believe me, 
they first scared me by making me to listen to others scream when being beaten, I was 
scared and cried and pleaded with them., then they laughed and mocked. They 
threatened me saying that if I did not tell them what I knew, I would suffer the same. By 
now they were angry with me and one man slapped me several times and left me in the 
room. After a while two men came again and started to questioned me, they made me sit 
on a chair and tied my hands behind... I could not move, they question me again and 
when I refused to answer they burnt me with their cigarette butts (showed faded scars on 
her face and neck), and pulled me by my hair.  Then they removed bonds from my hands 
and asked me to stand up; when I stood up they pressed me against the wall grabbing my 
throat saying that they would kill me. I could not move or breathe; one man even punched 
me in my stomach.  I was feeling lifeless, I have had no water or food for the whole day 
and now I didn’t know what time it was.  When I fell on the floor one man tore my clothes 
off while the other was watching (starts to cry and holds my hand).   The next morning, I 
was still lying on the floor and had no strength to get up, lying down I looked at myself and 
realised I was naked.  
 
After some time I heard footsteps, I closed my eyes tight, and was thinking this is my last 
day on earth, the door opened and I heard them come, a man screamed at me to get up, I 
had opened my eyes by now, but had no strength and when I tried to sit up I fell on the 
floor again, then he pulled me by my hands and made me sit on the chair.  The other man 
who was with him threw my torn dress towards me asked me what my name was. That 
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was the first time they asked me my name.  Again they asked me the same questions that 
the other men had asked me previously but I had no answers or even could not answer, 
as I could not gather any strength to talk.  Then they asked me to follow them. With much 
difficulty, I stood up and holding the wall walked behind them. We came to an office where 
they asked me to sign a statement written in Sinhalese. I did not know what it was as I 
don’t understand the language, but as now I had nothing to lose and knew that I was 
destined to die, I just signed it.  
 
They told me that there was someone waiting for me and I could go home. But if I told 
anyone of what had happened that they would come after me again so I should   keep 
quite.  I could not believe what I was hearing.  I saw my father with some other elderly 
man, my father embraced me and we started to cry but we could not stay there any 
longer, we quickly got out of the place as the men were shouting for us to leave. 
Afterwards, I learnt that the other man with my father was a lawyer and that my father 
paid a large sum to retain his services.  I also learned that the statement I signed was one  
claiming that I had given the names of the people who were involved in the shooting. This 
was not true, but now who would believe me, only I know what happened to me in the 
camp, which I can’t tell the outside world.  But I knew I was in danger  if the people who 
were responsible for the shooting got to know this, which was going to happen anyway.  I 
stayed in Colombo for a few days. After I came to Colombo my father through a friend of 
his arranged for me to come here. First, we came to Singapore and there I stayed in a 
safe house for about a month and then came to the UK.  My father had friends here, so 
he thought it was safer for me to be here than any other place   
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Ranu is one woman that escaped death and had managed to flee into exile. Many other women 
like Krishanthi Kumarasamy (page ) who was abducted at a check point never came back again.  
 
These women’s stories are examples where the asylum policies and their associated services still 
tend to be dominated by the stereotypical image of the male political activist escaping persecution  
followed by his wife and family, rather than understanding the danger women face in conflict 
zones.   
 
“Most asylum seekers are young, single men who have deserted their families for 
economic gain” Lord Rooker, Immigration Minister, May 2002 (Dumper 2002 pp 2) 
 
The lack of understanding of the effects of conflict on women and the stereotyping of the asylum 
seeker has shaped the design and implementation of asylum policy at all levels but also the public 
discourse.  Despite the increased number of women taking up political/military activities, (chapter 
five) only a very low number of women apply for asylum status (Dumper 2002; Asylum Aid 2003).  
Unfortunately, I was unable to find gender specific statistics on Sri Lankan asylum seekers but the 
empirical research findings and any available literature (Asylum aid 2003) made it clear that many 
women come into the country as dependents attached to their husbands status.  This traditional 
gender bias does not fully recognise women’s experience in conflict and has left women at a 
disadvantage when claiming asylum.  
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Violence due to involvement of spouse/relatives 
The gendered realties of conflict are that women are victims of violence and face security threats, 
not only because of their own involvement, but mainly due to the involvement of their male 
relatives. This is often not considered when assessing applications for asylum and many women 
have to face many difficulties in proving their case. 
 
Parvathi fled the country in 2001 with her young family after facing rape as a result of her 
husband’s involvement with the LTTE. 
 
Muttu was a member of the organisation. So it is because of him that we had to come 
here. On that night I heard the dogs bark and footsteps coming toward our house, I 
thought it was Muttu, but the big bang on the door made me realise it was the army.  They 
broke open the door. The children started screaming and I think the whole village heard 
the noise. The men went into all the rooms and they were screaming in anger. One man 
asked me where my husband was; I said I did not know. Then he caught me by my hair 
and shook me while shouting at me asking the same questions, then slapped me and 
kicked me, screaming at the children to keep quiet, but I heard them crying. Two men 
dragged me to the kitchen (she did not go into to detail of the incident, but summed up) I 
don’t know what happened. After, I was hospitalised for several days, while the 
neighbours looked after my children.  Once I recovered, Muttu made arrangements for us 
to leave the village after we left, Muttu also left and claimed asylum.  He came here 
before us and we joined him after   During his absence, I had to look after the family, I did 
not have a way of supporting my family so I worked in a house and earned some money 
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which was hardly enough  to sustain us. We had to borrow some money from a friend of 
Muttu to come here. I asked if she wanted to return:  How could I live there again… the 
whole village knows what happened to me, how I could leave my children to grow up with 
that stigma…  I never want to go home again. 
 
The patriarchal attitude that women are the property of men and that to sexually abuse the women 
is to humiliate the enemy men has meant that more and more women face sexual violence.  
However, not recognising sexual violence as grounds for asylum has meant that these women 
face further difficulties in seeking protection. 
 
Despite the violence, women also face economical hardships and displacement that leads them to 
flee their place of origin and seek a place of safety. 
 
Loss of livelihood/displacement 
Apart from the direct threat of violence there are also other intersecting factors such as loss of 
house and property due to area bombardment by the armed forces or the forced evacuation of 
civilians by the LTTE that have lead to displacement.  Raji was one of the boat people who sought 
refuge in India in 1998.  Her story has a better ending than the countless others who attempted to 
flee the conflict during the years.  Raji’s village in Jaffna was affected by the war, as a teenager, 
and single, she left with her Mother and Brother when the army went on a bombing spree in 1998.  
They escaped in a fishing boat to India with eight other people. Thereafter, she met her husband 
and together they fled to the UK.  She now has very little hope of returning.  
 
245 
 
 Now my home is here, where I live with my husband and children. My mother and brother 
are in India so there is no need for me to go back to Jaffna.  Even if I go to Jaffna my 
husband is in danger he would be killed by the LTTE and then what would happen to my 
children, and me so how can I go back?  
(Interview with Tamil woman living in Southwalk, August 2005). 
 
For Raji, the violence and the hardships she experienced in her country of origin has meant that 
she no longer considered it to be her home and challenged the idealised view of home.  For her 
home was where her husband and children live and where she did not have to face further 
violence or live with the fear of violence.  While many other women still referred to home as their 
place of origin which was Jaffna.  In that sense I felt that Raji had moved beyond the feeling of 
nostalgia that some women harboured who I met in the focus. This nostalgic feeling is something 
that Zarzosa (1998) considers only as a strategy that is adopted to survive in exile, particularly 
during the period of rejecting the host society. 
 
Political activism and resisting state/military violence 
Some women I interviewed entered the UK as political activists and faced violence/repression 
either at the hands of the government, the LTTE, or other military groups for being members of 
rival groups or taking up political activities.  I have documented many of their interviews in Chapter 
four. 
 
Helen was a journalist and worked for a leading newspaper in Sri Lanka.  She covered many 
stories of political importance including the Krishanthi Kuamrasmay case (page).  She was an 
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official reporter to cover the peace talks of 1994, which collapsed due to the assassination of Mr. 
Gamini Dissanayake82.  As a result she was constantly harassed by the police and imprisoned in 
1995 and later released.  No longer able to continue with her work she fled the country in fear of 
her life and claimed asylum in the UK. 
 
While these are only partial factors that have lead to women’s displacement, there are many other 
reasons that have led to their entry into the UK, sometimes directly, or at times via other countries 
such as India or Singapore.  Their journeys have not always been safe and eventless. Many 
women have faced greater dangers and at times even lost their lives in flight. 
 
Parimala was a seventeen-year-old married woman. She joined her family and a group of 
refugees to escape to India.  On landing in Rameswaran her husband reported her as 
missing. A few days after her body were washed over to the shore and were identified by 
her husband. The police were unable to identify the cause of death as her body was 
heavily decomposed and the case did not go further (as revealed by an informant in at a 
focus group September 2005 she was one of the women on the boat). 
 
In another incident  
Sinnarasa Anthonymala, a 17-year-old girl from Jaffna, was reportedly shot in the thigh by 
the Navy while travelling on a boat to India on 16 July 1995 and taken to the 
Kankesanthurai navy camp, where she was allegedly stripped of her clothing and tortured 
by being struck on the head with an iron rod, for which she needed stitches. She was also 
allegedly handcuffed at the ankles and suspended upside down from a window bar, 
                                                 
82 See chapter three for more information. 
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electric wires were applied on her body, and she was burnt with cigarettes and heated 
metal rods. On 28 August 1995, she was allegedly transferred to the Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID), where she was reportedly cut on the back of her neck, hit 
on the mouth and hit on her left leg with a piece of wood. After a month she was allegedly 
forced to sign seven statements typed in Sinhalese83 On her body the examining medical 
officer reportedly found a number of irregular marks and scars that corroborated all of her 
testimony of being tortured.  
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture E/CN.4/2000/9.02/02/2000  
http://www.sangam.org/FB_REPORTS/00UNTorture.htm accessed  14/12/ 2008.  
 
While the research has uncovered some reasons for women to seek asylum/go into exile they are 
not exhaustive.  Whatever the reason for their flight, upon arrival these women face much 
difficulty. 
 
Arrival 
Not only do women have to undergo violence and intimidation in their villages and homes, but 
they have also faced many forms of violence whilst in flight and on their arrival to the host 
countries. 
 
Ritu was from the North. When her parents suspected that she was an informant of the LTTE, 
they wanted her to leave the village soon as the army would come for her.  Arrangements were 
made to send her to a person named Jegga in India. Arriving in India, Jegga took her to a house, 
                                                 
83 Many Tamil women are unable to read or write Sinhalese  therefore, the military/police take advantage of this and get 
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where there were other women; she lived in the house for about a week. Even though Jegga had 
obtained money from her mother he also demanded sexual services.  After a few days Jegga 
arranged a visa for her to the UK.    Having no other way she had to work according to Jegga’s 
plan.  From India she was flown to Zurich, Frankfurt, Denmark and finally arrived in the UK after 
more than a week of leaving India.  
  
I was scared and devastated; you will not understand the things that went through my 
head.  Not knowing what would happen to me as if what had happened already was not 
enough (by this she meant the abuse of Jegga). Finally she arrived in the UK and was 
detained.  My application was rejected first, but then after appealing and agreeing to 
cooperate with the police I was granted status (interview with woman who fled the country 
with the help of a people trafficker UK August 2005).  
 
Ritu’s narrative is an example of the exploitation women undergo at the hands of the organised 
traffickers and agents such as Jegga who thrive on women’s vulnerability. These agents not only 
obtain large sums of money but some also abuse women for their own pleasure84. However, the 
complexities around forced migration are such that the only alternative women may have is to 
obtain the services of these agents to escape violence, torture, harassment at the hands of the 
state/non state military in the conflict zones. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
signatures for false statements under duress  
84 See Report “Refugee Women seek asylum in LTTE Office http://www.tamilnet.com/print.html?artid=11467&catid=13 
accessed 02/08/2004 where twelve women who lived in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu  since 1990 were trapped into 
returning clandestinely by boat where they were promised  foreign jobs. Upon arrival these women have been  held in 
safe houses in the suburbs of Colombo 
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Like Ritu there were many women in the focus groups who had paid traffickers to get them to the 
UK.  Some revealed that they paid handsome amounts of cash to these traffickers to bring them 
to safety and had travelled across eastern Asia and Europe to get to their final destination.  
 
In Exile 
Many women simultaneously face extreme social discrimination due to their new identity and 
social positioning as asylum seekers/refugees in exile.  As their stories reveal, the personal loss of 
identity as a result of the violence and humiliation they have faced has made them feel isolated 
(Interviews with women in focus groups). This is further exacerbated by the experience they have 
to undergo in the UK.  All these women I interviewed for this research have integrated within the 
host communities differently and live very different lives to each other.  However, an observation 
was that these women’s’ integration into the host communities have largely been shaped by their 
lived experience as well as the intersecting identities in their place of origin. 
 
For example Ranu (page 238) who experienced sexual violence is unmarried and lives in a 
council flat. She is not employed and is dependent on state benefits.  She rarely goes out to 
socialise with others due to unexplained fear and shame.  Several times during our interview she 
went to the door to see if it was locked and drew the curtains.  She also broke down in tears and I 
felt that she was under depression85.    I later contacted an outreach worker of a charity that was 
working with refugees and asylum seekers with the consent of Ranu and helped her to get more 
help. I gave her a call six months after we initially met and was told she was continuing her 
                                                 
85 I asked her if she had talked to her GP about her distress and she said yes and she was prescribed of medication but 
she felt that it did not help her. 
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treatment and is feeling much better and looking forward to the summer as a relative of hers will 
be visiting her. 
  
What is evident is that if Ranu had received the emotional support she needed at the very early 
stage of her arrival, she would have integrated into the community more effectively. Ritu (page 
246) continued to be single, but said she had a lover who was a former combatant of another 
Tamil militant group. They had no plans of marriage as he is already married.  She lives a life of 
isolation in a flat provided by the council and does not want to mix with other Tamil people in the 
community in fear that they will come to know of her relationship with a married man.   Parvathi 
(page 242) though had faced violence and had integrated well into the community and now lives a 
better life.  Her husband Muttu owns an off license and they live in a multi ethnic area where there 
are other Sri Lankan (Sinhala as well as Tamil) and therefore, they don’t feel isolated. She has 
limited interaction with the host community other than when they came to the shop where she 
helps out her husband at times.  She has built close ties with the Sir Lankan Tamil community 
who live in the area. Her husband is involved in many societies and organisations and gets 
involved in organising activities for the Tamil community and she enjoys participating in them.  Her 
family and the social interactions seemed to have helped her to come to terms with her past 
experiences. However, her relations with the Sinhala community in the area are not very cordial,” I 
hate them, they are the ones who ruined our lives” she says. 
 
Raji’s story (page 244) seems to have a better ending when considering the unfortunate tales of 
many other women and girls who fled their villages. But it is not such a happy ending for her in the 
UK.  The UK did not turn out to be the dreamland she thought it would be.  While she is lucky to 
be alive and escape from the LTTE and army, she is unable to escape the cruel social structures 
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that she lives in.  She is unemployed and looks after her kids at home, while her husband works 
locally as a clerical officer. 
 
“I feel very frustrated – and hardly go out, even when we go out, the looks I get on the 
streets and in public places are very heart- breaking, they look at us like we are dirt.  They 
know little about the lives we spent in Jaffna. If it were not for this war, we would have 
been living better lives than most of these people who live here. 
 
I asked her why she did not take up a job or further training. “I have to take care of my children, 
and I am the one who drops them off and picks them up from school and do all their work, my 
husband has no time for them, he has to earn for us. Also, I don’t like going out to work, I never 
went out on my own, nor has any woman in our family ever gone out to work” 
 
Many women including Parvathi (page 242) and Raji (page 244) have voluntarily accepted the 
role that has been assigned to them as mothers, wives and carers accepting the gender roles 
assigned to them in their place of origin. Parvathi though had transgressed these during the stage 
of her husband’s early exile where she had to care for her family. Upon re-uniting with her 
husband she has reverted to her former role as mother and carer. The fact whether this was by 
choice or forced upon her was a question even she was unable to answer. I think Muttu expects 
me to be at home I also did not feel comfortable going about on my own.  Parvathi’s experience 
tells us the status of many women who transgress their gender roles during conflict and take on 
additional responsibilities to care for their children/families in the absence of the men.  Upon 
return of the men either from combat or exile, these women return to their original roles and 
continue to live in the shadows of their men either as wives/mothers/daughters or carers.  
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Both women (Parvathi and Raji) have not moved from their traditional roles even in exile. Despite 
the average income that is generated by their husbands these women continue to live as house 
wives and dependents. They are not considered wealthy or upper class and do not feel 
comfortable interacting with the host community.   
 
For Helen (page 244) the story is very different.  She freely moves about and holds many 
voluntary positions within the society of journalists and refugees.  Despite her acceptance in to 
society, she had been economically marginalised and is still unemployed. She has been deprived 
of her career as a journalist.  When I met her she was feeling frustrated by not being able to do 
what she always loved.  Her income as a self employed translator is not a regular income and she 
faces financial difficulties too. Yet, she has not given up hope and is in continuous search of 
employment as a journalist. 
 
A closer analysis of these women’s integration processes seems to draw links to the social status 
they enjoyed in their place of origin.  For Rupa, the better status she enjoyed in Jaffna was key to 
her being proposed to by an educated upper class man that led to her marriage and move to the 
UK.  Her husband’s status as a professional and the income was sufficient for them to live a 
comfortable life without Rupa (page 238) being employed.  I also met several other women during 
my field work who, held professional jobs such as doctors, accountants, lawyers and academics.  
All these women had either held such jobs in their place of origin or came from upper class/upper 
middle class families or were educated in the UK and many had married men who were already 
residents in the UK and some paying large sums of dowry.   For Helen (page 244), despite 
discrimination in the labour market, her ability to speak fluently and having held a job have made 
her acceptable as a professional in the host community.  However, this was not the case for many 
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women I interviewed who despite their qualifications and skills feel discriminated against in the 
labour market and therefore, have given up working altogether. 
 
Many women such as Raji (page 244) and Parvathi (page 242), who did not enjoy such status and 
connections in their place of origin they are now socially marginalised and live very difficult lives in 
the UK depending on their spouses. Even women like Parvathi who helped in their husbands 
business considered themselves as unemployed.  Some who had paid jobs worked in 
supermarkets, post offices, schools as class room assistants or dinner ladies.   
 
The discrimination these women face is not only from the host community, but also from their own 
community, either from people who have migrated in the early 70’s or who are now well 
established or sometimes by people who live in the same status as asylum seekers/refugees. 
 
“I don’t feel comfortable coming for the focus groups, I don’t want to get insulted by the 
other woman, she is from the same village as me but from a higher caste family so even 
now she thinks that she can treat me like when she was in Jaffna” (Woman at Focus 
group West end Newcastle 2005). 
 
These two women entered into constant arguments over their disagreements during the meetings 
at times, interrupting the process, later I realised that they were not only divided on caste, but also 
had issues surrounding their political affiliations. Therefore, it can be argued that class and caste 
are important factors not only for the Sri Lankan Tamil women, who live in Jaffna, but also a 
deciding factor that determines their migration patterns, their settlement and the social networks 
they enter into as a result event in exile. 
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Other intersecting divisions such as their political affiliations that continues to divided them even in 
exile, show sufficient evidence to confirm that various political groups continued their work despite 
their exile, as I discovered during field work where I met a former LTTE cadre who has now joined 
a rival political group and was collecting funds for their political activities in the UK these groups 
continued to be divided on these lines rather than gathering round a common identity.   
 
More striking were the differences between the women of the two communities (i.e. Tamil and 
Sinhala). While Tamil and Sinhala women have joined separate community organisations aimed 
at providing support to other members of their respective community, during my field work I was 
unable to find evidence where Tamil and Sinhala women came together to work in partnership 
under one banner as “Sri Lankan” women in the diaspora.   Some Tamil women like Parvathi 
(page 242) believed that it was not possible to build any form of relationship with the Sinhalese.  
Even the women, who had better lives in comparison to the lives they spent in Jaffna, believed 
that they were victims of Sinhala oppression.  Many women seemed to cling on to the past 
nostalgia of the “happy days” and found it difficult to move on.  
 
How happily we lived in Jaffna, but see what these people did to us now we have to come 
and live here because of them .I don’t think we will ever be able to go back to Sri Lanka 
and live because now it is a Sinhala country, they are wiping out the Tamils. (Interview 
with Tamil Woman, Coventry 2006) 
 
However, for women like Helen (page 244) and another member of the Women’s Network were 
more open to building relations with the Sinhalese and said they enjoyed close relationships with 
Sinhalese friends during the time they lived in Colombo.   Another member of the Network 
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complained that (see extract in page) she was alienated due to her Tamil name and at times she 
was cast as an LTTE sympathiser even when she was not. 
 
Complex relationships between Forced Migration and Gender  
While forced migration is a result of the conflict, political repression and exclusive national building 
programmes, as witnessed in the case of Sri Lanka, plus many other conflict zones. It is also a 
more complex process that further exacerbates and encourages conflict and social violence. The 
economic and social vulnerabilities created around displacement and forced migration can 
manifest in many different ways and lead to the prolonging of conflict and the creation of new 
political and social oppression, especially for women, who become the most vulnerable, due to 
their sexuality and social status.  In this section, I will explore how research findings evidence that 
forced migration has led to the prolonging of the conflict as a result of the financial and ideological 
support of the diaspora and how such financial contribution has worked towards further 
oppressing women. 
 
A key feature of the conflict has been the financial/ideological support by the Tamil diaspora 
towards the LTTE cause and the anti LTTE campaigns of the Sinhala community, which are 
taking part on the streets of western cites86.  Apart from the direct financial donations87 and 
ideological support towards the political parties/groups, the regular remittance towards the families 
and dependants living in Sri Lanka becomes vital for sustaining the war economy.  The diaspora 
plays an important role in building international opinion on the conflict. Anti SL Government/Anti 
                                                 
86Demonstrations in July 2007 by the Tamil Community in Trafalgar Square London calling for the international 
community to pay attention to the Human Rights Violence that is taking place in the Sri Lanka recognise the Tamil self 
determination   
87 See BBC Report on 21st March 07 London 
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war demonstrations on the streets of London and other western cities, regular seminars, 
conferences and other political lobbying are important elements in the LTTE/State propaganda 
mechanism that contribute to re-invent and whitewash the reality behind the causes and 
consequences of the conflict.   
 
While financial remittance from the diaspora not only serves towards the sustainability of the 
economy, but also works towards re-inventing oppressive practices that existed in pre-conflict 
society such as the dowry (page  146) and class (page 61).  For example, there is an increased 
demand for dowry in the North East of Sri Lanka today and parents must comply in providing this 
if they want to give their daughters in marriage to a suitably qualified man who has resident status 
in the west.  This is one way for many women to escape the violence that is a reality of the conflict 
zones.   However, it is the well to do or those who have relatives abroad that can afford this kind 
of payment for their daughters.  For the women who are unable to afford such payments, they are 
left to deal with the harsh realities of the war or seek the services of human traffickers like Jegga 
(page 247).   As seen in Chapter Five (page 146) the dowry system and poverty (page) have been 
some of the reasons that have encouraged women to take up arms and commit violence.  The 
reality of the Tamil community is that rather than abandoning these patriarchal systems that 
oppress women, the society has re-enforced these cruel cultural practices leaving women more 
vulnerable to humiliation and violence. 
 
Women as protectors of culture 
While economic and ideological contribution plays an important role that helps in the continuation 
of the conflict, the cultural revitalisation is a key element in any nationalistic struggle. The diaspora 
contributes to the struggle by maintaining and re-creating such nationalistic symbols. As Radihika 
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Coomaraswamy argues, the Diaspora takes greater care in continuing these practices than when 
living in their places of origin (Coomaraswamy 1996). Patriarchal structures that operate within 
these societies call upon women to engage in their roles as cultural reproducers in boundary 
makers (Yuval Davis 1987), even in exile, thus placing greater pressure on women.  In her paper 
Dancing the War, Christina Natali (2006) reveals how a Sri Lankan Tamil woman had spent over 
£5000 to conduct an Arangathram dance recital of her daughter in the UK – when asked why she 
had spent this money she said because they wanted to maintain the tradition.  Another Sri Lankan 
family living in North London spent over £10,000 to conduct three ceremonies for relatives the 
occasion of their daughter on attaining the age of 13 years.  The grandmother of the girl, who was 
a school teacher in Jaffna, and now living with the family said to me: 
 
“It is important “that we maintain these traditions as we need to teach our children how 
to carry on our culture and traditions” (telephone interview with Tamil woman in the UK, 
July 2006).  
This re-confirms that militarised anti-nationalism while assigning women the role to protect their 
cultures, simultaneously use women’s’ bodies and sexualities to maintain the notion of the 
honourable state. 
 
Decay of Culture 
Displacement also can lead to the erosion of a culture/language and identity by not having the 
means for its re-generation within the host community. For example, parents of many second 
generation Sri Lankan young men and women are faced with the dilemma of arranging suitable 
partners for their children and having to reluctantly cope with an increased number of mixed 
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marriages or inter-caste marriages, which they would have not otherwise permitted in their place 
of origin. This has also led to some parents, seeking potentially suitable partners at very young 
ages and making close ties with such families so that when the marriageable age is reached they 
will not have to face the burden of their children not marrying into outsider castes/ethnic groups.  
My husband’s friend is from Jaffna, and I have a son who is at university. He is an ideal 
match for our elder daughter so I always ask my husband to keep in touch with his friend 
so that when the time comes we can make a proposal, but I am a bit anxious, we don’t 
know what these girls and boys will be up to when they leave home for university. (A 
mother who has a grown up daughter of 16 years 2006) 
 
On the other hand, many second generation Tamil children are faced with pressure to be included 
or accepted as “an insider” and tend to change or reject the upbringing of their parents/elders and 
adopt their own identity through the assimilation of new identities to become “included”.   
 
While this integration process (to adopt the culture and values of the host community)  works 
towards the decay or death of a culture, another factor that leads to this are the issues concerning 
migrants who either return to or visit their homeland.  With the signing of the CFA, there have 
been many people returning home, mostly for a short visit, who take on a new found identities, 
and wealth.    
Identity formation in exile 
What is at stake in an ethnic conflict and ethnocide in Sri Lanka is more than the mortality 
of bodies, more than the destruction of life and the demise of security.  Rather, what is at 
stake, especially for those whose bodies have been spared the destruction of death, is a 
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death of a way of being- in- the world, the death of that which constitutes their identity, 
honour and dignity (Daniel 1996: 68) 
 
Over the years, literature regarding identity politics among resettled refugees and immigrants has 
grown in recent times (Zaroza 1998).  Zetter argues that identity has become one of the key 
points of analysis in understanding a refugee life (1991).  While for Malkki identity is dynamic and 
a key-element in the creation of people’s (self) images, especially when it comes from 
‘refugeeness’ (Malkki 1992). It is true to say that refugees and immigrants continue to struggle 
with the changing and intersecting identities in strange foreign contexts, often caught up between 
unknown languages and cultures, among strange people and a strange land, quite often facing 
hostilities and humiliation.  
 
Gender becomes fundamental to the process of identity construction, especially in situations of 
conflict, war and displacement (Schrijvers 1999; Zarosa 1998). It can be argued that in times of 
exile, gender is re-negotiated as we see with the women who take on extended roles during the 
absence of their men. As Schrijvers (1999) suggest gender is located in the centre of human 
identity and dignity and has far-ranging consequences for the overall positioning of women. It 
determines to a great extent the way in which people experience their lives, insofar as it refers to 
“relations of power, privilege and prestige”.  It is clear that the research evidences that gender 
constitutes a key element in the Tamil women’s lives, at times of normality, as well as in conflict 
and in displacement and exile. 
 
For many of the women who participated in this research, their exclusion had begun long before 
they were made to leave their places of origin.  They were women who were excluded from the 
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political process that in the first place contributed to their exile. They were women, deprived of any 
political status that enjoyed a marginalised social status of being “mothers”, “wives” and also had 
other intersection identities based on factors such as castes and class.   Many had lost their jobs, 
which they held in local schools, banks and other offices, which had to be closed down, and many 
were internally displaced.   
 
This was exile without moving (Zrosa 1998), they had lost almost everything that belonged to 
them, even the safety of their private spaces, their home. Many women were harassed, abducted, 
raped, and at times murdered within these spaces.  They were unable to travel around freely to 
attend to their daily tasks, the streets, the fields and the market, which were once their socializing 
places became hostile to them. The military, IPKF or non-state military actors were operating in 
these areas which lead to a restriction of women’s mobility.  The outside world, full of tragedy, 
people arrested, tortured and killed. Imprisonment, disappearances, harassment were daily 
experiences of many women’s lives (see Chapter Four, Five, Eight), forming the brutalities of the 
regime that claimed to represent them as well as from the military.  Their places of origin were 
destroyed and women were left to negotiate between the past and present, the future of their 
lives, the safety of their children, and their families.  
 
In these circumstances in exile their intersecting identity, which were re-constructed around being 
an asylum seeker/refugee, and foreigner, even if they have come as racialised? As economic 
migrants or in to marriage women continued to be treated as “dependents”. Added to this, they 
were women and therefore, gained a dual identity of refugee/asylum seeker women/dependent, 
which has governed every aspect of their new identities.   
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The identities they have formed for themselves intervene within this dual identity of 
“refugee/asylum seeker dependent/woman”, which is constructed differently for a man. Within this 
major category, women’s experiences are not universal. There are intersecting identities that they 
have created for themselves, such as the members of the Women’s Network, who have become 
campaigners for ending GBV during times of conflict, women like Helen (page 244) who is 
contributing effortlessly as a volunteer for many groups and other women who hold professional 
jobs and have reached the peak of their careers.  Among this major identity “Tamil/refugee 
women” there are other sub/intersecting identities that have emerged and that women associate 
themselves with.  
 
Lives destroyed by violence  
Many women like Ranu (page 238) and Parvathi (page 244), invariably semiconsciously adopted 
an identity of women with no self-respect. The social and cultural practices that humiliate women 
who have faced sexual violence have triggered this. They constantly worry about the future and 
past memories of their violence. Often, they (women like Ranu (page 238) and Parvathi (page 
242)) have had no time to grieve, but had to take on the responsibilities of looking after their 
families or struggling to leave to a safer place, to escape further violence. Added to this, they also 
fear that when their partners get to know of the violence they will leave them. 
 
For  Parvathi, Muttu had accepted her and taken responsibility upon himself for her tragedy.   
Whatever, he says, I am sure one day this will come to haunt me, she says with tears in 
her eyes, and you know how our men react to these things, I also suspect that is why he 
doesn’t want me to go about on my own” 
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Ranu does not have a partner and faces the prospect of never having one for the rest of her life.  
“How can I ever have a relationship with a man”? She asks me. 
 
Widowhood  
Four women in the East London focus group, were widowed, and three in the Newcastle groups. 
For all these women and for many other families who are now in exile, the husband was the head 
of the household and sole income generator. In the absence of their men, these women are 
suddenly left with the responsibility of providing for the families and managing the household.  
Many women had no previous experience with income generating-activities and experienced 
difficulty finding employment and raising children alone, especially when there is hardly any 
support available for them. 
 
Apart from being economically vulnerable, these women also face the social death of becoming a 
widow in a community that celebrates married women as the auspicious woman (Coomaraswamy  
1996). Being a widow among a very superstitious community like the Tamil community, means 
that these women are placed at the very bottom of the social strata. Widows are not allowed to 
participate in any social activities, as they are considered signs of bad omen. As Ratha in (page 
115) experienced, she was barred from taking a front seat in a wedding ceremony of her sisters 
children. 
 
Widowed women are also considered unlucky and that is the reason that they had lost their 
husbands – here women are blamed for their victimisation, and it is not the conflict or the causes 
that led to the man’s death.  
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Dependence 
Many women who had come in to the country have done so attached to the status of their men, or 
a male relative and do not enjoy any form of rights, at times they live in constant fear of their 
partners abandoning them. Their economic dependency has also meant that they have to 
undergo many difficulties such as living in violent relationships, especially where many men have 
been subject to either being prisoners or combatants, and are now facing difficulty in fitting back 
into the community. 
 
He is a good man, but at times he can be very volatile and burst out for the slightest thing 
and become violent. When he is angry he does not know what he is doing.  But after that 
he will be begging for pardon (A woman at a Focus group who did not want to give an 
interview). 
 
Poor/uneducated 
The discourse that poverty creates conflict has dominated the western public discourse, which 
builds on the attitude that conflict arises due to poverty, and therefore, views asylum seekers as 
living in poverty in their places of origin.  As such, especially women who enter the country are 
viewed as poor, uneducated, deprived and oppressed.  This is also a problem that many women 
have to deal with when seeking employment. Many employers do not accept the qualifications 
women have gained in their places of origin and request that these women be re-trained (See 
Helen’s case in page 244).  As a result of these stereotypical identities, women suffer 
economically, as well as social marginalisation. As discussed in chapter four, such economical 
vulnerabilities also can lead to women being coerced to prostitution/trafficking. Link needed to the 
next quote/point. 
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When I arrived newly in 2000, I wanted to register with the Finchley job centre and was 
asked to see an employment adviser.  She asked me about my computer skills to which I 
said I had used a computer for more than 10 years and was very fluent in the use of 
packages such as word and excel.  She looked at me in disbelief and asked me “Have 
you used a computer in the UK?” This made me angry and sad but I politely asked her “is 
there a difference in a computer be it in Sri Lanka or the UK” to which she had no answer. 
(Authors own recollection of 2000 when I arrived in UK) 
 
Security 
In an atmosphere of hostility and coming to a strange land, security is another very real concern 
for many women who are in exile. 
 
I live with my daughter. The area that we have been dispersed to is a very deprived area. 
Crime and poverty is not new to this place.  Being a refugee we are constantly subject to 
harassment, once they threw stones through a window and broke the glass, the boys 
laugh and pass remarks at us on the streets. I can’t go anywhere alone or send my 
daughter; I have to accompany her even to school.  A few weeks ago when we were out 
they had broken into the house and destroyed the little things we had. I complained to the 
social worker, but not to the police, if the police come then they will get more hostile 
towards us. I have asked to be re-housed and am on the waiting list (Woman in East end 
of Newcastle focus group August 2005). 
 
Negotiating Past Memory 
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The political value of what is forgotten reminds us of the deep connection between 
“memory and freedom” (Passerni 1983: 196) 
 
As a result of the increased multidisciplinary enquiries into refugee resettlement, refugee’s 
physiological adoption has recently come to the forefront in both academic literature and 
organisational agenda.  It is now generally accepted that the refuges that have lived through 
violent experiences such as war or torture may suffer profound psychological duress during re-
settlement exile given the traumatic events they have suffered (UNHCR).   Such experiences are 
also considered to be a rather violent process, which persists in destroying the psychology of the 
survivor long after their actual occurrence even when far distant from danger (Manz 1995: 161).  It 
is believed that permanent re-settlement and its founding principles may afford refugees some 
degree of psychological assurance by implying that they should never again have to face their 
perpetrators or violence again, and thus they may be able to cope with their memories and 
experiences of violence whilst removed from the environment in which the trauma occurred. 
 
However, despite this understanding there seems to be very little support for women especially 
those coming from ethnic communities that treat sexual violence still as a stigma that they are 
unable to reveal to anybody. 
 
“I want to cry, cry all the time, if I only could scream and tell what happened to me. If I 
could only ask them to give those papers to me, I would tear r them in their faces. If I 
could only go back and live without fear” (Interview with Ranu continued)“ 
 
Another woman said,  
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Those days were the happiest days of our lives, we all lived happily, I can still remember 
how the children played with other children, and the women frequently visited us at home. 
During the New Year, we all got new clothes and children used to get money; it make 
them so happy.   Now we are left alone, even when we get together with others, there is 
no happiness as such. We all have sadness in our stories” (middle aged woman living in 
East London, October 2005). 
 
“Now that we are old, we can’t get used to living here, there at home there would be 
somebody always at home… now my daughter and son- in- law goes out to work and 
after the children go to school I am left alone. I hate this; there is nobody to talk to and I 
can’t even go to the temple…. I have not gone to a temple for many years now… in Jaffna 
I always went to the temple on Fridays. Now, even I don’t have friends to telephone, as 
many of them are dead and gone. I am praying daily that I must also die soon” (76 year 
old woman who was the mother of one of my informants). 
While part of the fear is the stigma attached to telling their stores, there are also the power 
relations that run within the families, where even when the women are prepared to talk and take 
steps their men deprive them of seeking outside help. 
 
I have never been to a GP after I came to this place other than for treating my children- it 
is not that I don’t want to see one, but that my husband always discourages me saying 
that I don’t have any illness and it is that I am just imagining.  Now, I am around 45 years 
old  but  can’t do anything about it, even when I complain he gets angry and tells me  if 
you want you can go – but then I know he won’t approve if I do it (interview with woman, 
Coventry 2006). 
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This woman’s story is associated with the power relations that exist in patriarchal societies like the 
Tamil community even in exile which was also a barrier when conducting interviews that I have 
discussed in Chapter Two (page 36). 
 
On the other hand, despite these issues, the support system never understands that women’s 
positioning are different from culture to culture, and that treating women universally is detrimental 
to their well being especially when they have faced such traumatic experiences in life.  The 
refugee support system typically emphasise infrastructural assistance and material aid rather than 
psychological support during reintegration (Farwell 2001: 44).  As such unresolved memories of 
violence can make re-settlement a highly troublesome process, particularly when one is unable to 
leave behind the memories of the “home”, a place that was filled with traumatic historical events, 
far from the natural process of reintegration such as in the case of Ranu (page 238), Ritu (page 
246), Parvathi (page 242) and other women whom I interviewed. 
 
This is the reality for thousands of Sri Lanka women, since the beginning of war, violence has 
become a harsh reality and has largely shaped collective memories of the Tamil community, in 
particular (see Appendix 3) repeated attacks on Tamil villages, by state military attacks have 
produced a “culture of terror”,   This has further exacerbated the violence that was perpetrated by 
the Tamil militant groups who have from time to time taken control over the North and East and 
continue to do so.  Violence has been the “motor of oppression” (Green 1994) used by the Sri 
Lankan state against its Tamil citizens.  However, the memory of such violence has formed the 
core of my interviews with most of the women who have now settled in the UK. 
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Summary  
The conflict related violence and the breakdown of economic and social systems have resulted in 
many seeking asylum across borders, blurring the nexus of forced and economic migration.  
Women’s increased involvement in conflict has seen women increasingly becoming targets of 
GBV.   Despite the changing nature of women's experience at times of conflict, policy on asylum 
and migration in the UK have failed to recognise women's intersecting identities and the lived 
experiences, when deciding on asylum and refugee status (Asylum Aid 2003).  As such, women 
face multiple vulnerabilities from the time they made the decision to leave the conflict areas.  
 
Narratives of women’s exile are only one aspect about the political or social experiences they 
have to struggle with.   However, these are also narratives about humiliation, GBV, loss, anger, 
suffering and they are stories of acceptance and belonging that is absent when discussing the 
lived experience of women in conflict.  They are also narratives of truth, deception and betrayal 
that are testimony to the experiences these women and many other women face in their places of 
origin during conflict and political repression, in flight and in exile. These narratives bear testimony 
of the power of violence, oppression and humiliation, to destroy one’s identity. These are 
narratives of women who have faced the brutalities of war and have been betrayed by the policy 
makers, who have failed to take into account that women have intersecting identities based on 
their caste, class, ethnicity, political affiliation and have been incorporated into conflict in different 
ways when formulating policy and have neglected their responsibility to protect women. 
 
For these women settlement has meant not only re-location to another part of the world, but also 
reinventing new intersecting identities followed by a deeply complicated individual process of 
negotiating past and present forms of violence/humiliation. In this sense identities are always 
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evolving.  As a result of agency approaches to re-settlement which often falls short of promoting 
successful social/mental re-integration, women face many difficulties in flight and in exile upon 
their re-settlement in their new homes.  However, for many women who have faced violence or 
witnessed violence, it is the emotional well being that has mattered most of all and it is past GBV 
that they are unable to come to terms with, but the institutions have played little attention to this. 
 
While these women have managed to re-construct their lives in different ways, what happens to 
the women who are unable to flee their societies? What protection is available to these women, 
when the state who is responsible for their protection becomes the protagonist? Will polices 
adopted by the international agencies be adequate to protect these women?  In search of 
answers to these questions I will, in the next chapter look at a piece of international law UN1325 
that is designed to protect and promote the participation of women during times of conflict and in 
peace building to explore the effectiveness of these types of legislation in providing justice to 
women and holding the perpetrators accountable for the atrocities committed. The final chapter 
draws together the main points in conclusion and makes recommendations  for practice and 
policy. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
 
Exploring the nexus between the theory and practice of women’s positioning within the militarised 
conflict situation in Sri Lanka, the thesis examines how women have accommodated, participated 
or resisted relations with militarised ethnic national liberation movements and what happens to 
women who accept and/or resist militarism and violence.   In doing so the research mapped the 
conflict (Chapter Three page 57) and explored how violence at structural level has led to the 
development of militarised ethnic conflicts and argued that the humiliation suffered by the minority 
groups especially the Tamils has led to the prolonging of the conflict.  
 
The theoretical framework of the thesis drew upon feminist theories of Intersectionality (Crenshaw 
1989, 1991, 1994; Collins P. Hill (1998, 2000); Yuval Davies 2006; Walby 2007; Thorvaldsdorrir 
2007), humiliation (Lindner 2000, 2006; O’Neill 2005; Hartling 1996) conflict (Galtung 1969)  as 
analytical tools to uncover the real life experiences of women in the conflict of Sri Lanka. Given 
the scope of the research I was unable to analyse the concept of representation in length.  Instead 
I examined the popular representations of women at times of conflict in the dominant media forms 
and argue that women have multiple layered identities rather than the popular representation as 
victims or perpetrators during conflict.  The research was informed by a feminist participatory 
action research approach (Orland Fals Borda 1991; 1999) based on the principles of: “inclusion; 
participation; valuing all local voices, and local ownership and sustainability” (O’Neill 1994, 2001; 
O’Neill and Campbell 2002; O’Neill 2004, 2006, 2008 pp.7) which focuses specifically upon 
women and their lived experiences of violent conflict and their involvement in ethnic national 
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movements and using in-depth interviews and observations in the field during 2004-2007.    
 
Based on the available literature and evidence gathered during the field work, GBV, constructions 
of womanhood and sexuality, women as actors of violence, women’s political agency within 
militarism, women’s resistance to violence and militarism, forced migration, responsibility to 
protect and post conflict reconstruction emerged as key themes that were analysed in depth.   
 
From the research undertaken for this thesis, in-depth interviews and observations there is 
evidenced that the protracted conflict in Sri Lanka is fundamentally rooted in the failure of the 
post colonial Sinhalese governments to accommodate intersecting interests and needs of the 
multi ethnic community in its nation building programmes (Chapter Three).   Instead, democracy 
based on the understanding “as the choice of the majority” has been used as a tool to re-affirm 
majority rule over the minority communities. This partial concept of democracy has worked 
towards bringing Sinhala led political parties to power and today state power is purely seated 
within the majority Sinhala rulers who have developed the notion of Sri Lanka as a Sinhala 
Buddhist country, leaving no space for competing ideologies.  The growth and development of 
Tamil militancy discussed in Chapter Three and the paradox of women taking up arms discussed 
in Chapter Five is a result of this structural violence, humiliation and the marginalisation of 
minority communities that has taken place since independence.  The grievances are not limited 
to the minority communities but also visible within the Sinhala majority.  Intersecting social 
divisions such as class and caste have worked towards excluding a significant proportion of 
Sinhalese people. The JVP crisis discussed in chapter three (page 69) is an example of how this 
exclusion has led to violence.  
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Caught up in this long battle for political and military supremacy, Sri Lankan women have been 
incorporated into militarised nationalism in multiple and contradictory ways. Women have suffered 
the burden of multiple oppression including GBV and humiliation due to their intersecting identities 
such as ethnicity, caste and class and other social and cultural practices that exist within the Sri 
Lankan society.  Faced with this oppression and humiliation women have taken up arms to fight 
against the oppressive structures that have governed their lives.  There is evidence that women 
have gone beyond the popular representations (defined as victims or perpetrators) and have 
resisted and challenged violence and oppression and have become agents of change at micro 
and macro level. 
 
Evedence gatherd from Chapter four (page 87) reveals that women’s sexuality has been central to 
their lived experience during militarised armed conflict.   Rape and sexual violence have been 
used by state and non state military groups not only to humiliate women and the communities 
these women belong to and punish women’s transgression but also to mobilise violence.  In 
particular the nature of GBV inflicted on Tamil women is evidence of how sexual violence has 
been used as a military strategy in this process to humiliate the enemy and encourage further 
violence (Dharmini page 113).  Despite evidence that confirms men have also been subject to 
sexual violence and rape as prisoners of war, members of rival military groups, or for holding 
different political beliefs, the politics around GBV have determined that only women can become 
victims of sexual violence and therefore, sexual violence continues to be used against women 
with no evidence of meaningful intervention from the state or international institutions to stop such 
crimes. 
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Militarisation has also worked towards controlling and re-shaping women’s bodies to meet the 
needs of these institutions.  In this process of constructing the respectable/virtuous woman, 
sexual surveillance has become a controlling mechanism including placing strictures on their 
behaviour and dress code.  The dress has been used as a tool to control sexuality and to divide 
the community as discussed in Chapter Four (page 87).  Women like Sriyalatha (page 106) in 
Chapter Four who do not conform to this dress code and women like Thilaga (page 110) and 
Dharmini (page113) who transgress the notions of respectability have been punished with the use 
of violence. 
 
While controlling and excluding some women’s bodies, militarism has simultaneously worked 
towards encouraging other women to transgress social boundaries  by recruiting them as 
combatants.  In this militarisation process, women have been associated with the notion of 
liberation of the land implying that women’s path to liberation is only through joining the military 
that fight to protect the land.  This binary between militarism and women has excluded a large 
proportion of women who do not support the militaries yet who have worked towards resisting and 
challenging women’s subordinate position in society. Such as the many women who are working 
for women’s economical and social rights, women who have fought for the free vote and many 
who joined the agitations for independence from the colonial rule.  These women, who came 
forward to protect women’s rights at times risking their own lives, have not only been excluded but 
also have faced inhumane punishments for their insubordination to the militaries. 
 
 
Analysis of the lived experience of the women combatants in Chapter Five (page 120 ) and Six 
(page 177) reveal that despite this claim of liberation through the military  even the limited power 
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that women combatants gain by joining the military  has come not without its price.  Tamil women 
have paid a heavy price for their transgression as combatants due to the exiting social attitudes as 
well as the masculine nature of these predominantly patriarchal military organisations.   Women’s 
lives in the camps and the lived experience of LTTE and ex-JVP ex-combatants in exile reveal 
that women’s enlistment into the non state militaries has not been an  automatic path to 
empowerment, as claimed by these organisations and their sympathisers.  For example despite 
the double liberation ideology of the LTTE (Coomaraswamy 1996), the research suggests that the 
recruitment of women has been due to a strategic need rather than in the interests of women.  
 
 
Along with economic hardships it is evident that women within the military (the state and non- 
state) face many other forms of discrimination due to the masculine nature of these institutions.  
Despite increased recruitment into combat in all armies women are underrepresented in positions 
of leadership.  Even when assigned with positions of power, women are expected to perform to  
standards set, which are in relation to men.   Given these circumstances and the discrimination 
women face, due to how gender intersects with other social categories, there is a real danger that 
women who joined the military groups especially the non state military will return to a society that 
has inherited poverty, dependency and exploitation that in the first place in part, and to varying 
degrees, pushed them or compelled them into supporting revolutionary militarism. 
 
With no other employability skills, lack of alternative employment within the communities and 
sometimes having sustained humiliation as a result of undergoing sexual violence, the trauma of 
violence as well as perpetrating violence, or as disabled women, women returning from combat 
will be left to depend on support provided by state or other non-governmental agencies, such as 
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Ranu (page 238) who now live on state support.  This is further made more complicated with the 
economical strain that the conflict has brought upon the north east. 
 
There are others who have used their traditional roles such as mothers, daughters and wives to 
resist violence and militarism. The Mother’s Front (page 208) is an example, where women have 
taken collective action for resistance using their traditional role.  The Mothers Front used their 
traditional identities along with traditional ritual to resist and challenge violence.  However, given 
that militarism and patriarchy will always resent women’s public participation, women’s resistance 
has not been an easy route.  Women have faced tremendous difficulties, antagonism and 
humiliation in their public activism.  The fate of the Jaffna Mothers Front is an example of the 
obstacles women face when challenging violence (page 208). Yet these women refute the 
stereotypical representation of women as victims and perpetrators of violence. The resistance 
strategies adopted by women of the Mothers Front where blood and animal sacrifices are made to 
inflict curses on the people who robbed them of their right to motherhood while challenging the 
military/media discourse of women as victims of violence have also de-constructed the image that 
women are innately peaceful. 
 
As stated previously women have adopted different strategies to cope  with the daily militarisation 
of their lives, some women like Saralthambi (page  22)  became victims of violence and, women 
like Leela (page 200) have been subject to violence due to their husband and continue to live in 
the village day after day reflecting on their experience.  Whereas others have faced violence and 
joined the LTTE and fought against the enemy who humiliated them and adopted strategies to 
resist violence.  All these women have experienced conflict in many different ways depending on 
their intersecting identities. While their experience have been shaped by their intersecting 
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identities, the conflict has also created new identities for them such as ex-combatants, members 
of the mothers front and sex workers who sell sex in the military occupied areas  and in this sense 
identities are always in the becoming.  
 
What was also clear during the field work was that when discussing women’s experience of the 
conflict, what has gone unrecognised is the experience of women who chose to flee the country 
and live in exile.  From the mid fifties, there has been a continuous flow of people voluntarily and 
involuntarily leaving the country, evidence gathered from the field work and as discussed in 
Chapter Eight shows that these women’s lives in exile have been largely shaped on their ability to 
integrate with the host community.  Women like Helen (page 244) have been able to integrate into 
society and hold responsible posts such as the secretary of a media group.  Other women like 
some members of the Women’s Network have created new identities for themselves as 
campaigners for peace. 
 
The research has established that women’s lived experience in conflict is largely shaped by the 
their individual and varying  identities of women and how these identities intersect with other 
social categories such as caste and class as well as the humiliation they have faced as a result of 
their  identities. By adopting intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989, 1991, 1994; Collins P. Hill 1998, 
2000); Yuval Davies 2006; Walby 1997; 2007; Thorvaldsdorrir 2007), as an analytical tool, the 
research has argued that the popular representation of women as victims of violence and 
perpetrators are only a strategy adopted by  the  the military and media to mask the realities of 
militarism.  The lived experience of the informants of this research and the observations made 
during field work have proved that women are not a homogenous group but individual women with 
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varied identities based on their social status such as class, caste and political affiliation to name 
but a few and these identities shape their lived experience at times of conflict as well as peace.   
 
The experience of members of Mother Front, the Mannar women’s group and the Network for 
Peace and Freedom has refuted the notion that  women are not passive victims of violence or 
aggressive perpetrators, but are capable of challenging these stereotypical representations of 
themselves and creating new positive identities for themselves (even though this is very minimal) 
at micro level either through their transgression of traditional roles and taking up men’s work in the 
absence of men or taking up a public role to challenge violence and political oppression.  While it 
is important to remember that in a traditional patriarchal society like the Tamil community one 
cannot expect a sharp paradigm shift within a few decades and therefore, we cannot completely 
dismiss the idea that these women will become more independent and empowered with a gradual 
transformation of the society as in the case of some women who are in exile.   In the same way 
the transgression of the women of the Mothers Front, Mannar Women’s Centre and the Network 
for Peace and Freedom who came forward to challenge the political violence can be seen as 
sowing the seeds for women’s future active participation in the political arena even at local 
governmental level.    
 
Despite the fact that some of these women vanished from the political arena thus does not in any 
way mean that they have reverted to the previous submissive positions. The advancement these 
women gained at micro level can be a valuable experience for their future activism and political 
participation as well as encouraging other women to follow their steps. This has been evident by 
the increased number of women coming forward to contest local council elections and holding 
posts in recent times as well as holding other public posts.   However, this transformation will only 
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be fully achieved with a well planned and inclusive post conflict programme addressing the real 
challenges the country will face in post conflict situation. 
 
Post conflict challenges 
Given these complexities of the conflict, the challenges facing post conflict Sri Lanka can be 
broadly divided into four categories: humanitarian, security, governance, and economic 
development keeping gender at the heart. Understanding these challenges will be the key to 
addressing some of the issues faced by women during conflict.  
 
The humanitarian challenges will include, returning internally displaced persons, refugees, 
addressing humiliation and trauma of victims of violence as well as the combatants of both sides, 
establishment of property rights of the displaced persons, and the demobilization of combatants 
and their reintegration into society. According to local non-governmental agencies, there are 
currently about 200,000 displaced people including 40,000 children. About 27,000 displaced 
children are facing multiple vulnerabilities such as starvation, recruitment to armed forces, sex 
industry, and child labour and trafficking there are a large proportion of children in the LTTE ranks. 
These children who are in settlement camps as well as in the LTTE ranks lack access to 
education, housing, health care and safe parenting. Many of these children also have been 
victims of violence or have witnessed brutal forms of violence such as murder/torture of their 
parents, rape of their mothers/sisters and violence to other family members including the elderly 
siblings.  Added to this, are the numerous social problems facing women and girls who are 
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displaced, who are left to support their families single handed, and thousands of women who have 
become widows on both sides of the conflict88.  
 
The fighting and displacement has destroyed the livelihoods, the properties of those who have 
fled have been re-occupied by intruders. The government itself has taken steps to handover the 
land of displaced Tamil/Muslim people in a sinister manner as they did during the decolonization 
(chapter three page 73) as well as planning to build military bases for its armed forces.  Returning 
properties to rightful owners will be an early post-conflict challenge as there will for once be no 
land available as most of the properties have been distributed to new owners and there are also 
the problems of people not being able to claim rightful ownership due to lack of necessary 
documentation as well as land not being suitable to use for living/cultivation/farming due to 
contamination by land mines, pollution from chemicals due to bombardment and other military 
activates. 
 
The transition from military to civilian life requires a rapid assessment of the needs of ex-
combatants who are men, women and children. To avoid a resurgence of hostilities, ex-
combatants should be provided not only with economic reintegration assistance training, 
employment and social care, but also assistance to come to terms with the scars of the humiliation 
and violence.  The violence they have undergone/perpetrated and the disabilities sustained, there 
will be considerable need to pay special attention to women especially those who have faced the 
bitter experience of sexual violence and torture at the hands of the state and non state militaries.  
However, such programmes will have to take into account the intersecting identities of women and 
diverse experience rather than a universal approach as “women who have faced violence”.  
                                                 
88 See chapter three for more on this issue 
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Security challenges include clearing landmines, disarming and re-integrating the rebels (DDR) and 
most importantly reforming the justice and security sector.  Both the LTTE and the state military 
have utilized landmines to defend themselves, to blow up enemy vehicles and enemy targets. 
Mass scale shelling and aerial bombardments have become a daily reality of the civilian lives. In 
such situations restoring security can be a major challenge not only because people continue to 
distrust the government military but also due to the security needs of men and women that differ 
and any programmes will have to make sure that the security needs of women are given as equal 
priority as the men.   
 
The LTTE as well as other non-state military that have been used to power with the use of guns 
and violence, hence disarmament will be a big challenge for post-conflict Sri Lanka. There will 
need to be considerable incentives for these men/women to hand over their weapons, the main 
tool which they have gained legitimacy through.  Also, they will have to be assured of safety and 
security if the government is to convince them to hand over their weapons. Not only must most of 
the rebels be integrated into the military/military groups, but there is a need to reform the entire 
security sector if security is to be restored, not only for the civilians, but also for the combatants 
both men and women who are being re-integrated as well as the state armed men who become 
redundant after the conflict is over.  Such reforms must include redefining civil-military relations, 
building respect for the civilian leadership, requiring transparency and accountability along with 
taking a more gender-sensitive approach.  
 
At the level of governance, Sri Lanka’s main challenges include re-establishing its human rights 
record, introducing changes to the constitution, and strengthening institutions of local government 
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while giving substantial power to the minority communities. It is evident that the current 
constitution of the country doesn’t provide enough authority and power to the local governments. 
Decentralization and other political reforms to strengthen the capacity of local government 
institutions could serve to create a new forum for resolving a wide range of grievances. The role of 
the Executive Presidency lies at the centre of the constitutional discussion.  
 
While re-addressing the deficiencies of the constitution and legislature, there is also a need to 
address the human rights records of the military and build good governance with the state 
institutions.  Poor governance, corruption and malpractice have become an epidemic starting from 
the top level. As discussed in chapter three, allegations of bribery and corruption against military 
and politicians at high level is not uncommon in Sri Lanka. This has seriously undermined the trust 
of the people in the political system. The constitution that is designed to give the executive 
unlimited power even after leaving office has become a serious deterrent to bringing charges 
against the people who commit crimes/corruption at the highest level. There is also the political 
patronage that ensures many of these corrupt politicians and officials enjoy “immunity”.  Even if 
the LTTE is totally eradicated, if good governance is not restored and people are left to be 
governed by the same political clan, there are no guarantees to say that there will not be another 
uprising of the masses similar to the JVP within the Sinhala community itself that will see more 
women come forward to challenge the state either militarily or politically as the foundations are 
already in place.  
 
In conclusion it can be argued that humiliation, gender based violence and the lack of 
understanding in the intersecting social divisions have become the key in defining this conflict and 
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any future research that is undertaken will have to bear these key theoretical concepts in mind 
when examining the conditions of post conflict Sri Lanka. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Experiences from other post-conflict societies such as Nepal and Sierra Leone show that the main 
characteristics of post-conflict societies are that they require leadership, resources allocation, 
labour and skills.  With such demand placed on them, societies emerging from conflict by no 
means can afford to forget women or ignore gender-related impediments and opportunities.  If Sri 
Lanka is to actively promote women’s participation in the post conflict reconstruction it would be 
essential to take a rights-based approach that will guarantee women’s fundamental right to: 
protection from gender based violence, to participate meaningfully in public life especially in 
positions of policymaking and resource allocation whilst understanding the intersecting identities 
of women and thereafter giving women the opportunity to benefit substantially in the 
reconstruction process.  
 
This raises difficult questions as to the women returning from combat. As in the case of the JVP, 
they came from the poorest strata of the Sinhala community and had faced discrimination not only 
prior to becoming combatants, but also after returning to their communities as there was no real 
change either socially or economically after the revolution. The JVP despite its political and class 
rhetoric were unable to change the social structures other than leaving a dark shadow of violence, 
thus creating a precedent for the use of violence opposed to democracy.  Even after entering the 
political mainstream they have not been able to become a major political force and gain the 
support of the majority. Their political weight has been limited to forming alliances and making up 
the seats that the ruling parties need to sustain power, and therefore balancing the scale. 
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Given the composition of the LTTE, there is no guarantee that this would be any different. The 
LTTE have been in power with the use of violence and intimidation, rather than through a 
democratic process.  Like the current Zimbabwe Zanue PF, who also have come in to power with 
the use of violence and continue to use it as a tool to hold on to power.  In the same way, it will be 
difficult for the  LTTE cadres who have been trained to hold on to the barrel  to chose to be govern 
by the ballet as proved with  other dissident groups such as EPDP and the Karuna fraction who 
use violence covertly to intimidate and silence their opponents.   
 
Also, there is no evidence of any form of political evolution within the LTTE which is a military 
organisation.  The LTTE gender policy is based on the vision of its leadership of Prabhakaran who 
the government claim is no longer alive. Therefore, it is unrealistic to believe that there would be 
any real change of political mindset that will allow women to become active participants in any 
power sharing programme as it will always be “men over women”, as  is happening in the South. 
 In these circumstances, future research will have to focus on the disarmament and demobilization 
of women combatants to see how realistic the liberation policy of the LTTE has been in post-
conflict Sri Lanka even though with the military defeat of the LTTE in may 2009 and the death of 
its leadership as claimed by the Government the women’s positioning is going to be more 
complicated (if at all any are left after the military massacre).  Any such research will have to bear 
in mind the intersecting identities of women and the diverse experience of these women within the 
communities and the ranks of the military institutions they enlisted into.   Methodologically such 
research should also take a participatory action research approach that is based on the principals 
of inclusion, participation, and valuing all voices (O Neill 2001, 2008) that will enable women to 
narrate their lived experience during and after the conflict without being subject to the 
representations of the state/military institutions that claim to represent them.  
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Appendix 1 
The research was carried out between March 2003 and July 2008 on a part time basis.  Originally 
registration was with Staffordshire University and transferred to Loughborough in December 2005. 
Due to the difficulties faced during the field work, the rapidly changing situation in Sri Lanka and 
my re-registration process I was unable to keep to strict deadlines and there was an overlap at 
times.  
Timescale  
Phase Research Activity Description Time Scale 
Phase 1 
UK Based 
a) Submitted proposal 
to Staffordshire 
University for 
registration  
 
b) Literature Review 
and incorporation of 
previous research into 
first chapter 
 March 2003 to 
December 2003 
Phase 2 
UK Based 
Development Phase:  
Developing research 
tools, setting up of the 
field work phase.   
 
 January 2004 to 
September 2004 
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Establishing 
agreement with the 
Social Scientist 
Association, Colombo 
Sri Lanka to provide 
support during filed 
work in Sri Lanka  
 
Making contacts and 
Establishing focus 
groups in the UK, prior 
to going to Sri Lanka 
so that I would be able 
to start the facilitation 
process immediately 
after my field work in 
Sri Lanka 
 
Phase 3 
Sri Lankan 
In-depth interviews 
with Ex-JVP woman 
combatants, 
 
Women who have 
The field work in Sri 
Lanka had to be 
limited to this period 
as I could not return 
thereafter due to the 
October 2004 to 
December 2004 
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faced violence from 
the military groups and 
Women activists of the 
Mothers Front and 
other women’s groups 
 
escalating violence 
and  Tsunami on the 
24th of December 04 
and my safety could 
not be guaranteed – 
However, I continued 
to keep in touch with 
the groups that I made 
contact and 
conducted telephone 
interviews for regular 
updates 
Phase 4 
UK based 
In-depth interviews 
with research 
participants  
 
 
 
 
 
Facilitating focus 
groups 
LTTE Ex-combatants 
who are in exile 
Sri Lankan Tamil 
women in Exile 
 
 
 
 
4 groups – Each 
group consisted 8 to 
12 women  
January 2005 to July  
2007 
 
 
I also had to re-
register with 
Loughborough during 
this time as my 
supervisor joined 
Loughborough and 
Staffordshire could not 
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 provide me with a 
supervisor 
 
In April 07 I submitted 
my progress report to 
Loughborough where 
it was agreed that I 
was able to start 
writing up  
 
Phase 5 
UK Based 
Analysing data from 
field work and 
preparation of thesis  
 August 2007 to  date 
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Appendix 2 
Schedule to interviews 
To all participants: 
I wish to confirm that this research is a part of my PhD study.  My main aim of the research is to 
understand the way the Sri Lankan conflict has impacted on women’s lives. If you wish to take 
part in this research either to give me an interview or attend a focus group, I will be very grateful to 
you.   Any information you provide will be strictly confidential and will be used only for writing up 
my theses and producing some academic papers. However, if you don’t want me to I will not 
include any information you give me in any other publications that I may produce in the future but 
will only use the information to write up my analysis for the thesis.  Your names, address or any 
other contact details that can identify you will not be revealed. I also undertake to send you copies 
of the publications that I may include your information if you wish to have them. 
 
Some of the questions I will ask you in the interviews will be:  
 
What is your ethnicity (this is to understand how ethnicity have influenced your experience) 
What is your experience with the military groups (any of the non state miltry groups or the army). 
Have you been a member of nay of the groups, if yes, which one . 
Would you like to tell me why you joined the group 
How did you spend your time in the camps (i.e what was it like to be a combatant) 
Any other questions that I will want to ask leading from the answers you give me 
 
However, if you don’t want to answer any of these questions you can choose to do so. I will 
only want to know what you are prepared to tell me. If you don’t want you don’t have to 
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I thank you very much for your cooperation, you can contact me at any time on e-mail or by 
phone, my contact details are available from the office you receive this form.   If you are not 
prepared now, please call me even at a later date and I will talk to you. Interviews can be 
arranged at a place you like to meet up with me. However the places for the focus groups will be 
informed to you once you agree to join up a group and this will be nearer to your area. 
 
Please feel free to contact me if you want any more information or any clarifications of the 
process. I am able to speak English/Tamil and Sinhala so don’t be put off if you don’t speak any 
one of these languages. 
 
Thank you all 
Zinthiya Ganehspanchan 
1 Ambel Way 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 
NE3 3JB
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Appendix 3 
 
15th December 
1955 
Ceylon (as known then) was admitted to the United nations, after 7 years of 
wait, along with 15 other nations 
5th June 1956 Tamil Parliamentarians attacked by Sinhalese mobs, 150 Tamils killed- The 
date the ‘Sinhalese Only’ bill was introduced by Prime minister S W R D 
Bandaranaike in the house of Parliament, as an act of protest, 
Chelvanayakam, the leader of the Federal Party, led a party of 300 Tamil 
volunteers and staged a sit down Satyagraha (peaceful protest) of the kind 
popularised by mahatma Gandhi in the days of the Indian freedom Struggle 
6th June 1956 S W R D Bandaranaike introduced the ‘Sinhalese Only’ official language bill 
in the House of Representatives.  
Rioting spreads in the City with Tamils being manhandled in buses, trains 
and on the streets.  Among the victims were two Tamil Lawyers A.C. 
Maharaja and S. Sharvananda (Later who became chief justice of Sri Lanka).  
They were pulled out of a car they were travelling and attacked by a mob.  
Indian Tamil shops attacked and looted.  More serious disturbances occurred 
in the Eastern Province, in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and in Gal Oya valley 
where a large number of deaths were reported.  In 10 days of sporadic 
rioting, an estimated 150 persons were killed, the majority of victims being 
Tamils.  This marks the beginning of the phase in the Island’s history when 
Tamils are subject to physical violence.  
22nd May 1958 Ani-Tamil riots break down. At Vavuniya (160 miles north of Colombo), four 
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Tamils were murdered, other assaults and robbed. In Polonnaruwa and 
Hingurakgoda, where Tamils are cut (stabbed) with homemade swords, 
grass cutting knives or clubbed to death or burnt alive.  Nearly a 100 are 
believed killed in Polonnaruwa along on the night of 25th May. Riots spread to 
all parts of the island,  28th may At Panadura, south of Colombo a mob 
attacks a Hindu Sivan Temple, pulls out the officiating Brahmin priest, pours 
petrol on him, and burns him alive. Elsewhere in Colombo rioting gets 
worse? 
 
The government requisitions five British ships and a French ship to take 
9,426 Tamil refugees from Colombo to Jaffna, out of an estimated 12,000 
men, women and children who were herded in temporary refugee camps.  
The operation, directed by the Ceylon Navy, is carried out in two stages 
during the nights of June 2-3 and 5-6 conditions of complete secrecy. 
25th May 1958 On the night of May 25, 1958 one of the most heinous crimes in the history of 
Ceylon was carried out. Almost simultaneously, on the Government farm at 
Polonnaruwa and Hingurakgods, the thugs struck remorse. The Tamil 
labourers in the Polonnaruwa sugar cane plantation fled when they saw the 
enemy approaching and hid in sugar cane buses. The goondas wasted no 
time. They set the sugar cane alight and flushed out the Tamils.  As they 
came out screaming, men women and children were cut down with 
homemade swards, grass cutting knives and katties or pulped under heavy 
clubs. 
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20th February 
1961 
On the 20th at around 7.30 a.m. when around 200 volunteers led by Federal 
Party leader Chelvanayakam, squat opposite all entrances to the Jaffna 
provincial secretariat in a Satyagrah protest, a huge crown gathers filling the 
streets, pavements and all approaches.  A bomb and stones are thrown at 
the Satyagrah in front of the Jaffna Kachcheri causing severe injuries to them 
by government sponsored thugs. 
 
April 18 A special train carrying the soldiers arrives in Jaffna at 2.30 a.m. and 
the troops are promptly moved into the sprawling secretariat grounds through 
the rear, while about 2000 satyagrahis, nearly 90 of them women, unaware 
of the development tired from the days’ fasting and prayers in the hot sun are 
yet squatting or stretched out at the secretariat entrances, Some of them in 
deep slumber. While usually there are thousands of supporters during the 
day, there are hardly any at that hour of the night. 
 
The crackdown begins.  Some Police officers emerge first, approach tow 
MPs. A Amirthalingam and V Dharmalingam, who had been keeping watch, 
and inform them they had been instructed to take them into custody under 
the Emergency Regulation.  The MPs submit without protest and Mrs 
Amirthlingam is also taken into custody.  Thereafter an estimated 500 army 
men, some of them carrying rifles, swoop on the passive Satyagrahis, attack 
them with rifle butts, belts and clubs, The sleeping volunteers wake up 
groaning and writhing in pain.  They are trampled with boots, kicked and 
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dragged away from the entrances.  Proctor S Nadarahjah, one of the joint 
secretaries of the Federal Party sustain head and shoulder injuries, another 
Congress MP  Mr. M Sivasithamparam who fearing assault on the Women 
Satyagrhis, stands with his arms stretched out and is himself attacked and 
sustain injuries.    The men pull down the Federal Party “post office” 
structure, smash up cars and bicycles parked in the vicinity, ripping tyres with 
bayonest and ramming the windscreens. 
 
All news from the Northern and Eastern Provinces are strictly censored, 
government statements allege that resistance continued in the province and 
that it sometimes took violent forms, whereas in fact strict non-violence is 
observed by the proclamation of the Emergency. 
31-may – 4 June 
1981 
Sinhalese police and army go on the rampage burning parts of the city of 
Jaffna, Hundreds of shops reduced to ashes and the Jaffna market square 
set on flame; They burn the post office of the TULF and the house of the 
Jaffna MP V Yogeswaran.   On 1st June civilians on the roads are attacked. 
The Jaffna public library, which was considered to be among the best in Asia, 
with its 90,000 volumes and rare documents and irreplaceable manuscripts 
on the history and culture of the Tamils, is set alight.  They also burn the 
press of Elanadu , which is the only Tamil daily in the Tamil areas. 
 
On 2nd June the army and police continue to burn shops in many areas in the 
peninsula. On the same day, after Emergency is declared and curfew is 
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imposed in Jaffna, the army kill two persons.  On 3rd and 4th June 5 people 
are killed.  On 4th June four members of parliament are arrested for no 
apparent reason and later released. Several other Tamils are also arrested.   
10-14 August 
1981 
Violence spreads to the entire country from 10th August and Tamils become 
victims of mass murder, assaults, hacking, burning, looting and raping and 
other forms of genocide attacks. In Amparai many houses belonging to the 
Tamils are burned by Sinhalese mobs assisted by the Security forces, A 
large number of shops are also burned and approximately 500 Tamils are 
made homeless.  Violence is particularly directed against the plantation 
workers, Thugs attack 43-estate s in the Ratnapura district. The line rooms 
(the houses which comprise only one room and built in a line where the 
workers live) are looted and burnt ad thousands of Plantation Tamils made 
refugees. 
Many Tamils killed are over 40,000 became refugees.  On 14th August 
President Jayawardena admits that the violence in the Ratnapura area has 
been an organised one.  
23 July 1983 Anti Tamil riots and massacres take place in Colombo and other Sinhalese 
areas. The world witnesses the worst violence against Tamils in Sri Lanka 
History, which has been planned and executed by elements with the 
government.  Enormous damage caused to Tamil owned property.  The cost 
of re-construction is estimated at Rs 133 million.  But this is quite apart from 
the cost of human lives and the untold suffering caused in purely human 
terms for many people who are innocent men, women and children. Tamils in 
319 
 
the South flee to their homeland in the North. Over 3,000 Tamils are killed, 
Many burnt alive, and Over 150,000 became refugees.  Hundreds of Tamils 
flee to neighbouring India and the West.  
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     Appendix 4 
   
List of conference papers submitted 
 
                                                 
 
“Perpetrators or Victims of violence” – The Role of Private Security companies. Paper presented 
for the Department of Political Science conference at the University of Bristol (November 2008) 
 
“Women’s violence in Global Politics” :  Paper presented for the ESRC Feminist International 
Relations Seminar series - Manchester University (August 2008) 
 
“Understanding women’s collective violence”, the paper explored the common representation of 
crime and criminals and was presented at the University of  Warwick 2 day conference, (May 
2008) 
 
“Mothering the other”, Explored how women have challenged political violence and militarism 
using their gendered identities. Paper presented at the Civil Liberties and Anarchy Conference 
Loughborough University (2007) 
 
“Aid for peace” – the paper explored the dangers associated with using development aid for 
fulfilling political agendas of donor countries: Sovereignty and its discontent organised by the 
University of Oxford dept of Politics  (2007) 
 
“UNR 1325 a conflict transformation tool for small states” – the paper explored the contribution 
that the resolution can make to bring peace to conflict states. Small States conference, University 
of Birmingham (April 2006)  
 
Truth telling for Justice – the paper explored the importance of truth finding missions to negotiate 
permanent peace and what happens when such commissions are established for gaining 
political edge.  Conference organised by the University of St John’s York (October 2006) 
   
Human security and development ; A joint paper presented at the Globalisation conference 
organised by the University of Newcastle (August 2005) 
 
“Doing Participatory Action Research with Women Refugees/Asylum Seekers”, Force Migration 
Student Conference (2005) 
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Cultural Violence in the context of Conflict, British Society of Criminology, (12-14 July, 2005) 
Leeds (Funded by Staffordshire university) 
 
Nationalism, Gender and Identity Politics, Sixth Inter University Graduate Conference, Cambridge, 
May 2005 
 
Conducting Participatory Action Research with refugees and asylum Seekers:  Postgraduate 
conference, York, March 2005 
 
Gendering the War,  Postgraduate Conference at University of Salford, September 2004, 
 
 
 
